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f'cVL-

Strategic location is a concept which deserves systematic examina
tion. The history of Portugal and her Atlantic island possessions
offers an opportunity for such analysis. Strategic location i s de
fined as the quality of being situated on the earth's surface in such
a way that location, alone or in combination with other factors, is
of significance in international relations.
Portugal's early history was largely shaped by her location. Her
position on the western coast of the Iberian peninsula aided the Portu
guese to escape incorporation into the Spanish state and encouraged
them to embark on a program of oceanic exploration that profoundly in
fluenced the history not only of Portugal but of the entire world.
Early in their ventures into the Atlantic Ocean the Portuguese dis
covered the Madeira and the Azores island groups--the latter them
selves of immense strategic importance, since they l i e near the center
of the North Atlantic.
The strategic significance of continental Portugal and of the Azores
has resulted in Portuguese involvement in most of the great European
crises since the Hundred Years War. I t has also led to the longestlasting alliance in European history--the t i e between Portugal and
Britain. On many occasions British aid was crucial for the preserva
tion of Portuguese independence. In return, Britain obtained great
advantages—a useful entryway into the Iberian peninsula and a valuable
naval base at Lisbon, as well as the assurance that the Azores would be
in friendly hands. During the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth
centuries, the British intervened to protect Portugal against i t s foes.
Portugal, in turn, was able to exploit her strategic location, and
keep the powerful ally needed to preserve her independence.
Portugal's strategic location has played a major role in the twen
tieth century. The country was involved in the First World War on the
Allied side. Under the leadership of Antonio Salazar, who became dic
tator in 1932, Portugal rendered valuable aid to the Nationalist side
in the Spanish Civil War. During the Second World War, Salazar's
Portugal remained neutral throughout, but granted the Allies base
rights to the Azores in 1943 under the terms of the Anglo-Portuguese
Alliance. That importance was underlined most recently during the
1973 Arab-Israeli War, when the Azores base was indispensable to the
American arms a i r l i f t to Israel. The Portuguese Revolution of 1974
aroused concern i n other NATO capitals, proof that Portugal's location
remains an important factor in world affairs.
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PREFACE
There are nations which have been small in size and
lacking in resources, but nevertheless have managed to play
an important role in history.

Despite her lack of many of

the attributes of power, Portugal's contribution to the de
velopment of the states bordering on the Atlantic Ocean has
been significant.

Many diverse forces have been responsible

for this, but one fact dominates all others:

there can be

few better examples in history of the importance of strategic
location.
Portugal's position on the map, her situation on the
fringe of Europe and on the threshold of the Atlantic, made
it possible in centuries past for her to make a mark on the
world far out of proportion to her size.

When her greatness

was gone, her location kept the powers of Europe interested
in her fate, particularly the foremost Atlantic power of
Great Britain.

Today, as a quick examination of a good news

paper will attest, her location still makes Portugal a matter
of concern to American strategists and foreign policy
planners.

After years of obscurity, Portugal and her stra

tegic- location have been highlighted by the 1974 revolution
and its consequences which are still unfolding.

vi

Geographically, there are really two Portugals--continental Portugal on the Iberian peninsula, and insular Portu
gal, the archipelagoes that have been part o£ Portugal since
their discovery.

These are the Azores and Madeira.

The

islands contain only a fraction o£ the total Portuguese popu
lation and land area, but their strategic significance has
been far out of proportion to their size, matching if not ex
ceeding that of the mainland.

They play an imposing role in

this study.
In contrast, the other portions of Portugal's once-vast
empire do not figure in any important way.

Angola, Mozambique,

and Guinea-Bissau have at last gone the way of the other
European colonies in Africa, and Macao and Portuguese Timor-Portugal's Asian remnants--lie outside the geographical
limits which this study can comfortably include.

Above all,

the island groups ethnically and culturally are as Portuguese
as Lisbon and their ties to the motherland appear permanent.
For this reason it is reasonably safe to assume that their
destinies will be linked in the future as in the past.
Portugal's location has brought her both good and bad
fortune.

It has assured Portugal of powerful protectors--

yet it has also involved her in quarrels not truly her own.
On the whole, however, location has given her advantages
which have permitted her to keep some control over her own
fate .
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CHAPTER I
THE CONCEPT OF "STRATEGIC LOCATION"

The attempt to apply an abstract concept to a historical
situation cannot succeed unless clarity exists as to what the
concept means.

Seemingly simple abstractions have an annoy

ing habit o£ revealing ambiguities and complexities when they
are analyzed.

V/hat then is meant by "strategic location"?

It may be best to begin by making clear what it is not.
Strategic importance is not synonymous with the posses
sion of natural resources (although any source of natural
riches will tend to become important in strategic calcula
tions).

The natural endowment of Portugal is and always has

been unimpressive but the country is significant nonetheless.
The Portuguese case suggests a brief definition of strategic
importance--the quality of being situated on the earth's
surface in such a way that location, alone or in combination
with other factors, is of significance in international rela
tionships •
A strategic location is obviously geographical but other
wise may be one of many kinds of physical feature.

Barriers

and passageways come first to mind when the word "strategy"
is mentioned.

Such features as mountain ranges and deserts.

1

2
which serve to separate, or straits and navigable rivers,
which assist communication, and thus tend to unite, are
examples o£ barriers and passageways respectively.

It is

general geographical location, however, that often provides
a state with its major influence over other states.

As two

recent scholars of international relations have asserted:
The role a state can play in the world is
strongly affected by its position on the
map. Thanks to geographical location,
certain states which are small in area
have made a greater mark in history than
larger nations endowed with far greater
resources,1
The word "communication" itself provides a clue to the
meaning of the phrase, for in one way or another, almost any
imaginable kind of strategic location is involved with the
movement of people, goods, or information across the earth-now perhaps also beyond it.

Control of a strategic location

gives the power to hasten or hinder communication and even to
prevent it altogether.

Since men live on the land and only

travel on the ocean, maritime strategy is concerned first and
foremost with the control of communication.
It is only natural, then, that the first thinker to give
systematic consideration to the importance of strategic loca
tion was the dean of naval strategists, Alfred T. Mahan.

In

his famous list of the "six principal conditions affecting

^Pierre Renouvin and Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, Introduction to the History of International Relations (New York:
Praeger, 1967), p. 11.

3
the sea power o£ nations," "geographical location" comes
first.

Says Mahan:
It may be pointed out, in the first place,
that if a nation be so situated that it is
neither forced to defend itself by land nor
induced to seek extension of its territory
by way of land, it has, by the very unity
of its aim directed upon the sea, an advan
tage as compared with a people one of whose
boundaries is continental.^

By Mahan's standards, Portugal has always had the disadvan
tage of a long land border, but in all otJier ways it is a
maritime nation; its interests and efforts at expansion have
always been directed seaward.
location were other than it is.

This would not be so if its
Portugal's possession of

island groups in the Atlantic has allowed her to claim some
of the advantages accruing to island nations.

In the words

of Renouvin and Duroselle;
Islands in the middle of an ocean are par
ticularly valuable as bases --economically
as ports of call on sea and air routes,
strategically important as potential naval
and air bases.^
The value of the Azores and Madeira is enhanced by the fact
that oceanic islands are rare in the Atlantic.

There are

not a great many other islands in the area from which com
parable economic and military advantages can be obtained.
Also, since continental Portugal's seacoast faces the open

2

Alfred T. Mahan, The Influence of Seapower Upon His
tory (New York: Hill and Wang, 1957), p. 25.

3

Renouvin and Duroselle, p. 15.

4
Atlantic, it has much freer access to the outside world than
it would i£ it faced an inland sea, which would make it much
easier to blockade.^
Other writers on naval strategy have followed Mahan's
lead.

Thus the most recent major work on maritime history

opens with this statement:
Geography is the major determining factor in
any nation's ability to utilize the sea com
mercially and to defend its political and
economic integrity from overseas attack.
Thus each nation tends to orient its politi
cal, economic and military life around the
advantages of its geographical position
vis-a-vis other nations.^
Earlier in this century one school of strategists went
so far as to elevate geographical position to the key role
in world history.

These were the so-called "Geopoliticians."

Although the founder of Geopolitics was an Englishman, Sir
Halford Mackinder, the concept drew its largest following in
Germany, particularly the circle associated with Karl Haushofer.

There Geopolitics was used as a justification for

aggressive expansionist policies, and was otherwise so un
sound theoretically that the word fell into disfavor after

'^Edward Wegener, "Theory of Naval Strategy in the Nu
clear Age," U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings 698 (May 1972)
194.
•^Clark G. Reynolds, Command of the Sea: The History and
Strategy of Maritime Empires (New York: Wm. Morrow and Co.,
1974), p. 1.
^For a good summary of Haushofer's ideas, see Derwent
Whittlesey, "Haushofer, the Politician," in Makers of Modern
Strategy, ed. Edward Mead Earle (Princeton: Princeton Uni
versity Press, 1944), pp. 388-411.

5
World War II.

The Haushofer school emphasized the need for

geographical expansion by any state seeking world power, and
argued that Germany must conquer the Eurasian "Heartland,"
i.e., the Soviet Union.

Haushofer's doctrines were in addi

tion tainted by the racialism of Nazi ideology.

Also, the

development of nuclear weapons and air transport persuaded
some analysts that geography had become irrelevant to stra
tegic problems.
has ever been.

This notion is no more correct now than it
Not all discussions of the interrelationships

of history and geography have been carried to Haushofer's
extremes.

Strategic location is only one of the aspects of

this general theme, which is fascinating and deserves more
attention than it has generally received.

7

Two more aspects of strategic location deserve mention.
Strategic location may be either a temporary or a permanent
condition.

"Temporary," or short-term, strategic location

is perhaps best exemplified in certain cases by military his
tory.

In war, the control of some insignificant crossroads,

or some normally unnoticeable terrain feature during a brief
battle may determine the fate of nations.

This study is con

cerned with the permanent type of strategic location or that

7Some useful studies available in English are: Harold
and Margaret Sprout, Foundations of National Power (Prince
ton: 0. Van Nostrand, 1944); Nicholas J. Spyckman, America's
Strategy in World Politics (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1944);
Derwent Whittlesey, The Earth and the State (New York: Holt,
1944). It may be significant that all these were published
during World War II.

6
extending over a long period o£ time and influencing a
series of historical events.

The strategic importance of

Portugal is of this category for it has existed now for
half a millennium.
Also, strategic location is usually examined as a
factor in national power, and regarded as an advantage for
the state that controls it.
of Mahan quoted above.)

(This is evident in the words

But unless the people who happen

to inhabit some spot of strategic importance also possess
such other assets as numbers, natural resources, industry,
and commerce and skillful leadership, they may find their
situation a misfortune.

It can cost them their indepen

dence, or their very existence.

Except for the "Babylonian

Captivity" under the Spanish Crown, a period (1580-1640)
which approximates one lifetime, the Portuguese have es
caped this fate.

To discover how and why they managed to

accomplish this, it is necessary to examine Portugal's
origins and expansion.

Portugal - Origins and Expansion

Portugal is the oldest nation-state in Europe, having
existed within its present boundaries (with only minor borO
der alterations) since the year 1250.
It is not obvious
why this should be so, since these boundaries do not follow
g

Don Stanislawski, The Individuality of Portugal (Austin;
University of Texas Press, 1959), p. 177.

7
formidable natural barriers.

The Iberian peninsula is cov

ered with mountain ranges and its rivers are generally
unnavigable but both mountains and rivers are oriented
east-west, at right angles to Portugal's long border with
Spain.
Yet the region of western Iberia, in which Portugal
lies, has always been somewhat apart from the rest of the
Peninsula.

The reasons for this are a matter of contro

versy but the fact itself is indisputable.

Before history

began, the Neolithic and Bronze Age cultures in the area
g
differed from those dominant in most of Iberia.
During the
Roman Conquest, tlie province' of Lusitania corresponded sur
prisingly to modern Portugal.

After the Empire collapsed,,

Lusitania became part of the Suevic Kingdom that rules
northwestern Iberia rather than falling under control of
the Visigoths as did most of the Peninsula.

This kingdom

regained a separate existence for more than a century before
being absorbed into Visigothic Spain in 585 A.D. It was
never forgotten, and was used as a basis for territorial
claims by later Portuguese kings.
Nearly all the Iberian peninsula was overrun by the
Muslims early in the eighth century.

Lusitania was not

spared, being conquered as early as 713 A.D. (only two years

®Ibid., p. 69.
^^A. H. de Oliveira Marques, A History of Portugal. 2
vols. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972), 1:21-25.

8
after the Muslim invasion began).

The only part o£ the

Peninsula not conquered lay in the far north.

Here some

Christian principalities managed to cling to their indepen11
dence or win it back after a brief period of Muslim rule.
The modern Portugal began as a county of one of these
little kingdoms, when Alfonso III of Asturias (a state also
called Leon) appointed a nobleman named Vomarano Peres to
rule a frontier district around Portucale (modern Oporto)
in the ninth century.

By the year 938 this county had

grown to a dukedom, already commonly called "Portugal."
This dukedom, in 1096, came into the hands of a family of
Burgundian descent.

In 1143, the second duke of the line,

Afonso Henriques, rebelled against his Leonese overlord and
claimed the title of king.

12

Not until 1179, however, was

the title given recognition by the Papacy.
The new kingdom

13

occupied only the northern third of

present-day Portugal, for the rest was still in the hands
of the Muslims, ivrho were split up into quarrelling little
states called "taifas."

Until 1250, the central theme of

Portuguese history was the gradual conquest of the taifas.
This was, in turn, part of the general "Reconquista" of
Iberia from the Muslims.

In 1147 Afonso Henriques captured

^^Ibid., 1:25.
^^Ibid., 1:41.
13
Stanley G. Payne, A History of Spain and Portugal.
2 vols. (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1972),
1:117.

9
Lisbon with the assistance of a fleet of Crusaders (mostly
English) who were on their way to Palestine,

The Portuguese

Reconquista was completed in 1250 by the capture of the
Algarve (the southern-most province of modern Portugal).

A

treaty in 1267 between Portugal and Castile confirmed Portu
guese possession of the Algarve and fixed Portugal's boun
daries substantially as they are today.
The little kingdom faced an uncertain future.

Origi

nally one of many Christian states, she saw her compatriots
absorbed by the most powerful of the Iberian kingdoms,
Castile and Aragon.

A similar fate for Portugal seemed not

unlikely, particularly since the country was confined to a
narrow strip of coast and mountain, shut out from the great
control tableland of Iberia by the power of Castile.

Late

in the fourteenth century Portugal found herself fighting
for her existence against her mighty Castilian neighbor.
Her independence was saved by a spectacular victory at
Aljubarrota in October, 1385.^^
Small, remote, and hemmed in on her landward side,
Portugal yet possessed an invaluable asset--her position
on the Atlantic.

Maritime activity had begun even before

Portugal became independent.

Crusaders from overseas aided

the Reconquest, as has been recounted earlier.

^'^Oliveira Marques, 1:13-73.
^ ^Ib id.

The connec-

10
tion with Britain, crucial in many periods o£ Portuguese
history, can be traced to the capture o£ Lisbon in 1250,
Aljubarrota was won with the assistance o£ English longbowmen and military advisors.^^
Portugal did not begin as a great seafaring nation,
for the development of her maritime power was a slow and
episodic process.

The bulk of her population have always

been peasant farmers, not seamen.

Other regions in western

Europe produced more ships and sailors, but according to
one noted authority, "what compensated to some extent for
the small size of the Portuguese fleet and the weakness of
the economy was the Kingdom's strategic position at the
outlet from the west Mediterranean to the Atlantic, central
17
axis of the sea lanes from Italy to Flanders."

The coun-

18
try was situated at the "street corner of Europe."
If Portugal enjoyed a central location from the vantage
point of the Atlantic, from the Iberian point of view she
was isolated.

This situation also had advantages.

If some

times threatened by her powerful Castilian neighbor (and by
its successor, united Spain) more often she was ignored.
Lying off the main pathway, she was left to manage her own
affairs to suit herself.

This "offside position" has been

^^Ibid., 1:127.
17

Payne, 1:125. (Emphasis mine.)

18
J. H. Parry, The Discovery of the Sea (New York: Dial
Press, 1974), p. 87.

11
compared to that o£ Holland, another sea-oriented nation,
in relation to Germany.

19

To make the most o£ an advantage such as Portugal
possessed, it is not enough simply to enjoy it passively.
Instead, a natural asset should, become the basis of an
active policy.

This requires both foresight and energy.

These qualities the Portuguese applied to a systematic
program of maritime exploration.

The fourteenth century

had not ended when Portugal began her great adventure, the
expansion into the Atlantic that would one day open up the
oceans, and carry Portugal's flag to the shores of Japan.
Like many great events, Portuguese expansion had tiny
beginnings.

Modest fishing ventures, conducted from tiny

ports now deserted and clogged with silt, marked the birth
of Portuguese maritime enterprise.

Trade relations with

other European nations also began very early.

Portuguese

merchants appeared in Flanders early in the tivrelfth century.
Close trade relations with England were established in
equally early times.
The future of Portuguese seafaring lay to the west and
south rather than to the north, however.

In these directions

lay the great mysteries and the great hopes of gain.

Legends

^^Stanislawski, p. 213.
20

Bailey W. Diffie, Prelude to Empire: Portugal Over
seas Before Henry the Navigator (Lincoln: University of
Nebraska Press, 1960), pp. 13-25.

12
o£ mysterious paradisiacal islands in the Atlantic Ocean
had existed for centuries.

Voyages down the African Coast

might tap the rich gold mines whose product reached Europe
by desert caravans.

Hordes of pagans were known to live

there, whose souls might be won for Christ.

Expansion into

these areas was made possible by a crucial technological
breakthrough:

the development of the caravel.

This was the

first true ocean-going vessel, the first ship sturdy and
versatile enough to sail anywhere.

21

The early history of the caravel is obscure, as is the
history of most technological advances before very recent
times.

But the evidence is conclusive that the caravel

originated in western Iberia, quite likely in Portugal
itself.

The reasons for this have a great deal to do, once

again, with Portugal's location.

The caravel was essentially

a crossbreed between two shipbuilding traditions, that of
northern Europe and that of the Mediterranean.

It combined

the sternpost rudder, a northern development, with caravel
hull construction and lateen sails which sprang from Mediterranean (and Arab) origins.

22

Portugal lay at a crossroads where ships built on the
Atlantic coast met other ships from the Mediterranean.

The

Portuguese traded both with northern and Mediterranean

21

C. R. Boxer, The Portuguese Seaborne Empire 1415-1825
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1969), p. 27.
22

J. H. Parry, The Age of Reconnaissance (New York:
Praeger, 1963), p. 6W.

13
countries, particularly the maritime cities o£ Italy whose
shipbuilding techniques were very advanced.

From the Medi

terranean also came the Mariner's Compass, which made
direction-finding possible in the open ocean in all weather,
and other advances in navigation.

23

Portuguese shipbuilders

were thus able to combine two disparate styles of seafaring
and produce something revolutionary.

Early in the fifteenth

century the Portuguese began to use their new ships to sail
to new places.
For centuries myths and traditions of islands scattered
throughout the Atlantic, "St. Brendan's Isle," "the Island of
Brazil," and the "Fortunate Islands," had circulated in
western Europe.

Which of these were pure legend, which were

based on actual discoveries in ancient or early medieval
times, no one can any longer determine.
a stimulus for Portuguese exploration.

But they provided
This led, in fact,

to the first Portuguese voyage to the Canary Islands either
in 1336 or 1341.

Then early in the fifteenth century Portu

guese voyages discovered the strategically important Atlantic
islands of the Azores and Madeira.

24

The Atlantic Islands

Some description of these two island groups is necessary.

^^Diffie, p. 53.
^'^Ibid. , pp. 56-59.

14
They are located far apart and differ in many ways but
possess some underlying similarities.

Both the Azores

and the Madeiras are oceanic islands of volcanic origin,
lying far from land and utterly uninhabited at the time of
discovery.

Both possessed considerable natural resources,

were attractive to colonists, and soon came to play impor
tant roles in the Portuguese economy.
The Madeira group consists of five islands located
575 miles southeast of Lisbon and about 300 miles due west
of the African coast.

25

There are five islands in the

group, only two of which--Madeira proper and Porto Santo-are inhabited.

Madeira itself, 286 square miles in extent,

is by far the largest.
decent harbors.

Mountainous and rugged, it lacks

But it is fertile.

Its name derives from

the Portuguese word for wood, because the island was heavily
forested when discovered.

Today it supports a population of

266,000 persons.
Madeira was discovered in 1419 by two sea captains
named Zargo and Teixeira, acting under the orders of Prince
Henry "the Navigator," the famous sponsor of Portuguese
exploration.

"The latter," in the words of one recent author,

"perceiving the strategic location of the islands, immediately
•2 5

Great Britain, Naval Staff, Naval Intelligence Division. Geographical Handbook Series, Spain and Portugal, 4 vols.
(London: H.M.S.O., 1945), 4: 4 [TieTeaFter cited Spain and Portugal)
26
T. Bentley Duncan, Atlantic Islands: Madeira. Azores
and the Cape Verdes in Seventeenth Century Commerce and
Navigation (Chicago; University of Chicago Press, 1972), p. 25.

ordered them colonized."

27

First exploited for its lumber, Madeira later became
a major source of sugar.

Its cane fields \\?ere the first

supply available outside the eastern Mediterranean.

Many

of the techniques for raising sugar cane, developed there,
were later applied in the sugar-growing areas of the New
World.

Eventually the Madeiran sugar industry was killed

by Brazilian competition and disappeared in the seventeenth
century.

Wine replaced sugar as Madeira's chief product.

The superb wines named after the island, which travel un
usually well, were exported widely (especially to Britain
and America) and became a major item in Portuguese foreign
trade.
More importantly, this first of all European overseas
colonies was useful as a base and a port of call for the
Portuguese expeditions that gradually felt their way down
the African coast.

29
_

After the Portuguese reached India

in 1498', Madeira lay on the route homeward from the east-and on the main route from Europe to Latin America.
Portuguese vessels coming back from the Indian Ocean were
actually required by law to call at Funchal, Madeira's port
and capital.
•2 7
James H. Guill, A History of the Azores Islands (Menlo
Park, Calif.: By the author, 1972)., p. xxvi.
28

Duncan, pp. 26-35,

^^Duncan, p. 25.
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Guill, p. xxx.

^^Oliveira Marques, 1:28.
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Whatever the importance of Madeira in Portuguese eco
nomic and imperial history, it is overshadowed in strategic
importance by the Azores.

There are nine islands in the

Azores group, "the sole islands which exist near the center
of the North Atlantic."
miles west of Portugal.
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They lie about eight hundred

The Azores, named after the hawks

(ag^ores) that abounded there, are ranged in a ragged line
stretching roughly northeast-southwest, the westernmost
islands, Flores and Corvo, 125 miles from the west.
total area is 888 square miles.

Their

All are rugged volcanic

peaks of the submerged Mid-Atlantic Ridge, and one island,
Pico, rises 7,600 feet above the sea.
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The colonization of the Azores began later than in
Madeira--logically, in view of their remoteness--under the
sponsorship of Flenry the Navigator.

He sent Gongalo Velho

de Cabral, a gentleman of his household, to lead the first
colonizing expedition to the Azores in 1439.

He "realized

the Azores would be ideal as advanced supply bases.

Using

Madeira as a forward base on the outward voyage and the
Azores on the return, he could send his caravels much far
ther down the African coast than before.
The colonists in the Azores were soon able to export
commercial quantities of a variety of products.

^^Guill, p. 18.
^^Spain and Portugal, 4:4.
^^Guill, p. 58.

Lumber,
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as in Madeira, was early exploited, and so were the fish
caught in surrounding seas.

Different islands came to

specialize in different commodities.

Sao Miguel grew wood

plants (from which dye was made), oranges, and wheat.
From the steep slopes of Pico came the best wine produced
in the Azores.

Terceira, the most populous island, raised

large wheat crops for export.

After trans-Atlantic com

merce began, the islands developed a thriving provision
trade, selling food to passing ships.
Many ships passed the Azoreans' way for a reason which
was a key to their strategic as well as their economic im
portance.

Because of the patterns of winds and currents in

the North Atlantic the Azores lie on the quickest and easiest
route eastwards for a sailing ship bound from America
Europe.

to

Moreover, the Atlantic westerlies blow directly

across them.

Columbus, on his very first voyage, stopped

at the Azores on his way back to Spain.

37

Over the cen

turies many sailing vessels followed in his wake.

Inevi

tably the Azores were of interest to naval planners as well
as merchant seamen hoping to pick up fresh provisions.

Con

trol of the Azores contributed to the control of the Atlantic
Sea lanes as a whole, since their strategic location was such

35

Duncan, p. 86.

^^Ibid., p. 131.
^^Ibid., pp. 23-24.
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that they could be used to protect (or to cut) the routes
to Europe from overseas.

The thick concentration o£ ship

ping around the islands created a tempting target for the
priva;teers who were a part of naval warfare in the age of
sail--as in the Anglo-Spanish sea battles during the age
of Queen Elizabeth.

The strategic importance of the Azores

developed even further as European powers built empires in
the New World.

Before the fifteenth century ended, the

Azores were the crossroads of the nascent Portuguese empire.
"More than any other geographical unit," the Azores "aided
in solving many of the riddles of the Atlantic ocean."
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Portuguese expansion rapidly carried their dominion to
regions never penetrated by European man.

In search first

of gold, then of slaves (the Portuguese began the Atlantic
slave trade, which had such momentous consequences for
American history), then of a way to India, the seaworthy
little caravels had made their way down to the Cape of Good
Hope in 1488.

The rounding of the Cape by Bartolomeu Dias

opened the greatest age in Portuguese history.
Vasco Da Gama sailed all the way to India.

In a decade

He was followed

by the seagoing conquistadores, Almeida and Albuquerque,
who employed the technological advantages of their cannonarmed vessels and a native talent for naval strategy to
create the world's first oceanic empire.

^^Guill, p. 18.

They seized control
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of the seaborne commerce of the Indian Ocean, operating
from a network of islands and coastal bases that reached
from Mozambique to the Moluccas, and whose linchpin was
the Indian port of Goa.

The first major western penetra

tion of Asia, the Portuguese ventures began a new age in
world history.

39

All in all, it was quite an achievement

for a small people on the western rim of Europe.

It is un

likely that the expansion could have taken place if the
Portuguese had not arisen in a location well suited to
encourage maritime adventurousness and to take advantage
of the advances in maritime technology that were made in
late medieval Europe.
Creating such an imposing structure, the Portuguese
were to discover in the sixteenth century, was far less
different than the endless task of maintaining it.

The

empire they built was so magnificent that their small popu
lation and scanty resources were stretched to the limit
just to keep it in being.

Against these difficulties, to

v\?hich ambitious rivals were soon added, the advantages con
ferred by strategic location temporarily were to prove in
sufficient.
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For more discussion of this fascinating story, see
J. H.- Parry and C. R. Boxer. The Portuguese technological
advantages are well explained in Carlo Cipolla, Guns, Sails,
and Empires (New York: Pantheon, 1966).

CHAPTER II

BRITAIN AND PORTUGAL:

THE ANCIENT ALLIANCE

Portugal's closest ties have historically been main
tained with Britain, another maritime Atlantic power.

Like

any long-standing diplomatic relationship, the AngloPortuguese tie was complex.

It included important economic

elements and some degree o£ political influence, despite
the enormous differences in political culture between the
two nations.
strategic.

The basis of the relationship, however, was
It was of vital importance to Britain, once she

became mistress of the Atlantic, that Portugal and the Portu
guese islands be in friendly hands.
The Anglo-Portuguese Alliance actually predates Brit
ain's emergence as a seapower.

Romantically inclined his

torians are fond of tracing it back to the year 1147, when
a band of crusaders led by Anglo-Norman barons provided aid
to the Portuguese King Afonso Henriques in his attack upon
Lisbon.

The crusaders' contribution proved decisive to the

seizure of the future Portuguese capital.

But neither this

"^H. A. R. Gibb, "English Crusaders in Portugal," in
Chapters in Anglo-Portuguese Relations, edited by Edgar
Prestage (London: Voss and Michael, 1935, reprint ed.,
Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1971), p. 13.

20

21
episode nor several later instances of participation by
English crusaders in the reconquest of Portugal was the
result of any alliance or other kind of official arrange
ment between the English and Portuguese kingdoms.

The

crusaders involved were private adventurers and the pacts
they made with the Portuguese did not concern or commit
the English government.
The first official link between England and Portugal
was not formed until more than two centuries after the fall
of Lisbon.

It was part of a sizable English intervention

in the Iberian peninsula, which was in turn a by-product of
the long Anglo-French struggle known as the Hundred Years
War.

This was more than a rivalry of two royal houses.

The

Hundred Years War was the first of the great duels between
England and France that were to convulse the European scene
until Waterloo.

Like those later struggles, the Hundred

Years War developed ramifications all over Western Europe
and spilled over into the Iberian peninsula.
In order to enhance their respective positions, both
England and France sought allies among the Iberian kingdoms.
Tlic great prize was the friendship oC Castile, tlic most
powerful of the peninsular states.

Castile's sizable navy,

operating out of Biscayan and Galician ports, was in a posi
tion to, threaten communications between England and her foot
holds in France, and even to raid the English coast itself.
In 1338, for instance, a joint Franco-Castilian fleet ravaged
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2

ports along the English Channel,,

In this conflict England

and France found themselves backing rival candidates for
Castile's unsteady throne.

The first alliance between Eng

land and Portugal was an offshoot of what originally was an
effort in 1367 to replace a pro-French usurper on the Castilian
throne.

Military success (the great English victory at Majera

3
3 April 1367) proved barren, however, when relations between
the English Commander, Edward the Black Prince, and King Pedro
the Cruel of Castile, broke down.

The English left the penin

sula, Pedro was overthrown and murdered,^ and the pro-French
Enrique of Trastamara resumed the Castilian throne.
Portugal became embroiled only after its rash King Fer
nando fought and lost a war with the restored Enrique of
Trastamara.^

The possibility of an Anglo-Portuguese alliance

first appeared when the Black Prince's younger brother, John
of Gaunt, the Duke of Lancaster, who had advanced a claim to
the Castilian throne (based partly on his marriage to King
Pedro's daughter)^ saw Portuguese assistance as the key to
realizing his ambitions.

7

Fernando resented the disadvanta-

2
Maurice Collis, The Hurling Time (London: Faber and
Faber, 1958), p. 106.
3
P. E. Russell, The English Intervention in Spain and
Portugal in the Time of Edward III and Richard II (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1955), p. 105.
Ibid. , P- 148.
Ibid., P- 152.
Ibid., P- 174.
7

C. H. Williams, "The Expedition of John of Gaunt to
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geous peace terms that he had been forced to accept.

On

the tenth of July, 1372, Fernando signed a treaty of alli
ance with John of Gaunt (signed by John as "King of Cas
tile").

The Portuguese were to attack Castile from the

west as soon as John invaded from Navana.

g

Unfortunately for Fernando, the English suffered a
devastating naval defeat off La Rochelle before they could
launch this invasion, leaving Fernando to face Castile
alone.

Portugal was invaded, leaving Fernando to send des

perate appeals to London.

The English offered to send help

(in return for a formal treaty of alliance between Fernando
and Edward III) but their aid of only 600 men came too late.
Fernando was forced to make peace with Castile and France
g
and became their ally instead.
Thus it appeared that Portugal had been forced into the
Franco-Castilian camp.

Yet the first formal alliance between

England and Portugal, the "Treaty of Saint Paul's," was signed
only three months later!

The treaty was referred to even in

the twentieth century as the "oldest alliance in the world"
by the government of Portugal 15 March 1912, in the person
of Dr. Augusto de Vasconcelos, Prime Minister and Foreign
Minister of Portugal.
the Peninsula," in Chapters of Anglo-Portuguese Relations,
edited by Edgar Prestage, p. 34.
^Russell, p. 193.
9lbid., p. 198.
lOPortugal,

Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Plain Speaking:
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Fernando was playing a double game.

While pretending

to change sides, the Portuguese King let his envoys in Lon
don negotiate as if nothing had happened.

The immediate

result of Fernando's machination was a bizarre situation in
which Portuguese warships took part in attacks on the English
coast although a treaty of alliance existed between the two
countries.

Still the English kept on good terms with the

Portuguese; in September, 1373, the English government di
rected that Portuguese were to be treated as f r i e n d s . A
thriving trade between the two countries was not interrupted.
After Enrique of Trastamara's death in 1379, Fernando
lost no time in moving over to the English side.

On 15 July

1380, the Treaty of Saint Paul's was formally renewed.

King

Fernando promised to assist a force of 2,000 Englishmen under
Edmund, Earl of Cambridge, a younger son of Edward III, who
were to land in Portugal and march on Castile.

He also prom

ised to marry his daughter to the infant English Prince Edward of Cambridge.

12

In July, 1381, the first English army ever to land in
Portugal arrived at Lisbon.

Edmund of Cambridge was a mis

erable commander and the expedition accomplished nothing.

Reasons for the Intervention of Portugal in the European
War -(London: Eyre and Spotiswoode, English translation,
1917), p. 6.
^^Russell, p. 201.
^^Ibid., p. 299.
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dawdling about Lisbon for months, plundering the Portuguese
13
peasantry.

The Castilians, the original objective of the

expedition, were never seriously attacked.

But this fiasco

illustrated for the first time one of the two ways Portugal
was to figure in English strategy for years to come.

In

wars on the Continent, and specifically in the Iberian penin
sula, Portugal was extremely useful to England as a "sally
port."

It provided convenient access (especially since

Lisbon was the finest harbor in the peninsula) for English
seaborne expeditions.

Lisbon lies in estuary of the Tagus

River, one of the few in Iberia that is navigable for any
distance.

Only Cadiz is at all comparable.

After Fernando's death in October, 1383, King Juan I
of Castile made an all-out effort to conquer Portugal.

The

attempt aroused an immediate outburst of patriotic antiCastilian fervor in Portugal, based on the mercantile in
terests in Lisbon, and signaled by the seizure of the throne
by the candidate they supported, Joao (John) I, first of the
House of Aviz.

The new king immediately sought English aid.

14

The response of the English government was unenthusiastic,
but the Portuguese were allowed to recruit English troops for
mercenary service.

Somewhere between 400 and 700 of the^e

troops were present at the battle of Aljubarrota in August,

^^Ibid. , p. 323.
^^Ibid. , p. 365.
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1385, where a spectacular Portuguese victory saved the na
tion's independence,^^
In the following years on 17 May 1386 , tlie famous Treaty
of Windsor established a lasting alliance between England and
Portugal.

The terms of the treaty included a clause guaran

teeing the House of Aviz against Castilian aggression, as well
as providing that nationals of either country could trade and
travel in the other country on the same basis as nationals of
that country.A Portuguese naval squadron was sent to assist
in the defense of the English coast.
A great many alliance treaties have been concluded after
the real need for them was past, and so it was in the case of
the Treaty of Windsor.

Portugal's independence was effec

tively confirmed at Aljubarrota, and was not seriously threat
ened again for almost two centuries.

The most important

immediate result of the treaty was not particularly beneficial
to Portuguese interests.

In 1387 the Portuguese found them

selves aiding another futile effort by John of Gaunt to make
good his claim to the Castilian throne.

In 1398 the Portu

guese were aided by an Englisli force in a successful defense
against another Castilian invasion.

17

^^Ibid., p. 386.
^^Ibid., p. 414. (Terms of the treaty are quoted in
full in Eduardo Brazao, The Anglo-Portuguese Alliance [Lon
don: Sylvan Press, 1957], pp. 31~34.)
17
Edgar Prestage, "The Anglo-Portuguese Alliance," in
Transactions of the Royal Historical Society. Fourth Series,
17 (London: Office of the Society, 1934), p. 75.
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Although the two kingdoms remained on friendly terms,
fostered a flourishing trade, and linked their royal families
and aristocracies by marriage, the political relations be
tween England and Portugal diminished briefly during the
fifteenth century.

Portugal's great age had begun.

Secure

at home, the Portuguese launched their drive into the Atlan
tic, exploring and colonizing.

For the next century and a

half, Portugal stood less in need of outside support than at
any other period of her history.
As Portugal turned outward, England turned inward.

Eng

lish interest in the Iberian peninsula waned after the death
of John the Gaunt and his Castilian ambitions.

After the

death of Henry V, the English in France were forced onto the
defensive.

Eventually their efforts to subdue France ended

in disaster, only their toehold at Calais remaining after
1453.

Then came the thirty years of civil strife remembered

as the "War of the Roses."

Henry VII, who ended this era in

1485 and founded the new Tudor dynasty, was preoccupied with
establishing his power at home and had no taste for renewed
adventures on the Continent.

His son, Henry VIII, was more

venturesome and intervened in wars on tlie Continent during
the early part of his reign, but Henry VIII's energies were
fully occupied at home after his divorce of Catherine of
Aragon and break with the Pope.

The internal difficulties

caused by England's religious transformation kept England
too weak and divided to play much part in international
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affairs throughout the reigns of Henry VIII's immediate
successors, Edward V and Mary.

(The eventual triumph of

Protestantism in England introduced a factor that compli
cated relations with Portugal as long as religious differ
ences mattered in international politics.

Portugal, unaf

fected by the Reformation, remained and remains today
staunchly Catholic.)
Stability at home was reestablished during the reign
of Elizabeth I.

Hitherto England had played only a minor

role in overseas exploration and trade but now English
energies were diverted to maritime enterprise on an unpre
cedented scale.

No new era of renewed Anglo-Portuguese

cooperation occurred, however, largely on account of develop
ments within Portugal itself.

Portugal reached its zenith

in the early sixteenth century and thereafter went into a
rapid decline.

It was plagued by the same economic back

wardness and religious bigotry that afflicted its Spanish
neighbors.

The quality of its leadership deteriorated.

The

Portuguese lost their lead in maritime technology to the
Dutch and English and actually seem to have retrogressed in
shipbuilding and navigation.

18

The basic cause of Portu

guese decline was simple overextension.

The small kingdom

had neither the manpower nor the resources to maintain a

18
James Duffy, Shipwreck and Empire (Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press, 1955), p. 166. See also, Tragic
History of the Sea, edited by C. R. Boxer (Cambridge: Publi
cation of the Hakluyt Society, 2nd series, CXII, 1959).
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worldwide maritime empire.

The revenues generated by Portu

gal's monopoly o£ seaborne trade in the Indian Ocean were
eaten up by the costs o£ enforcing the monopoly.

Yet the

garrisons the Portuguese could afford to maintain in their
bases were tiny, and the naval forces inadequate to hunt
down the interlopers and pirates from other European coun
tries who trespassed on the Portuguese domain with increas
ing impunity.
Portugal was once again in need of foreign support, and
England was one possible candidate for the role, although the
success of the English Reformation had opened an ideological
rift bet\\reen the two countries.
all, was still legally in force.

The Treaty of Windsor, after
But before any such develop

ment could come about the course of Portuguese history was
drastically changed.
In 1568 Sebastian I, who had inherited the Portuguese
throne in 1557, came of age and acceded to power.

19

The new

king was a romantic incompetent whose one aim was to crusade
against the infidel.

In 1578 he fulfilled his ambition by

leading an invasion of Morocco.

On 4 August 1578, Sebastian

(whose meager talents did not include generalsliip) led his
army against a vastly larger Moorish force at Alcazar-Kebir.
The Portuguese force was wiped out and Sebastian himself

1q

E. W. Bovill, The Battle of Alcazar (London: The
Batchworth Press, 1955), p. 6.
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kilied.^^
Alcazar-Kebir was a national calamity, not a mere
military defeat.

Sebastian had neglected to supply his

kingdom with an heir before marching off on crusade.

His

immediate successor was his uncle, the Cardinal Henry.
Being elderly and a Prince of the Church, Henry was obviously
unable to carry on the line of Aviz.
1580.

21

Henry died in January,

The strongest legal claim to the vacant throne be

longed to another of Sebastian's uncles, none other than
Philip II of Spain.

Philip not only had the law on his side,

but more importantly under the circumstances, Europe's best
army.

After careful preparations Philip sent the Spanish

forces, commanded by the fearsome Duke of Alva, into Portu
gal, where they swiftly crushed all resistance.

On 16 April

1580, Philip II formally assumed the Portuguese throne.

22

Thus began the sixty-year period under the Spanish monarchy
which the Portuguese call the "Babylonian Captivity."
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It should be noted that Philip's seizure of the Portu-

20

Ibid., p. 129. (Although Sebastian's body was later
recovered from the Moors, a story soon spread that he had
survived the battle, and imposters claiming to be Sebastian
turned up in the following years. A cult of "Sebastianism"
in which the King figured as a "sleeping hero" on the order
of King Arthur or Barbarossa persisted in Portugal for cen
turies. See Boville, pp. 155-57.)
^^Ibid., p. 151.
^^Ibid. , p. 155.
^^Charles E. Nowell, A History of Portugal (New York:
Van Nostrand, 1952), p. 133"^
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guese throne was not quite a "Spanish conquest."

Portugal

remained a separate entity, one of the collection of king
doms and principalities over which Philip ruled.

On assuming

the throne Philip made pledges (whicli he observed scrupu
lously) to respect all Portuguese laws and to appoint only
Portuguese to positions of authority within the kingdom.
Philip was generally supported by the Portuguese nobility
and clergy.

24

The Portuguese could at least hope that they

had secured the powerful ally they needed--although they had
paid an exceedingly high price for his help.
Under the circumstances, however, Portugal and Portu
guese interests were inevitably subordinated to her great
neighbor.

Portugal was dragged into Spanish quarrels, no

longer pursuing any foreign policy of her own.

Philip II

was quite aware of the resources and strategic advantages
he would obtain by absorbing Portugal into his empire and
gaining them may have been his main objective from tlie beginning.

25

The international repercussions of Philip's seizure
were enormous, and nowhere better appreciated than in London.
The English could only stand by hcl])lessly and watcli as
Philip swallowed Portugal, much as they opposed and dreaded
any Luso-Spanish union.

^'^Boville, p. 154.
^^Ibid. , p. 153.
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The future would prove that
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Elizabeth had justifiable cause for concern.

Sebastian's

death occurred at exactly the wrong time, from the English
viewpoint.

Hostility between Spain and England had not

yet reached a crisis pitch, sufficient to spur the cautious
Elizabeth into making an effort to revive the Portuguese
alliance.

The growing hostility was far enough advanced,

however, to insure that a Portugal controlled by Spain
would create worrisome security problems for England.
In 1585 the great war between Spain and England that
had been impending for a decade finally broke out.

The

acquisition of Portugal by Philip was an important if not
indispensable prelude to his decision to risk open war with
the English.

"The acquisition of Portugal meant a great

increase in Spanish strength in the Atlantic," wrote the
foremost authority on the Spanish Armada.

27

The important role of Portugal in the story of the
Spanish Armada is frequently overlooked in accounts of that
ill-fated expedition.

It is a demonstration of the role of

"strategic location" since no other port on Iberia's Atlantic
coast could have been used by such a large fleet.

If the

port of Lisbon was a useful entryway into the Iberian penin
sula, it was no less useful as a point of departure for an
enemy bent on the invasion of England.

The fleet assembled

in the Tagus estuary and sailed from Lisbon harbor on 9 May
27

Garrett Mattingly, The Armada (Boston: Houghton Miff
lin, 1959), p. 75.
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1588.
The Portuguese not only provided the staging base for
the "Enterprise of England," but a considerable proportion
of its total strength.

Ten galleons (as many as were pro

vided by Gastile) were included, as were four Portuguese
galleys.

Portuguese ships thus made up more than 10 per

cent of the Armada's total, and a much higher proportion of
effective fighting units in a force that actually consisted
mostly of armed merchantmen.

29

There is no need to recount

the well-known tale of the Armada.

One need only note that

the Portuguese contributed their share of the heavy losses
suffered by the Armada; three of the ten Portuguese galleons
never got home.

30

This was the first taste of the many mis

fortunes that Spanish domination would bring.
The destruction of the Armada (as is often forgotten)
was only the beginning of a long war, whose end neither
Elizabeth nor Philip II lived to see.

The Portuguese found

themselves in the "front line" of this the first great naval
war to be waged between western European powers.
As subjects of Philip II, the Portuguese were fair
game for English privateers.

Their merchant fleet was
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preyed upon by Drake, Hawkins and tlieir host of imitators.

•^^Ibid. , p. 245.
2^Ibid. , p.- 247.
30ibid., p. 370.
^^Kenneth R. Andrews, Elizabethan Privateering (Cam
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1964} , p~i 206.
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The English government did not merely aim at plundering
Portuguese commerce as an incidental by-product o£ the
assault on the Spanish.

Portugal played a much more impor

tant role in its strategy.

This is shown by their ambitious

riposte to the Armada, the "Portugal Expedition" o£ 1589.
The English government was very conscious o£ the great
advantages it would enjoy i£ it could somehow detach Portu
gal from the Spanish empire and recreate the alliance of
1386.

At a stroke Spain's naval powers would be reduced.

Her sea communications with the Americas would be imperiled
by a hostile power in control of the Azores.

At home Spanish

resources would be diverted to defense of her own borders.
And it happened there was in England a person who claimed to
be able to do just that.
This man was Dom Antonio, the Prior of Crato, the only
serious rival to Philip II for the Portuguese throne.

Since

he was a bastard son of Sebastian's predecessor, his claim
was marred by illegitimacy.

But he v\fas preferred by many

Portuguese (especially among the lower classes) as a native
32
over the foreigner Philip II.

As was related earlier, his

adherents were easily beaten by A.lvas Tercios, but the tena
cious Antonio did not give up.

Going first to France, he

persuaded Catherine de Medici (the real ruler of France at
the time) to lend him a fleet for an attempt to seize the

^^Oliveira Marques, 1:313.
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Azores.

He planned to use the Azores as his base in a bid

to reconquer Portugal.

(Antonio had many supporters in the

islands; not for the last time the Azores were a center of
dissidence in Portuguese politics.)

But no sooner had

Antonio's fleet reached the Azores than it was attacked
and utterly destroyed by a Portuguese loyalist fleet (led
by a great Spanish Admiral, the Marquis of Santa Cruz) off
Terceira, in 1583.

33

Antonio himself escaped.

Undaunted, Dom Antonio came to England after war began
with Spain.

There he made many friends among the English

seadogs (including Francis Drake) and persuaded the English
government that if he arrived within Portugal with an army
and a fleet, the Portuguese people would rise in his behalf.

34

others:

This was to be one of the three objectives (the
to destroy the remnants of the Armada in the ports

of north Spain, and to seize one or another of the Azores)
of the English counteroffensive.

This took the form of a

huge amphibious expedition, as large as the Spanish Armada
had been with Drake himself as naval commander and "Black
John" Norris, the most distinguished soldier in England, as
commander on the land,

35
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A. L. Rowse, The Expansion of Elizabethan England
(New "York; Scribners, n.d.), p. 259.
Ibid., p. 28 3.
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R. B. Wernham, "Queen Elizabeth and the Portugal
Expedition of 1589," English Historical Review 66 (1951)
(2 parts); 1:1.
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After numerous delays, the English armada departed in
April, 1589.

With such strength and such commanders it

seemed assured of success.

But it proved to be as complete

a failure as the Spanish Armada, altliough less costly in
life.

It suffered from the fundamental military faults of

multiple objectives and divided command (there were constant
disputes between the cautious Norris and the daring Drake).
The overcrowded, under-provisioned English ships were ravaged
by disease.

The attempt to attack the Armada remnants in

Corunna proved abortive.
The total failure of the operation was assured when the
English army landed in Portugal (fifty miles from Lisbon) and
the Portuguese people failed to rise up against the Spaniards.
Like many a political emigre seeking foreign support, Dom
Antonio had promised far more than he could deliver.

The

Spaniards held Portugal in an iron grip, and Dom Antonio
looked little like a national liberator when he handed in
Portugal behind an army of heretical foreigners.
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The Eng

lish army was too small to seize Lisbon by itself, and was
forced to withdraw without accomplishing anything.
to sail to the Azores was thwarted by fierce storms.

An attempt
All tlie

English had to show for their great effort was the capture of
eighty foreign merchant ships who sailed into the Tagus estuary

^^Rowse, p. 285.
37
Prestage, "Anglo-Portuguese Alliance," p. 88.

at tlie wrong time.
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This fiasco ended any chance for an early or decisive
end to the Anglo-Spanish war.

A long, exhausting struggle,

gradually locking the contestants into stalemate, was the
inevitable result.

The English were normally on the offen

sive, the Spanish on the defensive, with the protection of
their shipping as a primary concern and they both wanted
Portugal and her islands.

To accomplish this, they built

up an imposing system of commerce protection, involving con
voys, patrolling fleets, and fortified harbors.

One of the

most important features of this system was the Spanish con
trol of the Azores.

Terceira was turned into a great island

fortress, in whose harbor the Spanish treasure fleets could
shelter.
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For reasons explained in Chapter 1, eastbound

ships normally passed near the Azores.
The Azores were a risky, but profitable, hunting ground
for English commerce raiders who swarmed about the islands
throughout the war.
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As the Portugal Expedition demon

strated, the English were quite aware of the importance of
the Azores.

In 1589 John Hawkins, Drake's greatest rival,

proposed a plan which England would attempt to cut off
Spanish trade by keeping a squadron on station near the

^^Wernham, 2:212-213.
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Rowse, p. 289.
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Azores to intercept all ships sailing from the islands to
Spain.This scheme was never adopted as it required more
ships and better organization than were available in Eliza
bethan England.

But it testifies to the acute conscious

ness o£ the Azores' crucial role in the minds o£ England's
pioneer naval strategists.
The last major English operation o£ the war was the
"Island Voyage" of 1597.

A fleet led by the Earl of Essex

with Lord Thomas Howard and Sir Walter Raleigh each in a
command of a squadron, sailed to attack the Azores (after
an abortive attack on the Spanish port of Ferrol) with the
intention of seizing all except the heavily fortified
Terceira.Then they would lay in wait for the annual
Spanish treasure fleet, the "flota."

Raleigh landed in

Rayal and captured the island, while a force of Dutch troops
sailing with the expedition ravaged Pico.

But the expedi

tion, hampered by quarrels between Raleigh and Essex, missed
the flota by only twelve hours.

Largely because of Essex's

bungling, the treasure ships sailed into Terceira unscathed.
A subsequent attempt to seize Sao Miguel also f a i l e d . T h e
Essex's fleet tlicn sailed liome.
The increasingly pointless war dragged on until 160.4,
when .the new King of Great Britain, James I, made it his
41lbid., p. 19.
42sir Julian Corbett, The Successors of Drake (London:
Longmans, Green and Co., 1916), p. 193.
43ibid., pp. 196-203.

'^'^Ibid., p. 208.
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first order o£ business to end the conflict.
status was unaffected by the peace.
held vassal state.

Portugal's

It was still a firmly

The English, during the war, had re

ceived many object lessons of the dangers created by a
hostile power in control of Portugal; the Portuguese learned
the dire results of incurring English hostility.

The les

sons learned would shape the relations of the two countries
in the next century after Portugal once again gained the
power to pursue its own foreign policy.

Renewal of Alliance
The long Spanish domination of Portugal ended abruptly
in 1640.

Whatever support the Spanish monarchy had in Portu

gal had withered away in the total absence of Spanish protec
tion for Portugal's overseas possessions.

The Dutch particu

larly had preyed on the Portuguese empire, completely destroy
ing its domination of the Indian Ocean.

They had also come

near conquering Portugal's richest remaining colony, Brazil.
The Dutch were finally frustrated but by Portuguese efforts
alone.

The Spanish provided very little aid.^^

The Spanish government also whittled away at Portugal's
local autonomy, which Philip II had solemnly promised and
generally protected.

His successors were less scrupulous.

The Count-Duke of Olivares, Chief Minister of Philip

IV (and

^^See C. R. Boxer, The Dutcii in Brazil (Oxford: The
Clarendon Press, 1957).
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real ruler o£ Spain) bent on reforming and centralizing the
creaking .Spanish empire, was especially guilty of infringing
on Portuguese privileges.

Olivares' policies were resented

throughout non-Castilian regions of the Iberian peninsula.
In 1640 the Catalans (in the northeastern corner of Spain)
were driven to revolt.

The Portuguese, called upon to sup

ply troops to help in the suppression of the rising, instead
revolted themselves.
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On 1 December 1640, the end of Spanish

domination was proclaimed and a few days later the head of the
great House of Bragan^a assumed the Portuguese throne as Joas
(John) IV.
Portugal's renewed independence was precarious, pro
tected more by Spanish weakness than by the nation's own
strength.

The Spaniards were preoccupied for many years in

putting down the stubborn Catalans, and had no resources to
spare for the reconquest of Portugal,

The Portuguese needed

foreign assistance if they were to retain their sovereignty.
This assistance they received not from England, but rather
from France.

Cardinal Richelieu, the archenemy of the

Spanish Habsburgs, was already backing the Catalan rebels
and regarded the Portuguese secession as another opportunity
to weaken Spain.

He was the first to recognize Portuguese

46
J. H. Elliott, The Revolt of the Catalans (Cambridge;
Cambridge University Press, 1963), p. 517.
'^^Edgar Prestage, "The Treaties of 1642 , 1654 , and 1661,"
in Chapters in Anglo-Portuguese Relations, edited by Edgar
Prestage, p. 130.
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independence, although he made no formal alliance with
r.
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Portugal.
In 1640 relations between Spain and England were ami
able and the Portuguese neither expected nor received Eng
lish aid.

But King Charles I received a Portuguese ambassa

dor in April, 1641, and on 24 January 1642, a treaty was
signed between the two countries.
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Although Article 20 o£

this treaty referred to a "peace and alliance" between the
two kingdoms, this agreement was primarily a commercial
treaty, allowing English merchants access to the Portuguese
dominions and guaranteeing religious toleration to English
subjects traveling or residing in Portugal.
The year when Anglo-Portuguese ties ivere renewed, 1642,
was also the year in which the long quarrel between the
Stuarts and Parliament finally precipitated civil war.

For

many years to come the English (as in the fifteenth century)
concentrated their energies on internal revolution and had
little time to spare for foreign problems.

Development of

the Anglo-Portuguese relationship was effectively stalled
for a dozen years.
Joao IV was sympathetic to the Stuart causc and even
involved himself in the English civil war to a small degree.
The Portuguese ambassador to England, Sousa de Macedo, arranged

'^^Ibid., p. 133.
49

Brazao, p. 36.
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for the supply of munitions to the Royalist forces, and
served as an intermediary for Charles I's correspondence
with his queen and other supporters on the continent.
Sousa de Macedo left England in 1646 and for five years
thereafter there were no diplomatic relations between Portu
gal and Britain,After the Royalist defeat in England
and the execution of Charles I in 1649, a Royalist fleet
under Prince Rupert (the great Royalist cavalry commander)
arrived in Portuguese waters.

Despite Portuguese efforts

to maintain a neutral stance, Rupert's ships used Lisbon as
a base to attack Parliament's shipping.

The inevitable re

sult was the arrival of a Parliamentary fleet (under Robert
Blake, another soldier turned admiral) off the Portuguese
coast.

The Portuguese ports were blockaded and shots ex

changed between Blake's ships and the forts guarding Lisbon
harbor.
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After some further hostilities Joao IV realized

he could not afford enmity with the new masters of England.
Prince Rupert was forced to leave Portuguese waters, and a
Portuguese envoy was commissioned to negotiate a treaty
with Parliament,

It took three years of hard negotiations

before a treaty was finally signed on 10 July (O.S.) 1654,
and this agreement represented a near total capitulation of

^'^Px'estage, "Treaties of 1642, 1654, and 1661,

p. 137.

^^Ibid., p. 140.
R, Powell, Robert Blake, General-At-Sea (New York:
Crane, Russak, 1971), pp. 90-92.
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Portugal to England's demands.

Once again the main issues

were the commercial and religious rights of Englishmen in
Portugal.

Englishmen were given virtual extra-territorial

rights on Portuguese soil, and the Portuguese government
agreed to limit customs duties to 23 percent and not raise
them without the agreement of the English merchants.
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The

treaty of 1654 represented the beginning of a trend--the
inexorable passage of Portugal into the English economic
orbit, the development of Portugal into an economic appendage
of the British empire--which would reach fulfillment in the
following century.

In return for their concessions the Portu

guese received nothing substantial.

Not surprisingly, Joao

IV refused to ratify the treaty until April, 1657, finally
doing so only after another visit by Blake's fleet.
In the meantime, the Spanish, having finally suppressed
the rebellion in Catalonia, made a serious effort to reconquer
Portugal.

Cromwell's government could not and would not tol

erate any Spanish reconquest of Portugal.

This, in turn,

illuminated another enduring element in the Anglo-Portuguese
relationship;
her.

if Britain bullied Portugal, it also protected

The strategic importance of Portugal permitted Britain

no other course of policy.
.Blake's fleet, having twice visited Lisbon to intimidate

^^Prestage, "Treaties of 1642, 1654, and 1661," p. 145.
^^Powell, p. 282.
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the Portuguese, arrived a third time to protect them (11
July 1657).^^

Shortly thereafter Blake died, but his mis

sion proved successful.

This great (if little known)

British admiral always realized that the loss of Lisbon as
a strategic base to careen and water his ships wpuld make
it impossible to carry on Cromwell's cherished crusade
against Spain.
Blake's visit removed the Spanish threat to Portugal
only temporarily.

As an additional measure of support, the

Portuguese were permitted to recruit 12,000 mercenary troops
in the British Isles (a policy harking back to the fourteenth
century treaties) by a treaty signed at Whitehall on 18 April
1660.
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Before this treaty could be ratified, Charles II was

restored to the English throne.
The "Marriage Treaty" of 23 June 1661, is one of the
most important, if not the most important, of the pacts nego
tiated between Britain and Portugal.

Political upheaval in

England, for once, operated in Portugal's favor.

The new

king had reason to be grateful for Portuguese support during
the Civil V/ar, and he was betrothed to Catherine of Braganga,
the daughter of Joao IV.

Charles II's accession was soon

followed by important developments in Anglo-Portuguese rela
tions for nearly three centuries, but it also remains in

S^Ibid., p. 308.
56ibid., p. 282,
57Brazao, p. 39.
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force to this day.

It ratified all the treaties between the

two countries going back to 1641 but went much farther than
any of them.

The treaty provided for an unconditional alli

ance between Britain and Portugal, binding Charles II to
provide troops for Portugal's defense, to send a fleet of at
least ten ships to guard the Portuguese coast, and to make,
no treaty of peace with Spain prejudicing Portuguese inter
ests.

In a secret article Charles also promised to mediate

the long war between Portugal and the Netherlands, and fail
ing that, to defend Portuguese territory against Dutch
attacks just as if it were English.
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In return, the Portu

guese promised a large dowry for Catherine, the cession of
Tangier and Bombay, and confirmation of English commercial
privileges.
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(Tangier, which the English only occupied for

twenty-two years, lay on the Mediterranean coast of Morocco
and served England, while she held it somewhat as Gibralter
did later; and Bombay proved to be a useful point of pene
tration into western India.)

These territorial cessions

were unpopular in Portugal but the results of the treaty
proved well worth the price.

English troops sent to Portu

gal helped beat off yet another invasion, and by a treaty
signed 13 February 1668 (largely negotiated by the Earl of
Sandwich) Spain at last recognized the independence of

^^Keith Foiling, British Foreign Policy, 1660-1672
(London: Frank Cass, 1968), p. 49.
^^Prestage, "Treaties of 1642, 1654, and 1661," p. 149.
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Portugal.
The three decades following 1668 were a relatively
peaceful time for Portugal.

As a neutral under British

protection, she avoided involvement in the earlier phases
of the long struggle between Louis XIV and the other powers
of Europe.

Not until 1703 was the little country dragged

back into the European power struggle.

Portugal was rein-

volved by the Spanish Succession crisis.

The central issue

of the crisis--whether the Spanish throne would be allowed
to pass to a Bourbon, and the Spanish empire to be united
with the power and vitality of France--had obvious implica
tions for Portugal.

Her independence, so recently redeemed,

would be endangered if the decrepit government of Charles
the Bewitched were replaced by a monarchy backed by French
might.

The first course of action adopted by the current

Portuguese King, Pedro II, was a policy of appeasement.

In

June of 1701 he signed a treaty with France by which he
agreed to acknowledge Philip V (Louis XIV's nephew) as right
ful King of Spain, and to close his ports to the ships of
Philip's enemies.

In return, he received a French promise

of aid against any state who objected to the treaty.
Pedro was driven to this step bccause lie felt unsure of

^'^Prestage, "Anglo-Portuguese Alliance," p. 90.
^^Sir Richard Lodge, "The Treaties of 1703," in Chapters
of Anglo-Portuguese Relations, edited by Edgar Prestage,
pp. 157-158.
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British support since Britain had not yet made up its mind
to" oppose by force a Bourbon accession to the throne of
Spain.

In a matter of months, however, the British formed

the Grand Alliance with Austria and the Netherlands.

Britain

regarded the Franco-Portuguese arrangement of 1701 as an
intolerable obstacle to the effective cooperation of the
Grand Alliance.

A war against France in cooperation with

Austria would necessarily involve major naval operations in
the western Mediterranean.

Lacking any other base in the

region since Tangier had already been abandoned, the British
fleet was utterly dependent upon access to Portuguese ports
62
for supplies and repair facilities.

Portugal's location,

whose relative remoteness from earlier struggles between
Louis XIV and his foes (which had been waged mostly in
Flanders and the Rhineland) had made possible years of peace;
now plunged her into a very dangerous dilemma.

If she of

fended Philip V and his mighty uncle, she would be exposed
to invasion by French and Spanish forces.

If she held to the

treaty with France, she would be attacked from the sea, her
colonies and commerce in peril from the same British seapower
that formerly had protected them.
The. dilemma was solved by a vigorous British diplomatic
offensive.

Britain was not prepared to tolerate a French-

dominated Portugal and was determined to dismantle Pedro II's

^^Ibid., p. 158.
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entente with France by diplomacy if possible, or force if
necessary.

To accomplish their ends the British were able

to call upon the talents of a remarkable father-and-son
team, John and Paul Methuen.

In 1702 Paul Methuen was the

British Envoy Extraordinary in Portugal, a post in which he
had succeeded his father in 1697.

Both men had long exper

ience in Portugal, both diplomatic and commercial, and wide
contacts within the country.

The British government sent

Lord John Methuen (then Chancellor of Ireland) back to Portu
gal in 17 03 with the rank of Ambassador.

Lord John's primary

mission was to demand the opening of Portuguese harbors to
British ships.

He was instructed to warn Pedro II that

friendship with France would mean an inevitable break with
Britain.

He was to urge Pedro to join the Grand Alliance,

offering to accept any "reasonable demands" for an increase
in Portuguese territory, as well as to give Portugal the
same security guarantees that France had extended.
The Methuens had no great difficulty in persuading
Portugal to come over into the British camp.

Pedro's agree

ment with France, inspired mostly by fear, was unnecessary
now that Portugal was assured of British support.

His change

of front was formalized by the two "Methuen Treaties" of 1703.
The first of these, a treaty of military and political' alliance

A. D. Francis, The Methuens and Portugal (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1966), p. 51.
^^Lodge, p. 159.
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by which Portugal adhered to the anti-French coalition, was
signed on 16 May 1703; the second, a short commercial treaty
which allowed free trade in English wool and Portuguese
65
wines, on 27 December,

By a quirk of circumstance, this

treaty is much more famous than the Alliance, to which it
was a mere epilogue.

It soon resulted in the replacement

of French claret by Portuguese port and madeira as the
accustomed drink of English gentlemen.

Hence it was remem

bered long after the War of the Spanish Succession and the
diplomacy that was inspired had faded into the mists of
time.

It has been called "the most famous of all commercial

treaties.
At the time, however, the signing of this treaty was
nearly lost in the struggles of the War of the Spanish Suc
cession.

A spectacular British-Dutch naval victory off

Vigo, on the north Spanish coast, on 23 September 1702, re
moved the last Portuguese qualms about joining the Grand
Alliance.
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The Iberian peninsula, logically enough, was

to be a major theater in the War of the Spanish Succession,
and Portugal played an important role in the strategy of
the"Allies.

A central war aim of the Grand Alliance was to

^^Brazao, p. 44.
^^Lodge, pp. 165-66.
^^Francis, p. 151.
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drive Philip V from Spain and replace him with his Austrian
rival for the Spanish throne, the Archduke Charles.

This

necessitated major campaigning by the Allies within Spain
itself.

For the first time since the Hundred Years War,

British troops were committed on land in the Peninsula not
only to protect or liberate Portugal, but to conquer Spain
as well.

This aim they could not hope to achieve without

Portuguese assistance.

They needed Lisbon as a base, access

to Portuguese supplies, and Portuguese troops to reinforce
them.
Before this project could be attempted, the FrancoSpanish forces, led by Philip V and the French Commander,
the Duke of Berwick,
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invaded Portugal in March of 17 04,

intending to conquer Lisbon, and was stopped in the summer
more by logistical difficulties and hot weather than by
Portuguese resistance.In the spring of 1704 some 21,000
British and Dutch troops landed in Portugal.

The British

troops were led by the Earl of Galway under the supreme command of the Marquis das Minas, a Portuguese general.
1706
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In

this army marched on Madrid (most of the French troops

68

Actually an Englishman, tlie bastard son of the exiled
King James II and nephew of the Duke of Marlborough, some of
whose military talent he inherited.
69
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a French Haguenot refugee (Kamen, p. 19).
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in Spain were then besieging Barcelona) and took the capital
71
o£ Spain on 27 June.

But the people o£ Madrid refused to

accept the Archduke Charles as King o£ Spain, and a British
force led by the brilliant but erratic Earl of Peterborough,
for reasons unclear to this day, failed to unite witn. Galway
after a march from Valencia on the east coast of Spain.
Galway, cut off from Portugal, had to abandon Madrid and
withdraw to Valencia.
Spain was wasted.

The Allies' great chance to conquer

The following year Galvvfay's army was

destroyed by Berwick's forces at the battle of Almansa, 25
April 1707.^^
The record of British military operations in Spain from
the fourteenth century until the year 1808 is enough to con
vince the superstitious that they were conducted under some
kind of curse.

Again and again during the Hundred Years War,

the Elizabethan wars, and now again in the War of the Spanish
Succession, ambitious British military expeditions marched
into the peninsula only to be undone by logistical breakdowns,
quarrels between allied commanders, poor generalship, or any
>

combination of the three.

Never was failure more resounding

than in 1707.
Despite defeats in Spain, the Allies won the war.

Marl

borough's brilliant victories in Germany and Flanders, and

^^Kamen, p. 17.

^^Ibid., p. 19.
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Allied control o£ the sea (in which their control o£ Portu
gal's harbors played no small part) canceled
in the peninsula.

out failures

What fighting occurred in Iberia after

1707 took place mostly in Aragon.

France, fighting for its

life on other fronts, was unable to spare troops to attack
Portugal.
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In the end Philip V, by the treaty of Utrecht,

was recognized as King of Spain, but no union between France
and Spain was permitted.

Britain, now in control of Minorca

and Gibralter, depended less than before on the use of Portu
guese harbors, but was also better placed than before to
assist Portugal if the need arose.

Nearly a hundred years

passed before the nation's security was seriously threatened
again.
Portugal stayed out of European conflicts for the re
mainder of the century, assisted by the fact that the epi
centers of these conflicts were safely remote.

"Portugal's

distant but axial geographic position, togethr with its
alliance with Europe's premier maritime power, enabled it
to avoid major involvement."
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Portugal was involved very

briefly in the last stage of the Seven Years War.

Spain

was foolish enougli to enter the war on France's side after
France had effectively lost it.

As a result, Portugal as

Britain's ally was threatened with invasion in 1762.

The

^^Ibid,, p. 23.
^'^Stanley G. Payne, History of Spain and Portugal, 2:404.

Alliance Treaty with Britain was invoked and a British force
o£ six infantry and one cavalry regiments landed at Lisbon
to assist in the country's defense.

The whole episode was

minor, important only in that it conformed with an already
established pattern of active British intervention whenever
Portugal seemed threatened.7 5
On the whole the eighteenth century was a prosperous
period for Portugal.

Trade with Britain flourished.

7

For

many years the ruthless but efficient Marquis de Pombal
ruled as a dictator.

Almost the only event in Portugal

noticed by the outside world was the disastrous Lisbon earth
quake of 1755, the worst ever to strike a western European
c ity.
Like the earlier upheavals involving France, the wars
of the French Revolution affected Portugal rather late.
Significantly, Portugal was drawn in Britain's wake.

A

treaty signed between the two on 26 September 1793, required
Portugal to close her ports to French ships.

At first Spain

and Portugal fought France together as allies, but in 1795
Spain made peace with France, changed sides, and in 1797
invaded Portugal once again.
landed in Portugal, 7 7

Once more a British force

Unfortunately for Portugal, the British
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were too hard pressed elsewhere to send aid when Spain,
still a French satellite, invaded again in 1801.

The Portu

guese were forced to sue for peace, and yield the district
of Olivenga on their eastern border to Spain, cede some
Brazilian territory to French Guiana, and pay France a large
indemnity.

When Britain signed a peace treaty with France

at Amiens in 1802, she failed to demand the restoration of
Oliven^a to Portugal and Spain has kept it ever since.
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This humiliation was followed by five years of peace
for Portugal.

In 1807 the country faced an ominous new

threat to her existence, the most menacing to arise since
1661--the wrath of Napoleon himself.

The Emperor of France

was irritated by the large hole Portugal opened in his
Continent-wide boycott of Britain known as the Continental
System.

Portugal in 1807 was the only continental country

not dominated by Napoleon.

Portugal's ports served as entry

points for British goods into the Iberian peninsula, whence
they were smuggled all over Europe, undermining Napoleon's
grand scheme to wreck the prosperity of the "nation of shop
keepers."

The Portuguese refused to close their ports to

British shipping and Napoleon decided to resort to force.
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Napoleon's only access to Portugal was through Spanish
territory.

Spain was an ally of Franco, albeit a reluctant

Ibid. , p. 93.
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R. B. Mowat, The Diplomacy of Napoleon (New York:
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one.

To gain Spanish assent to an attack on Portugal,

Napoleon signed the treaty of Fontainebleau with Manual de
Godoy, the Chief Minister and actual ruler of Spain, on 27
October 1807.
Portugal.

This treaty provided for the partition of

The northern provinces were to be handed over to

an Italian relative of the Spanish Bourbons, the King of
Etruria, who was to become King of "Northern Lusitania,"
the southern province to Godoy himself as "King of the
Algarves," and central Portugal to be held until the peace
treaty, whereupon it would be given back to the House of
Braganca if Britain restored Gibralter and Trinidad to
c
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Spain.

Napoleon never intended to abide by the provisions of
this treaty as will shortly be seen.
for the Spanish Bourbons.

He had other plans

Fontainebleau won for Napoleon

what he needed, a pretext to introduce large French forces
into Spain.

On 18 October 1807 the French general Junot

led a French army across the Pyrennes and on 13 November
it was announced in le Moniteur, Napoleon's official news
paper, that "the regent of Portugal (Prince Joao of Braganga)
is losing his tlironc."
face of French might.

The Portuguese were lielplcss in the
On 29 November the Portuguese count

boarded ship and sailed off to Brazil under the escort of
the British Navy.

Junot entered Lisbon the next day.

^^Ibid., p. 210.
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Having disposed of the Bragancas, Napoleon turned his
attention to the Spanish Bourbons.

As soon as his troops

had occupied Spain in force, he summoned Charles IV, the
old King of Spain who had just abdicated, and his son
Ferdinand VII to France and forced them to sign over the
Spanish kingdom to Napoleon (the Treaty of Bayonne, 5 May
1808).
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Napoleon put his brother Joseph Bonaparte on the

Spanish throne.

This was a fatal blunder.

Even before the

treaty was signed at Bayonne, the people of Madrid rose in
arms against the French on 2 May.

The revolt was swiftly

crushed, but the "Dos de Mayo" proved only the beginning of
a savage guerrilla war, a war which involved the v\/hole of
c
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Spain.
The Spanish rising offered tempting opportunities to
Great Britain.

Spain, a long-time enemy, was suddenly con

verted into an ally.

By coincidence the British had just

assembled an expeditionary force (ironically, to invade
Spanish South America) under a promising general who had
made a name for himself in India, Sir Arthur Wellesley.
Wellesley's objective was abruptly diverted from Buenos
Aires to the peninsula.

Wellesley's orders originally were

to land in northern Spain if possible, with Portugal as an
alternative.

The British Navy badly wanted to retake Lisbon

^^Ibid., p. 213.
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harbor.
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The actual British beachhead on the peninsula

was at Coimbra in the north of Portugal, where Wellesley's
85
troops landed on 1 August 1808.

Three weeks later

Wellesley defeated Junot's troops so badly at the battle
of Vimeiro that the French in Portugal were compelled to
surrender.

Immediately after Vimeiro Wellesley was super

seded by two British generals senior to him, Sir Hew
Dalrymple and Sir Harry Burrard.

These gentlemen granted

Junot unbelievably lenient terms by the Convention of Cintra,
31 August 1808.

The Convention caused a furor in Britain.

Dalrymple and Burrard were promptly sacked and Wellesley
narrowly escaped the same fate.
The British now held Portugal.
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It did not greatly matter.

Their control of Lisbon har

bor provided them once again their traditional sally port
into the peninsula.

This advantage was to prove of crucial

importance to the outcome of the peninsular campaigns--and
of the Napoleonic war as a whole.
The campaigns of the Peninsular War covered a period
of six years, and are far too complex and dramatic to sum
marize here.

(Two great British military historians. Sir

Charles Napier and Sir Charles Oman, published liistorics oC

^^Richard Glover, The Peninsular War 1807-1814 (London:
David and Charles, 1974), p. 59.
o r
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^^Glover, p. 71.
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the Peninsular War, and both required many volumes for the
task.)

The British owed their triumph in the peninsula to

several advantages.

There was the Spanish guerrilla resis

tance, which normally tied down most French troops in the
peninsula, draining their manpower and morale.

There was

the leadership of Arthur Wellesley (or the Duke of Welling
ton as he was to become), a master of logistics and defensive
tactics, who knew how to make the most of limited resources.
And there was British control of Portugal, which when coupled
with British control of the seas, assured the British of a
secure base and dependable supply lines--an inestimable ad
vantage over the French trying to live off the barren and
war-ravaged countryside of Spain.

Without Lisbon the British

could not have fought in the peninsula.

Here, as many times

before, it proved the importance of strategic location.
This fact was known by the French as well as by the
British.

After Vimiero they made two attempts to oust the

British from Portugal.

The first, in May of 1809, was frus

trated by a British victory near Oporto, the battle of the
oy

Douro.

The second, which was launched in 1810, was a much

more massive affair, aimed at expelling the British from the
peninsula once and for all.

The invading army, heavily rein

forced from France, was commanded by Andre Massena, one of
most famous of Napoleon's marshals.

^^Ibid., p. 98.

He, too, recognized the
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strategic importance o£ Portugal to all o£ Europe and im
pressed its significance upon his men.

As Jean Jacques

Pelet, one o£ Massena's chief staff officers,• wrote later:
At last we were starting on our long - announced
expedition, closely watched by all of Eu
rope. ... It was at Lisbon that the fate of
the peninsula was to be decided and perhaps
the destiny of the world; if the British were
forced to abandon the capital they would lose
all their influence in Spain [sic]. No other
part of the country offered them the same
resources and advantages, and they would lose
the means of maintaining their army and
fomenting insurrection. Portugal would sub
mit and Spain, exhausted and discouraged,
would follow its example as soon as it was
abandoned. Then England would find itself
isolated and blockaded on its island. It
would lose hope of renewing its intrigues
with the governments conjoined in the Conti
nental System. Then France could preserve its
preponderance in Europe which could only in
crease with its excellent army of three hun
dred thousand in Spain composed of the best
corps available. Any other outcome of the
expedition could only bring the opposite re
sults.88
Massena's army of three corps of 7 0,000 men began its march
into Portugal in August, 1810.

Wellington's 50,000 British

and Portuguese troops fell back before him, fighting a suecessful delaying action at Busaco on 27 September 1810.
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As he retreated, Wellington adopted a scorched-earth policy,
destroying crops, wrecking roads and bridges, burning vil
lages, and driving off livestock.

88

The Portuguese National

Jean Jacques Pelet, The French Campaign in Portugal
1810-1811. edited, annotated and translated by Donald W,
Howard (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1973),
pp. 157-158.
89
Glover, p. 137.
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Militia known as "the Ordenanga," was called up, and waged
guerrilla war against the invaders.

Wellington planned to

make his major stand at that one location he could not
afford to lose--Lisbon.

One year earlier, on 20 October

1809, Wellington had ordered his engineer commander at
Lisbon to construct a line of field fortifications outside
the city, explaining that "the great object in Portugal is
the possession of Lisbon and the Tagus, and all our mea90
sures must be directed to this object."'

In accordance

with Wellington's instructions the famous "Lines of Torres
Vedras," an awesomely formidable set of defensive positions,
was built up on the hills outside Lisbon, completely protect
ing the city from land attack.
Massena's advance turned into an ordeal of starvation
and guerrilla harassment as Wellington's precautions took
effect.

The marshal had other troubles as well; quarrels

with subordinates, incredibly bad intelligence (although
the French had campaigned in Portugal twice in the previous
three years, they still had no adequate maps of the country
91
and took the wrong road to Lisbon)
and lack of support
from the other French armies in Spain.

Massena himself was

an old man well past his prime as a commander.

Nevertheless

he pushed stubbornly onward until his army arrived outside
90
Pelet, p. 142 (quotation is from Wellington's Dis
patches from the Peninsula, vol. 5, p. 234).

^^Ibid., p. 136.

61
Lisbon in October,1810, only to come face to face with the
92
Line of Torres Vedras.

As Massena at once realized, the

lines were so strong that his weakened army had no hope of
breaking through them.

For lack of any other alternatives,

Massena sat down outside the fortifications, hoping Welling
ton would attack.

This Wellington had no intention of doing.

His army,' plus a large percentage of the total population of
Portugal, sat snugly behind the Line of Torres Vedras, assured
of adequate supplies and reinforcements by British sea power.
Meanwhile Massena's army, cut off from its bases by a hostile
countryside, wasted away.
besieged were reversed.

The usual roles of besieges and

Held together by Massena's iron

determination, the French stuck it out for five months.

In

March of 1811 Massena finally gave in and ordered a retreat.
Pursued by Wellington's men, the French reached safety in
Spain in April.

In the whole campaign Massena lost 25,000

men of whom only 1,500 died in battle, the rest lost to
93
starvation, disease, and guerrilla ambushes.
Massena's failure decided the Peninsular War.

The

French were never able to mount another attack on Portugal.
In Spain they were thrown back completely onto the defensive.
In 1811 Wellington advanced into Spain, and although he suf
fered some setbacks, he pressed steadily onward.

The French

position in Spain, always precarious, collapsed in 1814.
S^Glover, p. 141.
93ibid., p. 148.
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Totally defeated at Vitoria, the French retreated over the
Pyrenees and the final battles of the Peninsular War were
fought in southern France.

Catastrophe in Russia had broken

Napoleon's power in central and eastern Europe.

His empire

was caught in an enormous pincers, one of whose arms was
composed of a vengeful Austro-Prusso-Russian coalition
descending on his northern frontier, and Wellington's army
driving into France from the south composing the other.
First Empire was inexorably crushed between them.
was forced to abdicate and exiled to Elba.

The

Napoleon

His attempt to

regain power in 1815 proved only a dramatic epilog to a
story already ended.
It will always be a matter for controversy just how
great the contribution of the British Peninsular campaign
was to Napoleon's overthrow, particularly when compared with
the disaster in Russia.

That it was great, no one can deny.

The Peninsular Campaign was the result of an error by
Napoleon.

By alienating the Spanish, Napoleon for the first

time gave the British a chance to grapple effectively with
his forces on land.

The British would never have been able

to take effective advantage of this opportunity--which they
had not anticipated-- if they had been deprived of a secure
base on the peninsula, easily accessible to British sea
power, yet far from the center of French land power.
their ally Portugal provided.

This,

It is as clear an illustration

of the role of strategic location as any in history.
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In the Age of Canning and Palmerston
The end of the Napoleonic War did not restore to Por1:ugal the tranquil prosperity she had enjoyed in the eighteenth
century.

The country was spared external dangers.

Indeed,

Portugal has not been threatened seriously with foreign
invasion from 1810 to this day.
was internal strife.

What she was not spared

The causes of this dissension, which

flared up into civil war, were very deep-rooted.

The entire

Hispanic world on both sides of the Atlantic, was plunged
into a time of troubles by Napoleon's invasion of Spain in
1807.

Foreign invasion and occupation were followed by

political chaos as deep regional and ideological rifts opened
within the Iberian peninsula.

On the other side of the

Atlantic the long-lived Spanish empire disintegrated and
Portugal parted company with her richest remaining colony,
Brazil.

Ultimately the problem faced by both Spain and

Portugal was their inability to adjust comfortably to a
rapidly changing world and to reach any kind of internal
consensus on the unsettling new ideas introduced during the
French Revolution.
Britain, as the dominant Atlantic power, was deeply
worried by the unrest that convulsed the Iberian peninsula
in the 1820s and '30s, and Iberian problems were a major
concern to her foreign policy makers.

Upheavals in the

peninsula had serious effects on both sides of the Atlantic
Ocean, and important implications for Britain's overseas
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trade and maritime security.

It is important to note tHe

differences between Britain's Spanish and Portuguese poli
cies.

In Spain Britain's main objective was to prevent

intervention by other European powers.

(Her efforts to

prevent outside meddling had only indifferent success.)
In Portugal Britain intervened quite freely, involving her
self in Portuguese internal affairs to a degree unprece
dented in times of general European peace.
Events in Portugal ran in close parallel with those in
Spain during the post-Napoleonic period.

The liberal revolu

tion in Spain against Ferdinand VII inspired a similar rising
in Portugal.

Its target was not King Joao VI (who with the

entire Portuguese royal house had lived in Brazil since 1807)
but his Regent in Portugal, Marshal Hugh Beresford (a British
officer who had been placed in command of the Portuguese army
during the Peninsular War).

Beresford was forced to leave

Portugal on 10 October 1820, and a constitutionalist regime
94
took power in the country.
The British Foreign Secretary, Lord Castlereagh, was
faced with a dilemma by the revolution in Portugal.
he recognize the new regime?
intervene?

Should

And was Britain obligated to

The treaties of 1386 and 1661 included clauses

that could be interpreted to mean that Britain was required
to repress any revolution against the legitimate Portuguese
government.

A more recent treaty, signed in 1810, bound

94
Payne, 2:517.
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Britain to recognize only a legitimate heir o£ the House of
Braganca as King of Portugal.

Castlereagh was able to dodge

the problem o£ recognition by taking the position that Brit
ain could not recognize the constitutionalist regime until
it knew the attitude o£ King Joao^ across the Atlantic in
Rio de Janeiro, towards it.

Castlereagh, in keeping with

his normal non-interventionist attitude in foreign affairs,
refused to countenance active British opposition to the new
Lisbon government.

He regarded the obligations included in

the earlier treaties to have lapsed due to disuse, and the
1807 treaty to have been cancelled out by the Vienna settle
ment of 1815.

Castlereagh and his successor. Sir George

Canning, argued that Britain was obligated to defend Portu95
gal only against foreign attack.

While taking a "hands-

off" position, the British government privately put pressure
on Joao VI to leave his luxurious haunts in Rio and return to
the mother country, pointing out that if he did not do so
quickly he might lose his throne.

In July of 1824 the King

returned to Portugal and swore to observe the new constitution.
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But Portugal's troubles were only beginning.

In 18 22

Brazil declared its independence, setting up as a separate
empire under Joao IV's eldest son, Dom Pedro.

The French

^^Harold Temperly, The Foreign Policy of Canning 182218 2 7. 2nd cd. (London: Frank Cass and Co., 1966), pp. 193-94
^'^Ibid., p. 195.
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invasion o£ Spain in 1823 badly frightened Portugal, for
obvious reasons.

But Canning, on 31 March 1823, promised

to carry out British treaty obligations.

The French, for

97
their part, made no aggressive moves against Portugal.
Portugal's worst troubles, however, stemmed from the
fact that the split between the liberal constitutionalists
and traditional absolutists in Portuguese society ran right
through the House of Braganga.

Joao himself was quite

willing to be a constitutional monarch, but his queen (a
sister of the arch-reactionary Spanish King Ferdinand VII)
was bitterly opposed, refusing to sign the constitution, and
his second son, Dom Miguel, was a dedicated traditionalist.
In May, 1823, Miguel supported by some Portuguese
troops, frightened his father into disavowing the constitu98
tion.

This led to nearly a year of uncertainty, during

which Palmella, the Portuguese Foreign Minister, asked Can
ning to send a force to Lisbon to put down the reactionaries.
Canning refused, in keeping with the principle of non
intervention, but did send a naval squadron into the Tagus,
where it could keep an eye on developments without getting
99
involved in Portuguese internal affairs.

On 30 April 1824,

Dom Miguel carried out a coup d'etat, and made his father a

^^Ibid. , p. 197.
98
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p r i s o n e r .^ I n M a y t h e o l d K i n g e s c a p e d t o t h e B r i t i s h
fleet moored in Lisbon harbor and was able to force Dom
Miguel to resign command of the army and go into exile.
Without formally intervening, Canning liad taken measures
by which Miguel's coup, which Britain opposed, could be
frustrated.

In 1825 Canning was able to diminish French

influence in Portugal (which was reaching proportions the
British disliked) by having his ambassador in Portugal,
William A. Court, persuade Joao to dismiss his pro-French
minister, Subserra, and reassign him as ambassador to Lon
don.

In 1826 Joao VI died, setting off a succession crisis.
The legal heir, Dom Pedro, was already Emperor of Brazil,
which he had no desire to leave.

Instead of assuming the

Portuguese throne himself, he assigned his rights to his
daughter, who was to marry Dom Miguel, provided Miguel swore
allegiance to the new Portuguese constitution, the proposed
"Charter of 1826."
Britain and Austria.

This arrangement was to be guaranteed by
Canning, originally lukewarm to Pedro's

proposal, decided to back it and was able to get it approved
by the Conference of the Four Ambassadors in Paris on 24 July
1826.

Within Portugal General Saldanha, Governor of Oporto

and strongest man in the country, compelled acceptance of the

^^^Livermore, p. 414.
1m

Temperley, p. 201.

^^^Ibid., p. 207.
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new Constitution.

Many Portuguese still supported absolutism, o£_course,
and one entire regiment of the Portuguese army demonstrated
their sentiments by deserting, colonel and all, over the
Spanisli frontier.

The Spaniards, in violation not only of

international law but of a treaty signed with Portugal in
1778, did not disarm and return the deserters but allowed
them to remain under arms in Spain, a standing threat to the
new Constitution.^®^

The suspicion grew that the absolutist

government of Ferdinand VII intended to back the deserters
in an attempt to overthrow liberalism in Portugal.

Canning's

reaction to this Spanish maneuver (which sounds familiar to
the twentieth century) was forceful.

Britain would permit

no Spanish domination in Portugal, even by such subtle means
as these.

When Spain permitted the armed deserters to attack

Portuguese territory, Canning invoked the casus foederis of
the Anglo-Portuguese Alliance.

On 12 December 1826 Canning

defended his policy in these memorable words:
Let us fly to the aid of Portugal, by whom
soever attacked; because it is our duty to
do so; and let us cease our interference
where that duty ends. We go to Portugal not
to rule, not to dictate, not to prescribe
constitutions--but to defend and to preserve
the independence of an ally. We go to plant
the standard of England on the well-known
heights of Lisbon. Where that standard is
planted, foreign dominion shall not come.lO^
lOSjbid., pp. 370-372.
104i5i^i, ^ p, 373,
105] p

,

582.
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So saying, Canning dispatched British troops to Portugal,
the first to land since the Napoleonic wars.
of the Redcoats brought immediate peace.
tions ceased at once.

The arrival

The border viola

Since Canning had succeeded in obtain

ing Miguel's reluctant agreement to abide by the new Charter,
the succession crisis appeared to be settled.

It stayed

settled only as long as the 4,000 British troops remained
in Portugal, however.

In 1828 the force was withdrawn.

Immediately, Dom Miguel repudiated his oath to the Constitution, assumed command of the army, and seized the throne.

X 06

Miguel was solidly in control of mainland Portugal for
three years, but the Azores refused to submit to his rule.
The independent-minded islanders, in constant contact with
foreign ideas because of their crossroads position, never
recognized Miguel as King.

When a Miguelist landing force

was driven off by the inhabitants of Angra on Terceira on
11 August 1829, the islands became a rallying point for
Portuguese liberals.

107

In 1831 Pedro I, the Emperor of Brazil, resigned his
throne, intending to establish his niece Maria Isabella in
place of his usurping brother.

Pedro received active en

couragement from both Britain and France, itself now a sup
porter of liberalism after the July Revolution in 1830.

^°^Duffy, 2:521.
^^^Cuill, p. 137.

The
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new British Foreign Secretary, Lord Palmerston, favored a
much more activist course in foreign policy than his pred
ecessor

Canning.

For this reason in 1831 and 1832 Portu

guese problems took up more of Palmerston's attention than
• Lurope,
r
108
any others in
With British assistance, Pedro's supporters set up a
"government in exile" in the Azores, whose constitutionalist
policies provided an attractive alternative to Miguel's
brutal regime.

With the Azores as a base and the tacit sup

port of Palmerston, who allowed him to buy supplies and hire
men in Britain, Pedro was able to raise a force of 7,500
troops which landed in 1832 at the liberal center in northern
Portugal, Oporto.

Palmerston, who had refused to recog

nize Miguel as king effectively prevented Miguel's fleet from
interfering with Pedro's invasion by blocking his way with
the British squadron stationed in the Tagus,^^*^

Pedro's force

was immediately besieged in Oporto by Miguel's army but
managed to keep its foothold.

Miguel, losing his support

from Spain when the absolutist Ferdinand VII died, was unable
to cope with a second landing by liberal forces in southern
Portugal.

In July of 1833 Lisbon fell after Miguel's fleet

was largely destroyed by a liberal squadron commanded by an

108
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lO^Duffy, 2:522.
^^'^Webster, 1:241.
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English volunteer, Sir Charles Napier.
Miguel fought on for awhile, but was completely de
feated in May of 1834.

The new constitutionalist govern

ment under the young queen Maria Isabella restored the
constitution of 1826.

Its victory would have been impossible

without British aid, formalized by the Quadruple Alliance of
1834 which included Britain, France, Portugal, and the new
liberal government in Spain.

112

Liberal constitutional

monarchy remained the dominant political force in Portugal
for the rest of the nineteenth century.

Its position was

always precarious, however, the country never enjoyed real
political stability.

In 1846 civil war broke out once more.

Palmerston, in his third term as Foreign Secretary, sent a
fleet once more into the Tagus in 1847 to protect Queen
Maria's government against left-wing insurgents.

In a

letter written to Lord John Russell on 9 August 1847,
Palmerston explained the British interest in preserving the
independence of Portugal, and the strategic advantages
Britain derived from Portugal's location:
Those advantages are many, great and obvious:
commercial, military and naval, and if we
were to lose them, some of them would not be
mere loss, but would become formidable wea
pons of attack against us in the hands of a
hostile power. For instance, the naval
position of the Tagus ought never to be in
the hands of any power . . . which might be
come hostile to England, and it is only by
maintaining Portugal in its separate
llllbid., 1:370.
2:523.
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existence, and in its intimate and pro
tected state o£ alliance with England, that
we can be sure o£ having the Tagus as a
friendly instead of its being a hostile
naval station. Only £ancy £or a moment
Portugal forming part o£ Spain, and Spain
led away by France into war with England,
and what would be our naval condition with
all the ports £rom Calais to Marseilles
hostile to us . . . and with nothing between
us and Malta but Gibralter. ... If on the
contrary the Tagus were at our command, we
should occupy an intermediate position
greatly impeding the naval movements of
France and S p a i n .
Centuries of experience lay behind Palmerston's words.
Portugal mattered because o£ her location.

Even in periods

o£ "splendid isolation" Britain maintained with Portugal
relations closer and more continuous than with,any other
Continental state.

The British intervention in Portugal

in 1847 marked the last in the series of overt interferences
in Portuguese a££airs.

Portuguese politics remained as

turbulent as ever, but Anglo-Portuguese relations became
less eventful.

This quiet period lasted most of what re

mained of the nineteenth century.

^^^Russell MSS. P. R. 0, 30/22/6, extract in Kenneth
Bourne, The Foreign Policy of Victorian England, 1850-1902
(Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1970), p. 276.

CHAPTER III

PORTUGAL IN THE FIRST WORLD WAR

Portugal Before the Outbreak of War, 1890-1914
Throughout most of the nineteenth century, Portugal
enjoyed a period of relative quiet in her international re
lations.

But this era was to end before the twentieth cen

tury dawned.

Portugal remained poor and in fact constantly

skirted bankruptcy.

Political instability, never overcome

for long, was to reach a climax in 1910.

Even the vast

empire that Portugal still retained, and on the African
continent extended somewhat, proved very much a mixed
blessing.

Portugal had not the resources to administer her

possessions properly, or to develop their natural wealth.
The Portuguese colonies were backward and scandalously run-a situation very tempting to stronger powers disappointed by
their gains in the sharing-out of Africa during the 1880s
and 18 90s.
The guiding principle of Portuguese foreign policy re
mained as it had been for years--the Alliance with Britain.
Relations between the two countries were not always harmon
ious but no Portuguese government was willing to forego the
protection that the tic with Britain provided.
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Not only did
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dizzying changes in Portuguese cabinets leave the Alliance
untouched, but the revolution o£ 1910, whicli ended the
ancient Portuguese monarchy forever, harmed it not at all.
For Britain the Alliance with Portugal remained an
important element in a complex, worldwide foreign policy.
The strategic basis of the Anglo-Portuguese connection re
mained as valid as ever despite revolutionary changes in
technology.

In fact it took on a new importance when a new

naval threat arose--the rising maritime power of Germany.
The strategic importance of Portugal and its islands made
it a tenet of British foreign policy that Germany must be
prevented from gaining undue influence in Portugal, which
might lead to Germany obtaining bases in Portuguese terri
tory that could threaten Britain's sea lanes.
The publication in 1890 of Alfred T. Mahan's The Influ
ence of Seapower Upon History heightened British awareness
of strategic location as an element of seapower.

Mahan's

teachings, based mostly upon British experience, were widely
read in Britain and had enormous influence there.^

For the

first time naval history emerged as a field of study in its
own right as Mahan traced Britain's rise to maritime dominion,
Mahan emphasized the value of "geographical position" as an
element of seapower, ranking it first among six principal
determinants of naval power.

He referred specifically to the

^Arthur J. jMarder, From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow,
4 vols. (London: Oxford University Press, 1961), 1:4.
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strategic advantages Britain had enjoyed because o£ its alliance with Portugal in more than one place in his book.

2

Mahan's view of "geographical location" as an advantage to
a nation seeking power on the seas emphasized the location
to that nation itself.

But his keen awareness of the impor

tance of overseas bases, and of denying such bases to a po
tential foe showed that the concept did not apply only to a
sea power's native soil.

Portugal and her islands were

obvious cases of strategic base areas.
In this connection the timing of a new Anglo-Portuguese
treaty is significant.

This Anglo-Portuguese secret Declara

tion was signed on 14 October 1899, just as the new threat
from across the North Sea became susceptible in Britain.
agreement was short.

The

It simply reaffirmed that the treaties

of 1642 and 1661 remained in force.

3

The British, then en

gaged in the Boer War, obtained an immediate advantage from
the treaty for it contained a clause forbidding the passage
of arms and munitions from Mozambique into the territory of
the Boers.^
Even as the British tightened their alliance with Portu
gal, they showed themselves willing to bargain away their
country's African colonies over the heads of the Portuguese.

^Mahan, pp. 185, 190.
3

Great Britain, Foreign Office, British Documents on the
Origin of the War, 1898-1914, G. P. Gooch and H. V. Temperly,
eds,, 11 vols. (London: H.M.S.O., 1927), 1:95.
4
"Anglo-Portuguese Secret Declaration," as cited in ibid.,
1:75.
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Portugal was in dire financial straits and Germany was dis
satisfied with her own unprepossessing collection of African
colonies.

The possibility arose that Portugal might be

granted the wherewithal to solve or at least alleviate her
money problems at the price of ceding part of her African
dominions to Germany.

After negotiations which began the

previous May, Britain and Germany signed a secret note on
30 August 1898, setting the boundaries of territory in
Angola which would be assigned to Germany as security for a
loan.^

The Portuguese were not consulted about the disposi

tion of their territory, although A. J, Balfour, who had
signed the agreement for Britain, piously remarked that "I
have al\\?ays, as you know, been of the opinion that this was
quite as much for the interests of Portugal as for those of
the other powers concerned."

In fact, Portugal managed to

scrape by without raising any loans against her African terri
tory and the agreement never came into force.

But it remains

significant for two reasons.
First, the arrangement points up one important charac
teristic of the Anglo-Portuguese Alliance, or of any clientstate relationship.

Britain needed Portugal and Portugal

needed Britain, but their alliance was not a partnership of
equals.

In any conflict Portuguese interests would run a

poor second to those of her mighty partner.

No matter how

^Marquess of Salisbury to Sir H. MacDonell (enclosure
in dispatch from A. J. Balfour to Sir F. Lascelles), as
cited in ibid., 1:80.
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much they resented the fact, the Portuguese could not defy
the will of Britain.
Second, the British willingness to accommodate Germany
in Africa did not extend to any other part of Portuguese
territory except tiny Portuguese Timor, far away in the East
Indies.

Most especially it did not extend to Portugal's

Atlantic islands.

When the possibility arose that a French

loan to Portugal might be secured by a lien on the customs
revenues of Portugal and the Azores, the British reaction
was immediate and uncompromising.

In a dispatch sent to

Sir Herbert MacDonell, then British Minister to Portugal, on
29 November 1898, Lord Salisbury, then both Prime Minister
and Foreign Secretary, explained the British position:
The enclosure in your dispatch No. 99 Secret,
of the 15th instant, shows that, among the
revenues to be assigned to the service of
the loan for which the Portuguese Government
is negotiating in Paris, are included those
of the islands adjacent to Portugal. The
expression "adjacent islands" may include
the Azores. If it does the matter assumes
an aspect to which Her Majesty's Government
cannot be indifferent. They have no desire
to interfere unnecessarily with the arrange
ments which the Portuguese government may
make with a view to placing their finances
on a satisfactory basis.^
Salisbury asked MacDonell to warn the Portuguese that the.
Alliance with Britain committed Portugal to maintain the ter
ritorial status quo, and that the treaty engagements would
be imperiled if the Azores were allowed to pass directly or

^Ibid.
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indirectly under the control of any third power.

"Since the

creation of a lien on the revenues of the islands might con
ceivably permit such a situation to arise," Salisbury in
structed MacDonell to "call the attention of the Portuguese
Minister for Foreign Affairs to the matter and state that Her
Majesty's Government feels bound to ask the Portuguese Govern
ment to give an undertaking in writing that the Azores, without
the written consent of the country, pass under the control of
any third power." 7
Although the loan in question was French, Salisbury took
good care to let the German Ambassador to Britain, Count
Hatzfeldt, know of Britain's objection to outside meddling in
the Azores.

The matter of the strategic location and impor

tance of the Portuguese Islands was too great an issue to
leave to chances of misinterpretation.

Salisbury noted that

Hatzfeldt "received this information with a rather discon
certed manner, and did not return for some little time to the
easy indifference by which his conversation up to this moment
had been distinguished."

g

This ivas not the end of British concern over Portugal's
Atlantic islands.

In 1906 the British government was again

worried by reports that "certain foreign powers" were at
tempting to obtain a coaling station, or special facilities
7

Despatch of Marquess of Salisbury to Sir F. Lascelles,
as cited in ibid., 1:80.
g

Memorandum by Lord Bertie, as cited in ibid.
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for coal ing at Horta in the Azores.

Sir Francis Villiers,

then British Minister at Lisbon, was directed by Sir Edward
Grey, the Foreign Secretary, to check into these rumors.
Villiers received prompt Portuguese assurances "that no con
cessions had been given nor was there any intention of grant
ing one, and that if an attempt were made to obtain a foot
hold in the Azores or elsewhere. His Majesty's government
would certainly be informed."

9

In 1908 a German naval squadron on maneuvers called at
the Azores and Madeira, giving the Portuguese government very
little advance warning of their visit.

The Portuguese were

especially annoyed at the German visit to Madeira, where the
Germans showed ivhat the Portuguese government considered a
suspicious eagerness to ingratiate themselves with the Madeirans.

The Portuguese Foreign Minister, Wenceslas de Lima,

passed the Portuguese complaints on to the British Minister,
Ernest Rennie, who informed London.

In a minute attached

to Ronnie's dispatch, W. A. Stewart, a Foreign Office clerk,
remarked that, "The Germans seem to have behaved in a some
what clumsy way in connexion with the naval visit to the
Azores.

They probably regard the Portuguese people as too

insignificant and too Anglophile to be treated with defer
ence by such a great power as Germany.In spite of Ger
many's domineering attitude towards Portugal (all too
^Despatch of Sir F. Villiers to Sir Edward Grey, No. 32,
as cited in ibid., 8:51.
lODespatcli of Ernest Rennie to Sir Edward Grey, No. 51,
as cited in ibid., 8:65.
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typical o£ Wilhelinine bumptiousness towards other nations)
Britain never quite lost her fear o£ a dangerous degree of
German influence there.
Where the Atlantic islands were concerned, the British
could becoinc concerned over quite minor matters, such as the
possibility that negotiations between Portugal and Germany
over a canceled concession for a German-owned sanatorium in
Madeira might lead to a

German foothold there.

11

When Wil-

helm II stopped off at Lisbon in 1905 on his way to visit
Morocco, Sir M. DeBunsen, the British Minister, noted with
some relief that while the German Kaiser was "received with
considerable pomp and splendour, it would be too much to
say . . . that his Imperial Majesty's presence in Lisbon
worked much popular enthusiasm."

12

In the light of current

Portuguese events, it seems the British worried too much over
German influence in Portugal.

Political turmoil in the coun

try rose towards a climax as King Carlos I and his eldest son
were murdered on 1 February 1908.

Carlos' successor, his

second son Manoel, was overthrown in 1910; since then no king
has reigned in Portugal, which immediately became a Republic.
The Republic was proclaimed on 5 October 1910, and on 9 Octo
ber the British Minister, Sir Francis Villiers, received a
note from the Republic's Foreign Minister, Doctor Bernardino
^^Despatch of Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Villiers, No. 52,
as cited in ibid., 8:65.
12

Despatch of Sir M. DeBunsen to the Marquess of Lansdowne. No. 30, as cited in ibid., 8:49.
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Machado, informing Britain that the provisional government
would abide by all existing treaties and desired "to main
tain and even to strengthen the friendly relations which
exist between Portugal and Great Britain."

13

No Portuguese

government, whatever its political complexion, could afford
to dispense with the British alliance.
Villiers was immediately instructed to carry on rela
tions with the new Portuguese regime on a de facto basis
(total nonrecognition would probably have been fatal to the
Portuguese Republic).

Britain wanted all powers to recognize

Portugal's Republic simultaneously.
did not come until 11 September 1911.

Full ^ jure recognition
In the meanwhile,

Britain sought assurances that the new government would allow
no third party any footholds in its overseas possessions.

As

early as 18 November 1910 Machado assured Villiers that "the
Provisional Government had no intention whatever of parting
with any of the Portuguese colonies.

If any were acquired by

a foreign power it could only be by force.On 28 August
1911, Grey, the Foreign Secretary, sent the British Charge
d'affaires at the Lisbon legation a telegram inquiring into a
report received by the Admiralty that a German company was
13
Despatch of Villiers to Grey, No. 64, as cited in
ibid., 8:72-73.
14
Despatch of Villiers to Grey, No. 79, as cited in
ibid., 8:79.
^^Despatch of Grey to Gaisford, No. 70, as cited in
ibid., 8:76.
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trying to purchase two of the Azores.

16

On 25 October, a re

ply came from the legation that the new Portuguese Foreign
Minister, Dr. Vasconcellos, confirmed Machado's assurances
that no third power would be allowed facilities in the Azores.
As for the sale of any islands, the Portuguese government had
no confirmation of such a deal, but if such a report were true,
"the necessary measures would be taken to prevent the occurrence of any difficulty."

17

Nothing further transpired, and

the report seems to have been groundless.
Late in 1912 the Admiralty suggested that the Portuguese
Alliance could be abandoned, since no enemy could attack Portu
gal's strategic possessions in the face of British sea power.
The Admiralty's arguments provoked a devastating counterblast
by Sir Eyre Crowe, one of the principal policy planners in
the Foreign Office.

Crowe argued:

The Admiralty argument practically amounts to say
ing that the Alliance is of little, if any, value
to us and that we may safely give it up, provided
Portugal remains independent and her Atlantic is
lands are not acquired by any maritime power.
But by what other means than the Alliance is it
suggested that this condition can be fulfilled?
At the present moment there can be no question.
I think that the Alliance and the Alliance alone
stands in the way of the islands falling into
other hands.18

^^Despatch of Gaisford to Grey, No. 71, as cited in
ibid., 8:77.
17
Despatch of Hardinge to Grey, No. 80, as cited in
ibid.,8:80.
18

Memorandum by Sir Eyre Crowe on Admiralty, Memorandum
of 18 December 1912, F.O./367, 343 X/L41. Unpublished MSS.
London; Public Record Office.
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Crowe's arguments quashed any proposal to abandon the Portu
guese Alliance.
Whatever other benefits the new regime brought Portugal,
it did not restore solvency.

The turbulent Republic, like

the decrepit monarchy before it, seemed chronically on the
verge of financial breakdown.

Once again, the possibility

arose of Portugal leasing or selling her African colonies.
In December of 1911 the Germans began unofficial overtures
to Britain for new negotiations to arrange a possible AngloGerman partition of Portuguese Africa.

Actual negotiations

began in March of 1912, and after months of hard bargaining
a new Anglo-German Convention was agreed upon on 20 October
1913.^^

This treaty once again restricted any cession of

Portuguese territory to parts of Mozambique, Angola, and
Portuguese Guinea.

No possibility existed that Portugal

could be forced to yield the Azores or Madeira.

Portugal and the Great War
The first war in a century to involve all Europe could
not be ignored by any European state--not even little Portu
gal, far out on the Continent's western edge.

Because of the

British Alliance, Portugal found herself inevitably aligned
with the Entente.

Neither the terms of the Alliance, nor the

interests of Britain, nor the interests of Portugal, however,

19

Despatch of Grey to Lichnowsky, "Draft Convention"
enclosure. No. 341, as cited in ibid., 10:538-540.
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required Portuguese entry into the war as an active bellig
erent.

The Portuguese armed forces were in very poor shape

and could make no major contribution to the Allied cause.

20

Britain wanted to have Portugal remain nonbelligerent, since
the services Portugal could render the Alliance had much more
to do with Portugal's place on the map than with her military
strength.
For their part the Portuguese remained loyal to the
British Alliance, but had no desire to participate actively
in the war.

On 7 August 1914 Bernardino Machado, then the

Premier of Portugal, announced in the Portuguese Congress
that the country would continue to adhere to the Alliance
with Britain. 2 1

This declaration was repeated and reaffirmed

several months later.

22

Portugal's military and economic

weakness was more recognizable in Portugal than anywhere else.
Deep political divisions made a united national war effort
impossible.

Nevertheless, there were powerful elements on

Portugal's political left that did favor belligerency.
The Portuguese did not fear German reprisals because they
held hostages.

At the outbreak of war more than seventy

20
John Vincent-Smith, "Britain, Portugal and the First
World War, 1914-16," European Studies Review, 4 (July 1974):
210.

21 Republic of Portugal, Plain Speaking: Reasons for
the Intervention in the European War (English translation)
(London: Eyre and Spottswoode, 1917)', p. 7,

22

Times, London, The Times History of the War, 22 vols.
(London: The Times , 1916)~ 9:321.

German merchant ships took refuge in Portuguese harbors.
Drastic action by Germany would mean the loss of all these
vessels.

In addition, the Germans did not want the Portu

guese in Africa (hotli Angola and Mozambique bordered on
German territory) added to their already formidable array
of enemies there.

23

Although the Germans had given evidence of interest in
the Portuguese islands, any attempt by them to use them as
bases was out of the question.

Portugal took such a pro-

Allied line that there was no possibility of German raiders
being allowed access to harbors in the Azores or Madeira.
As for the German Migh Seas Fleet, it was imprisoned in the
North Sea throughout the war by stronger British forces, and
had no access to the open Atlantic.
The way of a nonbelligerent ally, however, is not smooth.
Such a state is in an ambiguous situation, neither truly at
war or truly neutral, which has its own peculiar disadvantages.
Belligerent allies are likely to make demands which arouse
resentment, especially when the disparity of strength between
belligerent and nonbelligerent is as great as it was between
Britain and Portugal.

Belligerent enemies, on the other hand,

are likely to regard nonbelligerency as no more than thinly
concealed enmity and treat nonbelligerent states (if they dare)
with even less forbearance than they show to genuine neutrals.
^^Ibid., 9:322.
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All this the Portuguese were soon to discover.
Initially, armed conflict between the Germans and Portu•24
guese occurred only in the colonial areas of Africa,

As

early as the summer of 1914, shortly after the battle of the
Marne, the Portuguese were presented with a request by Marshal
Joffre (the French Commander-in-Chief) for artillery and gun
ners to reinforce France's depleted artillery reserves.

Al

though Portugal had no obligations to France and agreement
with Joffre's proposal would have made Portuguese belligerency
inevitable, this request had British support.

25

In the end,

some guns were quietly sent to France, although no Portuguese
personnel accompanied them.
The Portuguese role in the war soon became a bitterly
disputed issue in Portugal's internal politics.

The extreme

Republicans (Democrats) favored active belligerency, in part
because they believed that Portugal would be treated with
greater respect by the British if it were an active ally.

2^

The conservative Republicans (Unionists) and the Portuguese
Monarchists opposed involvement, many of the latter actually
pro-German.

27

Portugal's eventual entry into the war was

more a result of internal political maneuverings than of ex
ternal events.

The strongly pro-allied Premier Azeuedo

^^See ibid., 9:351.
^^Vincent-Smith, p. 217.
^^Ibid., p. 218.
^'^Times History, 9:339.
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Coutinho was replaced in January, 1915, by a conservative
general, Pimenta de Castro, who swung Portuguese policy into
a more neutral (or even pro-German) direction.
however, did not last four months.

28

Castro,

On 19 May 1915 a naval

mutiny in the Tagus sparked a revolution which ended with
his overthrow.

29

Castro's regime was replaced by a govern

ment dominated by the war-like Democrats.

In June of 1915

the new government offered Britain free use of all harbors in
Portugal and its possessions, asking nothing in return.

30

The

British government was no more than lukewarm to their ally's
embarrassing eagerness.

Sir Lancelot Carnegie, the British

Minister to Lisbon, had never favored Portuguese belliger
ency, regarding the country as too poor and politically un
stable to be an effective fighting ally.

The British govern

ment feared that Portugal might soon ask for a loan, which
Britain would have difficulty providing.

There was also the

distasteful prospect that "if Portugal remains neutral she
will probably, and if she becomes a belligerent, will cer
tainly, count on our support in making good her claim to have
a voice in the general settlement after the war and to in31
crease her territories in West and East Africa."
In fact, the Portuguese government had no expanionist

^^Vincent-Smith, p. 235.
^^Times History, 9:359.
3(1
31

Vincent-Smith, p. 227.

Carnegie to Grey, 19 June 1915, Despatch No. 72, secret,
F.O. 371/2440 (cjuotcd in Vincent-Smith, p. 228).
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ambitions.

It hoped only to safeguard the territories it

already held which it feared might be bargained away in a
future peace settlement.

The Portuguese remembered the

Anglo-German agreement of 1913.

Only if Portugal intervened,

it was thought, would her empire be completely safe. 3 2

The

British government refused to do anything to encourage Portu
guese intervention, or the Germans to provoke it.

On 5

August 1915 Grey obtained approval for a British policy re
garding Portuguese belligerency.

If Portugal entered the

war as a result of anything but the most flagrant German
provocation, Britain would contribute the absolute minimum,
under the terms of the Anglo-Portuguese Alliance, protecting
Portugal's coasts but providing no financial or material
assistance.

33

The British Admiralty took a much more posi

tive attitude towards the "Portuguese than did the Foreign
Office.

It lost no time at all taking the Portuguese up on

their offer of free use of Portuguese harbors, since it
wanted to use Oporto and Lagos as bases to fight against the
growing German submarine menace.
Admiralty invariably got its way.

In wartime conditions the
34

Portugal's strategic lo

cation was to be utilized whether the country was formally
belligerent or not.
The Germans quite naturally were upset that Portugal's

Vincent-Smith, pp. 229-230.
^^Ibid. , p. 231.
^^Ibid., pp. 232-233.
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strategic location now would be utilized by the British Navy
rather than their own.

Nevertheless they did nothing that

would provide the Portuguese a pretext for declaring" war.
Although the German community in Lisbon did whatever it could
to undermine the Democratic regime and stir up dissension in
the country, it accomplished little.

35

Nevertheless, Portugal's entry into the war was becoming
imminent.

In serious financial straits, the Portuguese gov

ernment desperately needed a loan.

Britain in its turn was

suffering from a severe shortage of shipping tonnage, and
wanted very much to get its hands on the seventy-six German
ships interned in Portuguese ports.

At the urging of Sir

Herbert Kitchener, the War Minister, the British decided to
ask Portugal to requisition the ships, assuring her of the
support of the Anglo-Portuguese Alliance if she needed it.
Linked with this request was the offer of a two-million pound
credit.

This offer was amended:

the two million pounds would

be loaned unconditionally, with a further million added if
Portugal seized the ships.

The Portuguese premier, Alfonso

Costa, agreed to this proposition with a show of reluctance,
after Britain consented to make a formal appeal to the terms
of the Anglo-Portuguese Alliance.
ships were seized.

On 24 February 1916 the

They passed under British control although

they flew the Portuguese flag.

36

^^Times History, 9:346.
^Vincent-Smith, pp. 235-236.
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Strong German counteraction to this very unneutral move
was predictable.

A sharp protest note was followed by a

declaration of war upon Portugal on 9 March 1916.
Portugal was in the war.
a new problem:

37

At last

This, in turn, immediately raised

what kind of belligerent role could Portugal

play?
It would not have been surprising if Portugal, like
many of the minor Allied states in both world wars, had
become only a nominal participant, declaring war but taking
no warlike action.

This course the Portuguese government

immediately rejected.

They were determined to send a Portu

guese fighting force to the main front in France.

The Portu

guese interventionists, long before Portugal was brought into
the war, had planned to send an expeditionary force to the
Western Front.

38

This decision was partly the result of na

tional pride, partly of a calculation that Portugal would be
taken more seriously, and her prestige in the Alliance en
hanced, if her troops were actually fighting.

The fate of

the Portuguese empire, the interventionists argued, might
depend upon a Portuguese contingent fighting in Flanders.

39

With the interventionists in power a force was soon dispatched.
On 3 February 1917 the first troops of the Portuguese Expedi
tionary Force landed in France--a force that consisted of two

^^Times History, 17:335.
^^Vincent-Smith, p. 220.
^^Ibid., p. 230.

divisions or about 30,000 men.

40

By this time the Allies

were liappy to see reinforcements from any source, and even
this small and ill-equipped corps was welcome.

It was as

signed a sector on the British front, on l)Oth banks of the
l.ys River in !• landers.
Unfortunately for everyone concerned, the Portuguese
Expeditionary Force was composed not of the Democratic fire
brands who had been eager to see Portugal at war, but of
bewildered peasant conscripts who were sent off to the trenches
in cloudy, muddy Flanders with no idea why they were there, or
enmity for the Germans they were supposed to fight.

Soon the

British developed serious doubts about the combat value of the
Portuguese,

On 15 January 1918 Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig,

the British Commander-in-Chief, recorded in his diary that,
"General Home, (Commander First Army) to which the Portuguese
were attached ... is anxious about the state of the Portu
guese."^^

Within a few months these doubts were confirmed.

On 9 April 1918 the Portuguese made their one mark on the his
tory of the Western Front when one of their two divisions broke
and ran under a heavy German onslaught, opening a dangerous
hole in the Allied line.^^

They did not seem to have been

employed in combat again.
^^Times History, 17:357.
'^^Sir Douglas Haig, Private Papers 1914-1919, ed. Robert
Blake (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1952), p. 279.
^^John Keegan, "The Battle of the Lys," in History of
the First World War, 7 vols. (London: Purnell, 1971), 7: 269626 97.
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On the seas the Portuguese entry into the war exposed
their merchant marine and fishing fleet to the ravages of
the German submarines.

The first Portuguese ships were

sunk in December of 1916; in the same month two U-boats
actually sailed into Funchal harbor and bombarded the
town.

43
Internally the Portuguese participation in the war

worsened the country's economic and social problems.

Food

riots broke out in Lisbon and Oporto in April of 1916, and
were followed by strikes.
cal strife.

Economic hardship led to politi

In December of 1917 the Democrats were forced

from power, and replaced by a new government, a coalition
led by Doctor Sidonio Paes.^^

Although this new regime re

mained in the war, it was noticeably less enthusiastic about
engaging in it actively than its predecessors.

The lukewarm

attitude of the Sidonio Paes government may have contributed
something to the Portuguese debacle in Flanders the following
April.
The only real contribution the Portuguese were able to
make to the Allied cause was providing bases in the Atlantic
for the struggle against the U-boats.

The opening of Portu

guese ports to British war vessels, mentioned earlier, gave

^^Times History, 17:356.
"^^Ibid. , 17:358.
'^^Ibid., 17:360.
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the British Navy access to harbors in the Azores.

Following

a pattern centuries old, the underwater successors of the
privateers found rich pickings around the islands.

A secret

order to an American Admiral escorting transports in the
iiuropean war zone stated, "reports of enemy submarine activ
ity indicate that the area of greatest danger is East of
longitude twenty West and within a circle radius five hun
dred miles from Fayal, Azores.

After the United States

entered the war in April of 1917, American naval vessels were
sent to the Azores, and by the Armistice the squadron there
numbered twelve vessels.This was to be the precedent for
much greater American utilization of the Azores as a base in
later years.

Not long after the war ended, a new kind of

strategic significance for the islands was revealed when the
U. S. Navy flying boat NC-4, making the first airplane flight
across the Atlantic, landed in the Azores in 1919.

48

After the war was over almost all Portuguese were agreed
that their participation in it had been a mistake.

If non

belligerent ally status had been uncomfortable, belligerency
had been costly and embarrassing.

Portugal was too small to

participate effectively in a battle of giants.

The one real

asset she had to offer her allies--bases (in fact her strategic
location)--she could and did provide before she became a bellig-

^^Thomas G. Frothingham, The Naval History of the World
War (Cambridge, Mass.; Harvard Univers ity Press, 1926), jT! ^7.
"^^Ibid. , p. 285.
48

Guill, p. 1S4.
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erent.

The tiny fraction, three-fourths of 1 percent, of

German reparations, which Portugal obtained by the terms of
the Treaty of Versailles, and a tiny piece of German East
Africa, were Iiardly adequate compensation for the cost incurred by her involvement in the war.

49

It was a lesson

which the Portuguese were to remember, and profoundly influ
enced the policy they would follow in the next great world
conflict.

49

U. S. Department of State, The Treaty of Versailles
and After (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office,
T947), p. 44.

CHAPTER IV

PORTUGAL AND WORLD WAR II
The Rise of Salazar and the Spanish Civil .War
The end of the First World War did nothing to ease Portu
gal's chronic political turbulence, which lasted far into the
next decade.

Over the course of time unceasing instability

had its repercussions on the Anglo - Portuguese Alliance.

Rela

tions with Britain deteriorated to the point that in 1927
Austin Chamberlain, the Foreign Secretary, began to doubt
whether the Alliance was worth preserving.

If there was any

doubt on this matter, the Foreign Office's reply to a query
on the subject strongly reaffirmed the Alliance's value.

The

tie with Portugal guaranteed Portuguese assistance in wartime
which had been of value in the Boer War and the Great War,
despite Portugal's weakness.

The fact that Portugal was

linked with Britain removed her as a possible enemy, easing
the burdens of Britain's defense planners.

Above all, the

Alliance guaranteed Britain the use of Lisbon harbor and the
Portuguese islands as naval and air bases in wartime, and
barred foreigners from obtaining footholds in the islands
without prior British consent.

The Foreign Office argued

tliat Britain's situation in 1914 would have been "immeasurably
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more dangerous and difficult" if Portugal had been on the
German side, or even completely neutral.

Such a situation

1
"might indeed have cost Britain the war."
These arguiiicnts plus the contention that Britain would
be on very shaky legal grounds if slie denounced the treaty
unilaterally, changed Chamberlain's mind completely, and in
November of 1927 the British Cabinet concurred in Chamber
lain's new view.

On 21 December 1927 Chamberlain replied to

a question on the Alliance in the House of Commons with the
statement that the British government liad "every intention of
maintaining in force the ancient Alliance between this country
and Portugal."

2

The question of the usefulness of the Alliance came up
once again in the interwar years, when in 1936 the retired
Ambassador to Portugal, Claude Russell, wrote a memorandum
on the subject at the prompting of Sir Samuel Hoare, recently
Foreign Secretary.

Reflecting the mood of the British govern

ment during that melancholy decade, Russell assumed that
Britain's primary aim was to reduce her risks and limit her
involvements abroad.

Russell expressed the fear that pro

tecting Portugal's colonies might embroil Britain with one
of her own dominions. South Africa, as well as with Germany,

^Austin Chamberlain to Sir W. Tyrell, PRO CAB 24/189
C.P. 255.
2

Great Britain, House of Commons, Parliamentary Debates,
vol. 212 , 11, 1927 (London: H.M.S.O., 1948), p. 386.
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Japan, or Italy.

Nevertheless Russell clearly noted that

Britain did derive an advantage from the Alliance--in time
of war Britain would have the use of the Tagus and the
Atlantic islands.

This advantage was hypotlietical but by

no means negligible.

3

Once again the Foreign Office spoke up in defense of
the Alliance.

An official of the Western Department, C. A. E,

Shuckbrugh, reiterated the arguments that had convinced
Chamberlain in 1927 and added to them the assertion that
Britain could expect no special rights in the Atlantic islands
(even in return for a British guarantee of Portuguese posses
sion) if she terminated the Alliance.

Shuckbrugh believed

that the military value of the Alliance had increased since
1927, and the naval value of Lisbon and the islands had been
supplemental by their new use, as landing places for planes
flying the British Empire's air routes.

If Spain went com

munist (at this time the strongly left-wing Popular Front
was in power in Madrid), a friendly Portugal would be a defi
nite asset to Britain, even if she had once more to be guarded
4
from invasion.

Shuckbrugh's arguments were supported by Sir

George Maunsey, Permanent Assistant Under Secretary at the
Foreign Office, a higher-ranking official.

The question

3

Memorandum by Claude Russell to Anthony Eden, 29 Jan
uary 1936, FO 371/20512.
'^Glyn Stone, "The Official British Attitude to the
Anglo-Portuguese Alliance 1910-1945," Journal of Contemporary
History 10 (October 1975) :737.
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appeared to be settled.^
Only a few months later, however, civil war erupted in
Spain.

The conflict was not merely a crisis in internal

Spanish politics l:iut in the international affairs' of all
Europe.

Portugal was destined to play an important if gen

erally overlooked role in the Spanish Civil War.

Portuguese

policy toward the Spanish displeased Britain, but Portugal
clung to it nevertheless.

To understand Portugal's position

in the Spanish crisis--and in much else that was to happen
later, one must backtrack a few years to 1932, when a funda
mental change occurred in Portuguese politics--the coming to
power of Antonio de Oliveira Salazar.
The instability, at times verging on anarchy, that had
plagued the Portuguese Republic since its inception worsened
during the 1920s.
collapse.

Political turmoil resulted in economic

In desperation the current military junta appointed

Salazar, then a professor of political economy at the Univer
sity of Coimbra, Minister of Finance in June, 1926.^

Salazar's

first term in office was short, but he was reappointed in 1928
by the Acting President, General Carmona.

Salazar's policies

proved so successful in restoring financial stability to the
country that he soon dominated the government.

On 5 July 1932

Salazar became Prime Minister and the following year a new

^Ibid. , p. 738.
^Hugh Kay, Salazar and Modern Portugal (New York; Haw
thorne Books, 1970), p. 38.
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constitution granted him dictatorial powers.

In this unusual

fashion despotism, the usual cure for anarchy, came to Portu
gal and one of the most durable regimes in modern European
history began its Jong reign.

Unlike most of its contempo

raries in liurope and out, the "Estado Novo," as Salazar's
government was called, was the creation not of a popular dema
gogue or a military dictator, but of a professor.

It reflected

Salazar's own mild-mannered but iron-willed personality.

As

dictators go, Salazar was neither very ruthless nor very cruel,
although his power rested ultimately upon armed force and an
efficient secret police, the P.l.D.E.
Salazar's own political beliefs were strongly and unmis
takably right-wing.

He himself was a devout Catholic, and

Catholic doctrine colored his economic and political beliefs.
Corporatism, a basic principle of his regime, was drawn partly
from Catholic thought, partly from Mussolini's Fascist state.
Salazar himself was then and later often called a "fascist,"
and he did admire Mussolini.

g

In the prewar years Salazar's

government took on some typical fascist trappings, such as a
uniformed youth movement.' But if it resembled any other Eu
ropean dictatorship it was not Fascist Italy, and still less
Nazi Germany, but the short-lived Austrian state of Dolfuss
and Schuschnigg.

Salazar did share with the Italians and

German dictatorships a loathing for Marxism and Communism in

^l b id . , pp. 48 - 49.
^Ibid., p. 67.
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all its forms.

Anti-Communism was one of Salazar's deepest

beliefs, never abandoned or relaxed throughout his lifetime.

9

This belief helps explain not only his domestic policies, but
his foreign policy as well.
Given Salazar's views, it should surprise no one that
Portugal openly backed the Nationalist side in the Spanish
Civil War from the very beginning.

Salazar actually sent a

force of 20,000 "volunteers" to fight on Franco's side.

This

force was one of the least-known, but by no means the smallest
or least effective of the various foreign legions engaged on
either side in the Spanish struggle.As many as 50 percent
of the Portuguese force became casualties.Salazar's help
to Franco's forces went far beyond contributing troops.

He

provided diplomatic and moral support, and what few munitions
he could spare.

The most important assistance Portugal pro

vided was to serve as a conduit for the aid sent the Nation
alists by their powerful foreign allies, especially Germany.
The foremost historian of the Spanish Civil War writes, "It
was through Portugal that the greater part of German aid was
at first sent."

12

The Civil War was not a month old when the

Spanish Nationalists made their first requests for aircraft

^Ibid,, p. 68.
^^Ilugh Thomas, The Spanish Civil War (New York; Harper
and Brotliers, 1961), p. 232.
^^New York Times, 6 May 1939.
^^Thomas, p. 231.
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to be delivered via Portugal.
On 22 August 1936 the German Charge in Lisbon, Count
Du Moulin, reported to his government that a shipment o£
arms had been passed on to the Spanish rebels after being
landed in Lisbon from German vessels.

He noted that "Prime

Minister Salazar removed all difficulties within a veryshort time by his personal initiative and personal handling
14
of details."

Salazar's action set the pattern for future

arms shipments.

Once again, Portugal was serving as a sally

port into the peninsula for outside forces.
was once again a factor in world history.

Her location
Due to Portugal's

easy access to the outside world and the circumstance that
Nationalist forces quickly won control of most of the Spanish
territory on her borders, she was ideally situated to foster
outside intervention in the Spanish fratricide.

Signifi

cantly, until Germany formally recognized the Franco regime
on 18 November 1936, the German Minister in Lisbon also
functioned as the unofficial envoy to Nationalist Spain.
There was one major alteration in the pattern of cen
turies.

This time Britain was not the foreign power inter

vening in Iberia.

The British government feared that the

S., Department of State, "Charge d'Affairs in Portu
gal to (German) Foreign Ministry," in Documents on German
Foreign Policy, Series D (Washington, D.C.: Government Print
ing Office, 1950), 3:14 (hereafter cited as D.G.F.P.)
l^ibid., 3:53.
15"Foreign Minister to Legation in Portugal," as cited
in ibid. , 3:132.
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Spanish War might be the trigger that would set o££ the longexpected, long-dreaded world war.

Her primary objective was

to keep out of the conflict herself and as far as possible to
keep other powers out as well.

It was impossible to recon

cile Britain's aims with Salazar's wholehearted support of
tlie Nationalist rebels.

The result, inevitably, was strain

on the Anglo-Portuguese Alliance.
When Britain and France sponsored an international effort
to prevent outside meddling in Spain, Portugal had to be
pressured heavily by Britain before she would agree to par
ticipate.

On 18 August 1936 Salazar issued a decree embargo

ing the export of munitions to Spain, but included a clause
which provided "that the prohibition is to be suspended
should any nation adhering to the agreement enlist, directly
or indirectly volunteers for either side, open subscrip
tions . . . , or send funds publicly subscribed. . .
Since various outside powers--Germany and Italy on one side,
the U.S.S.R. and Mexico on the other--were doing just that,
a loophole was left through which Portugal could send any aid
to Franco she desired.
Portugal did make a show thereafter of adhering to non
intervention.

The country had a seat on the International

Great Britain, Foreign Office, "Spain No. 2, pp. 15-17,"
quoted in William E. Watters, An International Affair: Non
intervention in the Spanish Civil War, 1936-1939 (New York:
Exposition Press, 1971), p. 58.
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Non-intervention Committee,
but its participation was
always reluctant and balky, conditioned on strict adherence
to

nonintervention by all other powers, which never occurred.

At times the U.S.S.R. used Portuguese involvement as a justi18
fication for its own aid to the Spanish Republicans,

Portu

gal contributed its share to the atmosphere o£ hypocrisy and
sham that constantly surrounded "nonintervention."
Salazar's attitude toward the Spanish War, combined with
demands for greater military assistance from Britain, brought
the British government once again to reassess the AngloPortuguese Alliance.

After Portugal in 1937 requested larger

arms shipments and the dispatch of a British military mission
to Lisbon, the British Foreign Office sought the views of the
Committee of Imperial Defence.

The Committee replied by

ordering a report by the Chiefs of Staff Sub - Committee on the
Alliance, and then passing the report to the Foreign Office
with its endorsement.

Once again the value of the Alliance

was reaffirmed on strategic grounds.

In the last decade the

importance of Portugal's strategic location had in fact in
creased.

Germany's rearmament, the growth of hostility be

tween Britain and Italy, and the Spanish Civil War had raised
the value of the Alliance to British naval strategy.

If a

hostile government aligned with Germany and Italy came to

^^Dante A. Puzzo, Spain and the Great Powers, 1936-1941
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1962), p. 116.
1R

Watters, p. 86.
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power in Spain, Gibralter might become untenable.

In that

event access to Portuguese ports would be invaluable to the
Royal Navy.

The use of air bases in the Azores, Madeira,

and the Cajie Vcrdes IsJands (off the western bulge of Africa)
would be-of great use for shipping protection since they
formed a triangle through which much of Britain's maritime
commerce must pass.

The Chiefs of Staff concluded by stres

sing the importance of the Anglo-Portuguese tie to Britain's
strategy and confirming that its maintenance was extremely
^ ^ 19
important.
On 21 July 1937 the Cabinet approved the conclusions of
the C.I.D., including its recommendation that a British mili
tary mission be sent to Lisbon to counteract German and
Italian influence.

The sending of the mission helped keep

Portugal within the British political orbit.

20

Britain's

assessment of Portugal's strategic value thus overrode any
differences caused by the two nations' profoundly divergent
attitude toward the Spanish Civil War.

Any danger that a

rift in the Anglo-Portuguese Alliance might develop was there
fore averted.
Two other factors operated to preserve the AngloPortuguese tie--the course of the Spanish Civil War and the
diplomatic astuteness of Antonio Salazar.

Portuguese help

to the Nationalists, crucial in the early stages of the

^^CAB 24/270 C.P. 189, COS 602C10 1336-B.
^'^Stone, p. 740.
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"Crusade," became less essential as the war went on.

As

they moved on from victory to victory, slowly grinding down
their Republican opponents, the Nationalists won both German
and Italian recognition, and tlie control of such major ports
as Cadiz and Cartagena.

Thereafter the Axis powers could

send the men and supplies so important to Franco directly
i\fith no need to use Portugal as an intermediary.

Portugal,

whose essential contribution had been her service as an entryway for aid from Germany, could then move discreetly to the
sidelines without fear that she would thereby weaken her
friends.

This reduced friction with Britain.

Salazar, whose expertise in foreign affairs was to serve
his country well throughout his lifetime, never put a foot
wrong.

He helped the Nationalists all he could when his

help was most necessary, but did so quietly enough that he
avoided openly offending Britain.

His adherence to noninter

vention, however insincere, allowed Britain to ignore his
actual support of the Nationalists.

With the total victory

of Franco's armies in March of 1939, Salazar could feel that
he had won the best of all possible diplomatic worlds.

A

neighboring regime which Salazar regarded as a menace had
been overthrown and replaced by one which was not only
friendly but in Salazar's debt.

Indeed, for this reason,

one of Franco's first actions as dictator of Spain was a
friendship treaty with Portugal on 17 March 1939, called
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the Iberian Pact.

21

Salazar had managed to make a vital

contribution to Franco's cause without alienating the
JVritisli in the process.

Shortly after the Spanish crisis

Salazar had publicly reaffirmed tJie value of the Alliance
to Portugal in a speech delivered on 22 May 1939.

22

It was,

as Salazar knew full well, Portugal's mainstay in an increas
ingly perilous world.

The Alliance was left unshaken, even

strengthened, by the cataclysm in Spain.
Salazar's principal biographer, Hugh Ka/, argues that
his Spanish Civil War policy was not merely aimed at destroy
ing the Spanish Republic, but was in fact "constructive and
23
almost visionary."

Kay sees Salazar's ultimate aim as the

creation of an Iberian bloc which would interlock with the
Anglo-Portuguese Alliance, and draw Franco away from theAxis.

Britain would help Portugal to rearm, while Portugal

would safeguard British interests diplomatically in the
peninsula, strategically by his control of the Atlantic is
lands and important portions of Africa.
The European holocaust had been averted in Spain only
to erupt, a few months after the end of the Civil War, in

^^Kay, p. 461.
22

Antonio De Oliveira Salazar's Speech to the National
Assembly, 22 May 1939, Portugal, Secretariado da Propaganda
Nacional, Portugal (Lisbon, 20 June 1939), pp. 5-6.
^^Kay, p. 110.
24
Royal Institute of International Affairs, Survey of
International Affairs 1939-46 (London: Oxford University
Press, 1956), 9:319.
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Poland.

World conflict once again presented Portugal with

difficult problems similar to those she had faced in 1914.
Her ruler, who had seen his policies triumph a few scant
months before, faced new and difficult tests.
oncc again on the edge of a vortex.

Portugal was

It was a foregone con

clusion that Portugal's location would, unless the war
proved very short or very localized (and neither circumstance
was in prospect), become a factor in the struggle.
Portugal and the Allies
In 1939, unlike 1914, the foreign policy of Portugal
was guided by the decisions of one man.

It would not be

come an issue between political factions as it had during
the Great War.

This time there was no sentiment for inter

vention by any significant section of the Portuguese; the
memories of the costly humiliations that followed Portugal's
entry into war in 1916 were still painful.

The first announce

ment of neutrality appeared in the Portuguese press on 2
September 1939.

If ever Salazar spoke for his people, he

did so on 6 October 1939 when he proclaimed Portuguese neu
trality to the world in a speech before the National Assembly.
Immediately after announcing "deliberation to be neutral and
[the Portuguese government's] hope of maintaining peace for
the Portuguese people, unless the honor of the country, her
interests or obligations, should cause us to abandon that
position," Salazar added, "however, we should not have re
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mained at peace with our conscience (for friends should not
turn away at times of need) if we had not reaffirmed at
that grave moment our feelings of friendship and our full
fidelity to the British Alliance."

25

Salazar's neutrality

was thus neither absolute nor unqualified.

There was no

question of abandoning the British Alliance.
The British in turn had no desire to see Portugal be
come an active belligerent since any assistance she might
offer would be in the form of access to strategic bases
which she did not have to be a belligerent to provide.

The

Foreign Office had decided in 1938, when an Anglo-German war
over Czechoslovakia seemed imminent, that Portugal should
remain neutral, and this decision was upheld in 1939.

26

Salazar himself had few illusions about Hitler, whose
pagan racism had little in common with his own Catholic outlook. 2 7

The Portuguese dictator might sympathize with Hit

ler's anti-communism, but even this had been compromised by
the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact that had preceded the war's out
break.

Britain need have no fear that Salazar would fall

under Hitler's spell.
Sir Walford Selby, British Ambassador to Portugal from

25

Antonio Oliveira de Salazar, Speech to the National
Assembly, 6 October 1939, Portugal, Secretariado da Propaganda
Nacional, Portugal (Lisbon, 22 December 1939), pp. 4-5.
^^Sir Walford Selby, Diplomatic Twilight 1930-1940
(London: John Murray, 195377 PP• 109-1107
^^Kay, p. 67.
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December, 1938 to December, 1940, did fear German influence
on otlier elements of Portuguese society.

The country was

full of German agents and attempts were being made to infil
trate such strategic Portuguese organizations as the Mocidade,
tlie official youth movement, and even more ominously, the
secret police and the armed forces.

28

The Germans were en

trenched in the Portuguese economy and their efficiency
29
earned them much admiration in Portugal.

The British de

voted much effort to combating German penetration, resorting
to such measures as supplying munitions to the Portuguese
army and opening an air route between London and Lisbon to
compete with the German-run airline between Lisbon and
Madr id.^
Salazar, if sympathetic to Britain, was yet a strongly
nationalist ruler who was determined to uphold Portuguese
sovereignty and adhere more strictly to neutrality than
Britain preferred.

Friction inevitably developed between

Portugal and her protector.

The old problem of the First

World War--the relationship between two allies, one of whom
was a belligerent and the other at peace--returned to plague
Anglo-Portuguese relations.
By 1940 dissension between the two nations had become
serious enough that Selby was asked to pass a personal

^^Selby, p. 89.
29

Kay, p. 128.

^'^Selby, p. 107.
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message to Salazar from Lord Halifax, then British Foreign
Secretary, detailing the British position on issues that
had arisen bet\veen the two countries.

Salazar returned "a

courteous but firm reply which emphasized his good will,
but insisted on the Portuguese right to interpret her neu
trality in her own best interests.

On this point Salazar

made clear he must reserve his complete liberty of action.
Halifax pronounced himself satisfied with this reply.
Relations between the two states might have continued
in this sometimes inharmonious but basically uneventful
fashion if the war had not changed so drastically between
April and June in 1940.

In three months Germany's sudden

triumphs in Scandinavia, the Low Countries, and France
made her masters of all western Europe except the British
Isles and Iberia.

The arrival of German troops at the

Pyrenees passes raised the possibility, distant but discern
ible, that the Wehrmacht might invade Portugal.

Great Brit

ain, which Portugal for centuries had regarded as her in
vincible protector, was in dire peril, faced with invasion
itself.

Germany was now master of most of Europe's Atlantic

seaboard, a position far more advantageous than she had ever
enjoyed in 1914-18.

(Lisbon was the only important port on

the Continent between Stockholm and Cadiz still outside
German control.)

Not only Portugal herself, but her islands

in the Atlantic were potential victims of German attack.

^^Ibid.,

p. 111.
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The German victories and fears of a German-inspired
coup in Lisbon or a Spanish attack on Portugal caused the
British War Cabinet on 15 May 1940 to ask the Chiefs of
Staff, especially the Admiralty, to prepare a plan for Brit
ish action if it should be necessary to occupy strategic
points in Continental Portugal, the Azores, or the Cape
Verdes.

The Admiralty replied that Portugal itself would

not be of much value to Germany since before taking the
country she would have had to obtain control of Spanish air
fields and harbors which would suffice to meet German needs
in Iberia.

No action in Portugal itself was recommended.

The Azores and Cape Verdes must, however, be denied to the
enemy since enemy forces in the islands would threaten
32
British sea communications.
The occupation of the French Biscay ports by German
troops in June of 1940 increased the atmosphere of stark
danger felt in the Admiralty.

Germany now had the bases

from which she could launch raids or amphibious expeditions
against the Atlantic islands.

Force H, the British naval

squadron stationed at Gibralter, was given the mission of
protecting them.

On 10 October 1940 Admiral Sir James

Somerville, Commander of Force H, was diverted from an
attempt to intercept the Vichy French battleship Richelieu
by warning of a possible German landing.

Two troop trans

ports were kept ready to land troops in the Azores if

^^Stone, p. 740.
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Spain or Portugal were invaded; the British would on no account risk a German foothold in the islands.

33

Hitler

realized that the probable consequence of an invasion of
Iberia was a British seizure of the Azores and, as will be
seen, this influenced his own plans for the Iberian penin
sula.
The British War Cabinet, in a desperate but resolute
frame of mind inspired by the threat they faced in the sum
mer of 1940, actually considered the pre-emptive seizure of
the Atlantic islands.

This course of action was rejected

on 22 July since it would be unwise to precipitate matters
and incur the hostility of either Iberian government.

Only

if actual hostilities with them broke out, or if it were
clear beyond reasonable doubt that either country was about
to join the Axis against Britain, would the islands be
seized.

Only the Cabinet itself could make the decision

for such an operation.The question thus was settled for
the time being, but would come up again.
Meanwhile, still another power became concerned by the
fate of the Azores.

The fall of France had created worri

some new problems for the United States.

For the first time

Roosevelt's administration had to consider whether or not it
was necessary that the United States intervene in the war,

^^Captain S. W. Roskill, The War at Sea 1939-1945 (Lon
don; H.M.S.O., 1954), 1:272-273.
R. M. Butler, Grand Strategy (London: H.M.S.O.,
1957), 2:239.
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Even if the United States kept out of the conflict she could
not ignore the threat raised by a potential enemy in control
of the entire European contineilt.

It might become necessary

to keep Germany from gaining footholds in the Americas,
Keeping the Atlantic islands, especially the Azores, out of
German hands would be vital to any such effort.

Air and

naval bases in the Azores, once in German hands, could be
utilized to cover an actual invasion of the Western Hemi
sphere.

As early as July of 1940 the Americans warned Portu

gal and Spain (who owned the Canary Islands) of its concern
over the status of the Atlantic islands and received assur
ances from both countries that neither would allow any
,
35
changes.
In 1940 the U. S, Government concentrated above all on
keeping Britain in the war.

Once it was evident, by the

end of the year, that Britain's immediate crisis had been
overcome and that the conflict would be prolonged, the U. S.
Government took steps to support the British by all means
short--just barely short--of war.

In rapid succession came

the "destroyers for bases" deal and the passage of the LendLease Act.

These measures resulted in increasingly intimate

Anglo-American cooperation and a slow but inexorable drift
towards actual American involvement in the war.
Interestingly enough, the very first military operation

^^William L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason, The Chal
lenge to Isolation 1937-1940 (New York: Harper and Bros.,
1952), p. 738.

outside the Western Hemisphere the United States planned
during the Second World War was the occupation of the
Azores.

36

The idea for the project was actually inspired

by Winston Churchill in a private message to Roosevelt sent
11 April 1941 warning that Germany might soon occupy Spain
and Portugal.

If that happened Britain would dispatch ex

peditions to the Azores and Cape Verdes.

Fearing that Ger

mans might move in before the British could arrive, Churchill
suggested that Roosevelt send a U. S. naval squadron "for a
friendly cruise" in the vicinity of the islands.

37

The naval

cruise was canceled after Salazar, fearing an American visit
might be interpreted as a breach of neutrality, refused to
issue an invitation.

Roosevelt, however, informed Churchill

on 29 April 1941 that the U. S. was setting up a naval patrol
which would cover the "westerly side" of the Azores and Cape
Verdes, although no planes would be flown over the islands
themselves.

In the same message he asked Churchill to "make

it very clear to the American people" that if Britain did
occupy the Azores it would be for British wartime defense
only, and that Portuguese sovereignty would be restored after
the war.

Roosevelt's exaggerated suspicions of "British

imperialism" may have been the real reason for this request,
but the ostensible reason was "that as you know, most of the
^^Richard W. Steele, Tlie First Offensive 1942 (Bloomington: Indiana University PresF^^ 1973), p~!^ IT]
37

U. S., Department of State, Foreign Relations of the
United States 1941 (Washington: Government Printing Office,
1959), 2:839 (hereaIter cited as F.R.U.S. 1941).

115

Azores are in Western Hemisphere under my longitudinal map
reading."

In his reply Churchill assented readily to

Roosevelt's wish, although he complained that any prior
warning of a British occupation miglit mean tliat "we shall
be forestalled," since the Germans, "will try to synchronize
any decisive move from Spain or Portugal with a stroke on
the islands.
On 27 May 1941 Roosevelt delivered a speech in which
he proclaimed an "Unlimited National Emergency."

In the

course of this long and important address he stated:
They [the Germans] also have the armed power
at any moment to occupy Spain and Portugal,
and that threat extends not only to French
North Africa and the western end of the
Mediterranean but it extends also to the
Atlantic fortress of Oakes (a port on the
westernmost bulge of Africa, the capital of
present-day Senegal) and to the island out
posts of the New World--the Azores and the
Cape Verde Islands.39
Roosevelt returned to the subject of the islands several times
during this speech.

Me warned;

Equally, the Azores or the Cape Verde Is
lands, if occupied or controlled by Germany,
would directly endanger the freedom of the
Atlantic and our own American physical
safety. Under German domination these is
lands would become bases for submarines,
warships and airplanes raising the waters
that lie immediately off our own coasts
and attacking the shipping in the South
Atlantic. They would provide a springboard

^^Ibid., 2:839-841.
39

Franklin U. Roosevelt, The Public Papers and Addresses
of Franklin D. Roosevelt, edited by Samuel I. Rosenman (New
York: Harper and Brothers, 1950), 10:185.
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for actual attack against the integrity and
the independence of Brazil and her neighbor
ing Republics.40
Roosevelt proclaimed that American policy was to resist any
attempt by Hitler to expand towards the Western Ilemispliere
or to threaten it.
the seas.

Germany would not be allowed to control

"We insist upon the vital importance of keeping

Hitlerism away from any point in the world which could be
used or would be used as a base of attack against the Ameri
cas.The Portuguese islands, as Roosevelt's earlier
passages demonstrate, were prominent among these points.
Military planning already backed up Roosevelt's
rhetoric.

On 22 May Roosevelt met with his senior military

advisors, Admiral Harold Stark and General George C. Marshall,
and ordered them to prepare at once for an occupation of the
Azores.

Although the President believed that the landing

would merely be a peaceful "takeover from the Portuguese or
the British," Marshall responded that any American force
should be ready to fight.

Roosevelt gave Stark and Marshall

"thirty days in which to have ready an expedition to sail
42
for, and take, the Azores."
It would have been ironic if the United States had
opened its active participation in World War II by the inva
sion of the territory of another neutral.
40lbid., p. 188.
41lbid., p. 190.
4 2steele, p. 14.

No such drastic
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step, fortunately, turned out to be necessary.

The Portu

guese government made it clear that the islands would be
defended against all comers.

Alarmed by a statement by

Claude Pepper, a Democratic Senator from Florida, that the
United States should occupy, among other places, the Azores
43
and Cape Verdes,
the Portuguese Minister in Washington,
Joao de Bianchi, anxiously called on Cordell Hull, the Sec
retary of State, on 9 May.

Bianchi stressed that Portugal

had neither promised nor granted bases to any other power,
and was reinforcing the defenses of its island to resist
attack from any quarter.

Although Hull reassured the Portu

guese Minister that Pepper spoke for himself only, Portugal's
fears were not groundless.

To underline their determination

to keep any foreign forces out of the Azores, the Portuguese
hastened to reinforce their garrison there.
The American occupation of the Azores was destined never
to take place.

The Portuguese made it plain that they would

resist fiercely any attempt to occupy any of their territory.
It soon became apparent that neither Portugal nor its islands
were in imminent danger.

A month to the day after Roosevelt

called in his Chiefs of Staff to plan the seizure of the Azores,
Germany invaded Russia.

At once the complexion of the war was

S., Congress, Senate, Senator Pepper speaking on
"America and the World Conflict," 77th Cong., 1st sess.,
6 May 1941, Congressional Record 87:3617.
^^F.R.U.S. 1941, 10:841-42.
"^^New York Times, 25 April 1941.
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changed dramatically.

With the strength of the Wehrmacht

concentrated against Russia, Hitler had few resources to
spare for adventures in the Atlantic.

In the end the U. S.

troops originally intended to occupy the Azores were sent
to another island far to the north, relieving the British
garrison in Iceland in July of 1941.'^^
Neither Allied concern for the fate of the Azores,
nor Portuguese concern for the maintenance of their neutral
ity entirely abated during 1941.

Bianchi tenaciously sought,

but never quite received, assuranced from Hull that the Amer
icans would in no circumstances violate Portuguese sovereignty.

47

The United States government was not willing to

give any such assurance.

Although Britain had sometimes

tried to restrain the United States from excessive impetuosity in the Atlantic.

48

she was at least as unwilling as

the United States to risk an/ German coup in the Azores, as
is demonstrated by a message from Churchill passed through
the British Embassy to Sumner Welles, Under-Secretary of
State (and much closer to Roosevelt than Hull) on 18 June
1941.

"The British government," read the request, "desired

to know whether the Government of the United States would be
prepared immediately to undertake joint staff conversations
with the British government to agree on plans covering the
46steele, p. 16.
"^^F.R.U.S. 1941 , 2:844- 848.
48

Kay, p. 162.

occupation o£ the Azores,"

49

to provide for a situation in

which Salazar was unable or unwilling to request American
or British protection.
l^ooscvelt, For his part, took steps to improve the in
creasingly prickly state of Luso-American relations.

On

14 July 1941 he dispatched a personal letter to Salazar.
After assuring the Portuguese ruler of "the consistent de
sire of the United States that there be no infringement of
Portuguese sovereign control over those territories,^®
Roosevelt offered to assist Portugal to defend her posses
sions against German attack, with full assurances that
Portuguese sovereignty would be respected, and American
forces withdrawn immediately after the war's end.

He sug

gested that Brazil be asked to participate in any defense
measures, apparently believing that Brazilian troops might
be more welcome on the soil of their mother country than
American forces.

Roosevelt concluded by referring to his

visit to the Azores in World War I when he was Assistant
Secretary of the Navy.

His mention of the U. S. bases then

established in the Azores and of the "close and friendly"
relationships between the American forces and the Portuguese
population may have been intended as a gentle hint that similar arrangements should be made again.

"^^F.R.U.S. 1941 , 2:851.
^°Ibid., 2:852.
^^Ibid. , 2 : 853.
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Salazar's reply was equally friendly in its tone.

He

wrote that "The Portuguese military authorities did not share
the fear of an attack on the Azores by German forces, since
control of the Atlantic is not their's."

52

The Portuguese

government, with antiaircraft guns and aviation material
supplied by Britain, was confident it could defend its islands
against any attack.

Salazar suggested that he would accept

American aid if Britain could not provide adequate supplies.
Although announcing his intention of preserving Portuguese
neutrality, he left a door open for future cooperation-"should [Portuguese neutrality] change in consequence of a
violation of her sovereignty, the situation resulting there
from would have to be examined in a different light and the
new position would have to be defined."

53

Thereafter the relations between Portugal and the United
States warmed.

The Azores problem lost its urgency for the

time being, to be revived in a new context in 194 3.

When the

United States entered the war in December, 1941, one of the
immediate results was the escalation of the German submarine
offensive.

Whereas the U-boats had previously largely con

centrated their attack on the convoy routes near Britain, they
now operated off the North American coast, in the Gulf of
Mexico, and in the central Atlantic.

The consequence was a

tremendous slaughter of Allied merchant shipping.

^^Ibid. , 2 : 854.
^^Ibid., 2:855.

The sub-
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marine menace, one of the most serious dangers the Allies
had faced since the beginning of the war, reached crisis
levels in 1942.^^
Although German submarines had lurked around the Azores
since early in the war, the islands hitherto had lain well
south of the main convoy battlegrounds.

The expansion of

the U-boat offensive now made them increasingly attractive
as defensive bases.

The Allies needed every available port

to shelter convoys and their escorts, and every available
airfield to fly protective patrols and hunt down submarines.
The Azores were especially useful in one regard.

One of the

Allies' most serious handicaps was the so-called "Black Pit,"
an area in mid-Atlantic which could not be protected by
patrol planes flying from bases on either side of the ocean.
The Black Pit had been narrowed since the war began by the
use of longer-ranged planes, but in 1942 it was still 600
miles wide.^^

In this area, U-boats could operate with rela

tive immunity to aircraft, and here they inflicted the heavi
est losses on Allied shipping.

Bases in the Azores could

put an end to the "Black Pit."

Patrols over the central

Atlantic could be flown from the islands and provide air
cover for convoys from one side of the Atlantic to the other.
Use of the Azores would also make it possible to use convoy

^^Samuel Eliot Morison, History of the United States
Naval Operations in World War II, 15 vols. (Boston: Little,
Brown, 1956), 10:8.
^•''Dldward P. Von der Porten, The German Navy in World
War II (New York: Crowell, 1969), p. 186.
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routes further south than those currently available, a real
advantage in the stormy north Atlantic winter.

Convoy routes

could be shortened, economizing shipping, and changed more
easily to elude U-boats.
in the Azores.

Naval escorts could be refuelled

Airfields in the Azores, besides strength

ening the anti-submarine patrol, could be used as landing
places for air transports.

It was estimated that use of the

Azores for this purpose alone could save yearly a million
tons of shipping, plus 100 million gallons of aviation fuel.

57

Therefore, the Anglo-American objectives shifted from the
negative aim of denying the use of the Azores to Germany, to
the positive aim of obtaining the use of the islands them
selves in the anti-submarine offensive.
Nevertheless in 1942 Salazar was still unwilling to
grant the Allies bases in the Azores.

The possibility yet

existed that Germany might retaliate for any such action by
attacking continental Portugal.

In 1943 the war had turned

so decisively against the Germans that any invasion became
very unlikely.

The submarine menace had not yet been over

come, the Battle of the Atlantic raged its fiercest in early
1943, and British de.sire for bases in the Azores became pres
sing.

In March of 1943 the British Naval Staff recommended,

as one of four measures necessary to gain victory over the

^^Sir Anthony F.den (Earl of Avon), The Reckoning (Bos
ton: Houghton Mifflin, 1965), p. 453.
57
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U-boats, access to the Azores.
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As the North African cam

paign ended. Sir Dudley Pound, Chief of the British Naval
Staff, revived a proposal that Britain should ask for the
granting of bases in the Azores.

The British were so anxious

to obtain the bases that on 10 May:
The Prime Minister sent the War Cabinet a mes
sage saying that he would be prepared to ap
proach the Portuguese Government for facilities
and to let them knoiv, if they made difficulties,
that we intended to take over the islands. He
thought that Dr. Salazar . . . might find it
easier to bow to force maj eur than to assent to
such a violation of Portuguese neutrality.
Sir Anthony Eden, the Foreign Secretary, vigorously objected
to any such seizure, on the grounds that violation of Portu
guese neutrality would alienate world opinion and tie up
resources badly needed elsewhere.

Eden, supported by Sir

Ronald Campbell, the British Ambassador to Portugal, held
that the Portuguese would respond favorably to an appeal
based upon the Anglo - Portuguese Alliance.

Churchill was not

easily dissuaded from occupying the Azores outright. • On
21 May 1943, he replied to Eden that "the Combined Chiefs of
Staff strongly recommended that the Allies should have the
use of the Azores as soon as possible, as a military neces
sity."^*^

The War Cabinet insisted on a diplomatic approach

first, arguing that no forces would be available to occupy

^^Roskill, 2:370.
^^Edeh, p. 453.
'^^Ibid. , p . 454.
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the Azores for two months at least.Churchill, then visit
ing the United States, agreed to postpone any action until
his return.

Back in Britain Churchill maintained, at a

Chiefs-of-Staff meeting held on 7 June, that the bases could
not be obtained without force or the threat of force.

Eden

replied that he was not against a display of force, but that
a few days must be allowed for diplomacy to be tried first.
He was supported by the Chiefs of Staff, and "so diplomacy
had its chance.
The very next day Salazar asked Campbell for new AngloPortuguese staff conversations because the military situation
had changed.

The British Ambassador interpreted this pro

posal as a signal that Salazar might be ready to grant the
bases.

On 18 June, Eden called in Doctor Armindo Montiero,

the Portuguese Ambassador, and laid before him a formal re
quest for base rights.

In return Britain would aid Portugal

against any German air attacks on her mainland, protect Portu
guese shipping and trade, and guarantee Portuguese sovereignty
over all her colonies.

The same day Campbell approached

Salazar, who promised to consider sympathetically the British
offer.

On 23 June, Salazar agr.eed in principle to provide the

facilities, but asked for further conversations on conditions

^^Sir Llewellyn Woodward, British Foreign Policy in the
Second World War (London: H.M.S.O., 1962), pT 379.
^^Eden, p. 455.
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for the grant.Detailed conversations began on 6 July.^^
Salazar's assent turned out to be only the beginning of
weeks of hard bargaining.

Salazar was willing to al-low bases

only to British forces, and only under the terms of the AngloI'ortugucsc Alliancc.

'I'he United States also wanted landing

rights in the Azores, but Salazar was reluctant to let any
American forces into the islands.

There was nothing compar

able to the tie xvith Britain between Portugal and the United
States, and the Portuguese government had not forgotten the
loud demands by influential voices in the United States only
two years before, for American seizure of the Azores.

Lin

gering suspicions were not eased by American tardiness in ac
cepting the same commitments as the British to unlimited
Portuguese sovereignty over her possessions.^^

The U. S.

government, in 1943, began to press for commercial landing
rights (for Pan-American Airways) in the Azores, to "mate
rially shorten our communications to the Mediterranean and
the Middle and Far East."^^

Its request complicated the

British negotiations for base rights.
Churchill, not a patient man at the best of times, be
came fretful at the pace of the negotiations.

Eden recorded

in his diary:
'^^Ibid. , pp. 455- 56.
^^Woodward, p. 380.
^^Kay, p. 169.
^^U.S., Department of State, Foreign Relations of the
United States, 1943, 6 vols. (Washington, D.C.: Government
Printing Office, 1963-65), 2:529.
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We had a row about this [the Azores negotia
tions] last at Defence Committee. After dinner
something of a shouting match going on for an
hour or more. W. [Churchill] maintaining that
we could have taken the islands in June, July
or August but for my insistence on approaching
Salazar, that he had himself been pleased with
progress at first, but that now it was clear
that S. was merely fooling me. I retorted that
we had been absolutely right, that we had
stopped him making unprovoked attack on an
ally and that anyway he had not been in a posi
tion to do the last until the end of August.
Brooke [Field Marshal Sir Alan Brooke, Chief
of the Imperial General Staff] said we had
gained some ships for "Husky" [landing in
Sicily] by my plan.67
Churchill, as was his habit, apologized the next morning.

His

outbursts did result in the setting of 15 October as the dead
line for the negotiations.
on 18 August.

68

The agreement was finally signed

Lengthy as the negotiation process had been,

there was little chance that it would prove fruitless.

Sala

zar's biographer presents personal testimony from General
Santos Costa (then Portuguese Under-Secretary for War) that
when Salazar first received the British request, he decided
at once that "The Alliance had been invoked and Portugal
could not refuse."

69

The only question remaining was the

terms on which the Alliance would be fulfilled.
The Portuguese granted their aid to Britain in as lowkeyed a fashion as possible.

^^Eden, p. 464.
^^Woodward, p. 3 81.
69

Kay, p. 168.

They themselves remained neutral
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(a decision which suited the British perfectly)
and allowed
facilities at first only to the British.

American requests

to station 10,000 men in the islands were turned down, and
when the Americans asked to send a naval air squadron to the
islands, Salazar went so far as to threaten to resist its
landing by force!

After some months it was agreed that

American aircraft could operate from the Azores--provided
that they and their crews wore British insignia.

71

the U. S. forces were able to build their own bases.

Eventually
New air

fields were constructed at Santa Maria (Terceira) and Lagens
by U. S. Navy Seabees.^^
By the time the Azores bases were finally obtained, the
worst of the Battle of the Atlantic was over, the Allies gain
ing a decisive upper hand in May, 1943.

But the long struggle

did not end until Germany itself was overrun, and Allied air
craft based in the Azores played a key role in keeping the
German submarines at bay.
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"Thus, after more than four years

of war, could reliable air cover be at last provided over the

^^Woodward, p. 380.
^^Ibid., pp. 381-383.
^^George F. Kennan, Memoirs 1925-1950 (Boston: Little,
Brown, 1967), pp. 142-162. George Kennan, the renowned Ameri
can diplomat and historian, served as counselor in the Ameri
can legation at Lisbon for a year and a half. After the
death of the American Minister in 1943, Kennan, as Charge d'Affairs was the executive head of the American legation for a
considerable time, and played a major role in obtaining
Salazar's consent to American forces in the Azores.
^^Morison, 9:46.
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whole Atlantic north of 30°N . . . the prosecution of the
Atlantic struggle had been transformed, and the U-boats suftered further and drastic discomfiture."

74

The Azores Agreement of 1943 was a landmark, but not
the l;ist s Lgn i r i c;i n t diplomatic pact involving tlie Azores.
Once LJ. S. naval forces were established in the islands,
Salazar's suspicions that the Americans intended to seize
the Azores were gradually overcome.

On 27 March 1945 the

U. S. and Portugal signed an "Agreement Regarding Air Trans
port Command Service to Europe Through Portugal."

This agree

ment granted U. S. transport planes landing rights in Lisbon
by way of Santa Maria Airfield in the Azores.

75

One scholar

considers that the Agreement, and a later pact signed on
6 December 1945, are of greater long-range importance than
the Azores Agreement of 1943.

16

The ties between the U. S.

and Portugal were strengthened, and the Azores assured of a
role in the worldwide network of air routes being woven
across the globe, routes of primary importance in postwar
communications.
The United States did not acquire base rights in the
Azores easily or quickly, and having once gained them, was
unwilling to give them up.

On 10 September 1945 the British

^^Roskill, 1:47.
75

U.S., Department of State, Foreign Relations of the
United States, 1945, 9 vols. (Washington, D.C.: Government
Printing Office, 1967-68), 5:449-451.
K. Sweeney, "Portugal, the United States, and
Aviation, 1945," Rocky Mountain Social Science Journal 9
(April 1972): 77.
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government notified the U. S. o£ its intention to terminate
the 1943 agreement with Portugal.

77

This would mean the

lapse of U. S. base privileges within nine months after termi
nation.

On 19 November the U. S. government asked British

support in seeking postwar American bases in the Azores and
Cape Verdes.

In an aide memoire from James Byrnes, U. S.

Secretary of State, to Ernest Bevin, the British Foreign Sec
retary, it was stated, "It should be pointed out that the
United States Chiefs of Staff attach the highest importance
to the acquisition by the United States of rights to operate
on a long-term basis, air and naval facilities in the
Azores."

78

Bevin was reluctant to see the Azores used as

military bases in the postwar vsforld, however, he wished to
see the islands used only for civil aviation, and made avail79
able to the U. N. Security Council in the event of war. "
British insisted that if bases were set up;
As regards the question of British participation
quite apart from His Majesty's Government's
vital interest in this part of the world from
the strategic angle, their long-standing and
intimate connection with Portugal makes it
politically essential from their point of
view that, if any base is to be set up in the
Azores and the Cape Verde Islands before the
coming into force of the World Security Orga
nization, His Majesty's Government should
participate in it as equal partners. Further
more in view of the previous attitude of the

^^F.R.U.S. 1945, 6:204
^^Ibid., 6:212.
^^Ibid., 6:217.

The
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Portuguese government over the negotiations
for the establishment of wartime bases in
the Azores, His Majesty's Government cannot
help feeling that if the United States Gov- •
crnrnent wore to press for a base with which
His Majesty's Government were not actively
associated, they might well ii)eet witli a re
cusal from Portugal.^"
Even after its close wartime cooperation with the United States,
Britain did not want it or any other power entrenched in the
Azores.
Portugal and Germany
Salazar maintained diplomatic relations with Germany
throughout the war.

The tone of Luso-German relations was

cordial (at least until the Azores Base agreement) and Sala
zar was on excellent personal terms with Baron Oswald von
81
Hoynigen-Huene, the German Minister to Portugal.

Toward

Germany itself, however, Portugal clung to an attitude of
arm-length neutrality.

Salazar refused to provide any aid

to the German war effort.

When approached by Huene on 2 July

1941 with a proposal that Portugal send a volunteer unit on
the lines of the Spanish Blue Division to the Russian Front,
Salazar returned an answer that deserves to rank as a classic
example of the polite diplomatic rebuff.

"Aside from the

fact that Spain had a debt of gratitude to pay for the help

^'^Ibid., 6:219.
8T
J. K. Sweeney, "The Framework of Luso-American Diplo
matic Relations During the Second World War," Rocky Mountain
Social Science Journal 10 (October 1973):100.
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in the Civil War," said Portugal's ruler, "the nature of the
Spaniard was also more expansive and demonstrative than that
82
of the reserved Portuguese."

Salazar might sympathize

with Hitler's "anti-Bolshevist crusade" but he did not intend
to contribute to it in any way.
Given Salazar's policies, Portugal was unlikely to play
any major role in German wartime diplomacy.

Yet what kind

of role might she play in the Reich's own military and naval
strategy?

Continental Portugal, far out on the western rim

of the Iberian Peninsula, did have a place as a subsidiary
factor in proposed German operations in Spain.

Much greater

attention was given, however, to Portugal's islands.
In late 1940 the Germans made plans for an operation
called "Felix" aimed at seizing the vital British base at
Gibraltar.

83

One possible danger to "Felix" was a British

riposte through Portugal.

Control of Portugal was not ab

solutely essential to a successful attack on Gibraltar, but
Portugal might be used by Britain, as it had been many times
in the past, as a sally port into the Peninsula, with serious
consequences for any German troops campaigning there.

The

Germans considered both diplomatic and military steps to
thwart any danger from the direction of Lisbon.

Contingency

plans were drawn up to cope with any British landings in
82j:). c.F.P. , Scries D, 13:70.
OT
The German directions for Felix can be found in a
collection of documents by Hans-Gunther Seraphim, "Felix and
Isabella; Dokumente zu Hitlers Planungen bei Spanien und
Portugal auf der Jahren 1940-41," Quellen zur Nuesten
Gcsch ichtc 5 ( 1 95r.J , Heft I : r)«-82.'

132
Portugal.

According to Fuehrer Directive 18, which stated

the operational requirements for "Felix," "Mainly mobile
formations" should be provided for the possible invasion of
Portugal.

A marginal note opposite this clause restricted

the force to mountain troops, a relatively weak type of formation.

84

Later the Germans decided a stronger reaction

force was needed, and assigned three powerful divisions to
.1
, 85
the task.

"Felix" never took place.
Francisco Franco's unwillingness

It was frustrated by
to involve himself in a

war not yet decided, the need to rescue Mussolini's forces
from disaster in Greece and Libya, and Hitler's approaching
invasion of Russia.

On occasions thereafter the Germans did

make plans to deal with possible Allied campaigns in Iberia.
In May of 1941 an operation called "Isabella" was planned to
seize western Spain and Portugal in the event of a British
landing.

86

The Allied invasion of North Africa ("Torch") in

November, 1942, caused special alarm, Hitler fearing that it
would be followed by an Anglo-American offensive in Iberia.

87

^'^U. S., War Department, Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1946), 6:959.
^^Franz Haider, The Private War Journal 14 August 1939 to
24 September 1942, edited by Arnold Lissance (English transla
tion of the transcription of the original MSS, 1946) 9 vols.
(Missoula: University of Montana Library), 5:7 (mimeographed).
^^Ibid., 6:41.
87

Conference of 19 November 1942, in Germany, Naval High
Command, Fuehrer Conferences on Matters Dealing with the Ger
man Navy. 9 vols. (U. S. Navy Office of Naval Intelligence:
Microfilm unpublished typescript copy, 1947), 2:127.
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But there was no longer much that Germany could do against
the Allies in the Peninsula for she no longer had the forces
to spare.
German strategic interest however was by no means
limited to the Iberian mainland.

The Germans' concern with

the Atlantic islands was at least as great, perhaps greater,
than their interest in the Peninsula.

It matched the con

cern of the British and American governments whose preoccupa
tion with the Azores has been examined earlier.

The Azores

alone were of greater importance than mainland Portugal.
German interest in the Azores first appears in the
record in September, 1940, when "Felix" was under considera
tion.

In a report to Hitler dated 6 September, Admiral Erich

Raeder, the Commander in Chief of the German Navy, suggested
that the United States might occupy the Portuguese islands
(as well as the Spanish Canaries) in connection with American
entry into the war, an event Raeder believed to be imminent.

g

On 26 September 1940 Hitler agreed that the y\zores. Cape
Verdes, and Canaries might have to be seized by the Air Force
In an attached memorandum Raeder pointed out the disadvantage
which was to dog all German planning for operations in the
Atlantic:

88
Conference of 6 September 1940, as cited in ibid.,
2:19-20.
89
2:25.

Conference of 26 September 1940, as cited in ibid.,
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Lack o£ an adequate fleet will constitute
a continual drawback in case of further
extension of warfare, e.g., with regard
to the occupation of the Canary Islands,
tire^Cape Verde Islands, the Azores, Dakas,
Iceland, etc.90

An

i n t o r e s t i ni', r e a s o n f o r H i t l e r ' s k e e n

interest in the Azores

was revealed at another conference between Hitler and Raeder
on 20 April 1941.

Using the Azores as a base, the Germans

could attack America with a modern plane of the Messerschmitt
type.

91

This would compel the United States to build up its

own defenses and curtail supplies to Great Britain.

92

Mean

while, Raeder himself had cooled considerably toward the idea
of an Azores occupation.

He stated the operation would be

93
risky, "but with luck could succeed."

Then the real diffi

culties would begin.
A massive British counterattack was certain.

The navy

would be diverted from its proper offensive role to defensive
escort.

Even the U-boats, the main German naval offensive

arm, would be tied down, effectively ending the submarine
campaign.

It was very doubtful whether harbor facilities in

the Azores were at all adequate to speedy unloading, or whether
there was adequate shelter for aircraft and supplies.

94

Raeder

^^Conference of 14 November 1940, as cited in ibid.,
2: 41.
91
Possibly the Messerschmitt 264, a long-range bomber
which never went into production. See William Green, Warplanes of the Third Reich (New York: Doubleday, 1970).
QO
Conference of 14 November 1940, as cited in Germany,
Naval High Command, Fuehrer Conferences, 2:41.
-^^Ibid.
^^I b i. d.
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advocated that Germany should not occupy the Azores herself,
but influence Portugal to fortify the islands and defend them
against British or American incursions--steps Portugal took
without German encouragement.
Still, Hitler clung to hopes of operations in the Azores.
On 22 May 1941, Raeder had to repeat his earlier arguments
against occupation, but the "Fuehrer is still in favor of
95
occupying the Azores in order to bomb the United States."
By the summer of 1941 German objectives in the Atlantic islands,
as in continental Portugal, had become defensive rather than
offensive, keyed to thwarting Allied gains.
The U. S. occupation of Iceland led the Germans to expect
similar Anglo-American moves into the Azores and Cape Verdes.
Due to Germany's weakness at sea, a German invasion of Iberia
was almost the only countermove the Nazis could make if the
Allies actually did occupy the islands.

Hitler also proposed

that an operational group of U-boats be held in readiness to
strike back if the Allies occupied the Azores, Madeira, or the
Cape Verdes.
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But both Raeder and Admiral Karl Doenitz,

Commander of the U-boats objected to this diversion of the
97
inadequate U-boat force, and Hitler withdrew his proposal.,
After the Allied landings in Morocco and Algeria, Hitler's interest in the Azores declined.
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The German naval

^^Conference of 22 May 1941, as cited in ibid., 1:65.
^'^Conference of 25 July 1941, as cited in ibid., 2:14.
^^Karl Doenitz, Memoirs: Ten Years and Twenty Days (Lon
don: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1959), pp. 229-231.
II. Ilirisley, Hitler' s Strategy (Cambridge: Cambridge
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authorities realized there was no longer a chance o£ attacking
the Azores.

Raeder's report to Hitler on 22 December 1942

included the following:
The Portuguese islands are exclusively at
the disposal of our enemies who use them
as a base under the protection of a neutral
flag. It is not strategically necessary
for us to occupy these islands at the moment,
although we would like to establish our own
air bases there.99
The wistful mention of German air bases in the Azores is the
last indication of German hopes to use those islands.

Raeder

must have realized that no such operation was any longer pos
sible.

The German's worst fears about the Azores came true

some months later, when the Anglo-Portuguese Azores base agree
ment was signed.

It appears the Germans learned of the agree

ment only when it went into effect on 12 October 1943.

Their

only countermeasure was a diplomatic protest delivered to
Salazar on 15 October.

There was no bombing raid on Lis

bon, not even, as in 1916, a declaration of war.

Nothing

could better illustrate the depths to which German fortunes
had sunk.
Strategic Location and Portuguese Neutrality
War in the twentieth century developed dimensions far be
yond the military and diplomatic limits it possessed earlier.
University Press, 1949), p. 151.
99

Conference of 22 December 1942, as cited in Germany,
Naval High Command, Fuehrer Conferences, 2:143.
^^^Survey of International Affairs 1939-1946, 9:339.
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It became "total," to use the common expression.

Total war

is waged on economic, intelligence, and psychological fronts
-a^s—we tl—a-s--e-n -bat-tl-e-fi-e-lrds-aTid-at^conf-er-e-nce~tab"i"es ;
As has been demonstrated, Portugal played an important
role in the strategic maneuverings of both sides, while being
fortunate enough to remain uninvolved in the actual fighting.
Neutrality spared Portugal the destruction and misery in
flicted on most European nations, but could not totally iso
late her from a war raging on all sides.

In fact, neutral

status made Portugal all the more attractive a territory for
the practitioners of some newer aspects of global war.

Not

merely neutrality, but strategic location, for Portugal's
position enabled her to fill some roles other European neu
trals could not.
Of Europe's neutrals, Portugal, because of her location,
had the best communications with both sides and with the out
side world.

Shielded from German-controlled territory by

Spain, she was in easy touch with the Americas.

The Trans-

Atlantic Clipper service, flying boats owned by Pan-American
Airlines, used Lisbon as its European terminal during the war
years.

Portugal's capital became a European crossroads.

In

the words of the most authoritative study of the wartime neu
trals :
After a period of bewilderment and acute
anxiety Portugal emerged as the chief re
maining link between llitler's Europe and
Great Britain and the Americas. British and
American, as well as German and Italian air
lines called at Lisbon, the American Export
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Lines kept up passenger and cargo sailings
until December 1941, and Spanish and Portu
guese ships crossed the Atlantic throughout
—the-war
L-i s-b-on -w as--the—e-kie-#- tt'-a-n-s
shipment f)oint for the relief supplies for
prisoners of war and internees dispatched
by the International Red Cross, which
chartered Portuguese ships for the last
stage of the journey.101

-

Portuguese neutrality thus was the interest of both sides,
and all the more secure in consequence.

The price the Portu

guese paid was to see their country turned into an arena for
spies.

Intelligence is an indispensable war-winning weapon,

and important information of all kinds is often most easily
obtained on neutral soil.

Portugal, with its open communi

cations between two warring blocs and two hemispheres, be
came an intelligence crossroads.

Agents of belligerents' spy

services used Lisbon as a message center and sometimes as a
headquarters for espionage in the warring countries.

Of all

the aspects of war intelligence operations are the least docu
mented and the most likely to be distorted by rumor and delib
erate misinformation.

Nevertheless, it is easily established

that Portugal was a key area for intelligence activities.

The

German army spy service, the Abwehr, for instance, used Lisbon
as its base for espionage in Britain.

102

The British used a

double agent in Lisbon to feed falsified intelligence to Ger
many after they captured the entire German spy network in
%

^°^Ibid., 9;320-321.
102

Anthony Cave Brown, Bodyguard of Lies (New York:
Harper and Row, 1 975), p. 60.
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Britain.

10 3

When the United States entered the business of

xvartime espionage, one of the first overseas offices was in
104
- Irisbon^m -f ciTTxraT'y, "~19"^'2 ."

^

liconomic warCarc is often waged in neutral countries.
In r e l a t i o n t o n e u t r a l s , e c o n o m i c w a r f a r e h a s t w o m a j o r o b 
jectives:

gaining control of strategic raw materials and

manufactured goods and preventing their export to the enemy,
and use of neutral territory as a passageway through an eco
nomic blockade or preventing use in that way by an enemy.
Since Portugal had little in the way of strategic raw ma
terials to offer, her most important role in economic war
fare was in relation to the Allied blockade of Axis Europe.
With her Atlantic ports and islands, her extensive colonial
empire, and her commerce with the Axis powers, Portugal could
not be ignored in any attempt to cut off the Axis from the
outside world.

Before June, 1940, Portuguese commerce with

Germany could be carried on only by sea; but after that date
goods could be transported overland to Germany by way of
Occupied France.

105

As a result Britain found it difficult

to interrupt traffic between Portugal and Germany by naval
means, and had to rely on diplomacy.

As Portugal's major

C. Masterman, The Double-Cross System in the War
of 1939 to 1945 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1972),
pp. 138-140.
Harris Smith, O.S.S., The History of America's
First Central Intelligence Agency [Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1972),
41.
105|y. n. Medlicott, The Economic Blockade, 2 vols.
(London: H.M.S.O., 1952), 1:55.
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trading partner, Britain was in a position to apply severe
economic pressure, but negotiating with the stubborn Salazar
was never easy.

Eventually, the British relied upon pre

emptive buying, which put pounds sterling into Portuguese
pockets, "and in Portugal the blockade issue never lost the
character o£ a game o£ poker between hard-faced friends."
Whatever hardships the blockade imposed upon Portugal, were
more than compensated by wartime prosperity, for as one study
concludes:
To travellers from countries at war Portugal
seemed an incredible oasis of peace and pros
perity; no blackout; no ration cards; shops
full of food and luxuries, for those who
could afford them.107
Portugal•came through the war as well as any European
country, and better than most.

In spite of the fact that

"Portugal was of crucial importance to both Great Britain and
Germany"

108

because of its location, it escaped being bombed

or invaded, departing from neutrality only when and where
such departures suited Portuguese interests.

In part this

was due to Portugal's strategic importance itself; when dan
ger was most imminent Germany would not attack Portugal
because of the well-founded fear that the Allies would occupy
Portugal's Atlantic islands.

And the Allies would not occupy

^•^^Ibid., 1:528.
107
Survey of International Affairs, 9:321.
10 8
Sweeney, "Framework of Luso-American Diplomatic
Relations," p. 93'.

141
the islands first, in spite of powerful temptation, because
of possibly unfavorable consequences in continental Portugal.
This advantage, crucial though it was, might have been
insufricicnt if :i t luid not been couplcd with astute diplomacy
Slirewtl, stubborn, and cautious, Salazar exploited strategic
location brilliantly.

His highly successful wartime foreign

policy was perhaps the greatest service Salazar rendered his
country during all the years he was Portugal's overlord.

CHAPTER V
I^ORTIJGAL AND NATO
Portugal's Entry into NATO
The end of the war did not bring international tran
quillity to the world--or to Portugal.

The coalition that

destroyed the Axis barely survived their enemy's destruction,
and was soon replaced by two hostile power blocs.

The re

sulting Cold War developed in the immediate postwar years.
It was universally acknowledged as the dominant fact in world
politics by early 1949, when the North Atlantic Treaty Orga
nization (NATO), a formal alliance of the western powers, was
created under United States sponsorship.
The United States was one of the two great protagonists
in the Cold War struggle, the only country whose strength
could outmatch that of the Soviet Union.

It clearly had re

placed Britain as the leading power in the Atlantic world.
But the United States neither hoped nor wished to contain the
expansion of the Soviet power alone.

The American govern

ment wanted to share the burden with the support of an alli
ance of western European and North Atlantic nations.

Portu

gal was visualized as part of this grouping from the begin
ning.
1 42
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The western European countries, especially Great Britain,
were, if anything, even more eager for the creation of an
Atlantic pact than the United States, for it would end all
chances that the United States would withdraw into isolation
and leave them to face Russia's power alone.

On 11 March

1948, Ernest Bevin, the British Foreign Secretary, sent an
aide memoire to the U. S. government in which he suggested
there be concluded "an Atlantic Approaches Pact of Mutual
Assistance, in which all the countries directly threatened
by a Russian move to the Atlantic, could participate, for
example. United States, United Kingdom, Canada, Eire, Ice
land, Norivay, Denmark, Portugal, France and Spain, when it
has a democratic regime."^
The name of Portugal reappears frequently in the records
of the planning that led up to the foundation of NATO.

No

one, of course, imagined that the Portuguese could contribute
powerful military forces to an alliance, but she could be an
asset in another way, as Samuel Reber, an important State De
partment official (Acting Director of the Department of
European Affairs) pointed out in a planning conference held
on 26 July 1948.
In regard to Portugal Mr. Reber stated that
this country was also important from the
strategic standpoint, not only because of
its position on the Iberian Peninsula, but
also due to its possessions of the Azores.
^U.S., Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United
States, 1948, 9 vols. (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing
Office, 1972-76), 3:47.
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Agreeing \-}ith this statement Mr. Hoyer Millar
(Sir Frederic Hoyer Millar, a British diplo
mat stationed at the Washington embassy) sug
gested that Portugal might be tempted to
enter sucli an arrangement despite its close
ties with General Franco, if it could come
in, as it was, on the ground floor and could
be assured of U. S. support of the pact.2
During another meeting held on 2 September, George Kennan,
then an important policy planner in the State Department, in
cluded Portugal with Iceland and Denmark as countries that
"would be valuable in the regional arrangement primarily be
cause of their geographic position and for the facilities
3
they might be able to provide in the event of hostilities."
If the United States and its west European clients were
eager to see Portugal as an Atlantic alliance partner because
of her strategic location, Portugal was a willing recruit.
Salazar's fear and hatred of Communism had not been reduced
by the passage of time.

The outcome of World War II, particu

larly the destruction of German power and the expansion of
Russia westward, inspired in him a positive alarm.
sidered Russia the real victor in the war.^

He Con

Salazar also

saw positive benefits that his country could gain by partici
pation in the Cold War.

It was an advantage for a small

country to be courted, especially to be courted by the United
States, which had such rich gifts to offer.

Considerable eco-

^Ibid., 3:203.
I) i d . , 3:226.
^Luc Crollen, Portugal, the U. S. and NATO (Leuven,
Belgium: Leuven University Press, 1973), p. 40.
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nomic benefits could be expected, and to be the ally of a
great power could not but increase Portuguese prestige.
Salazar had demonstrated in earlier years how well he under
stood how to cxtract advantages from international crises:
Indeed, disruption in Big Three Unity, a
power vacuum and disequilibrium in Central
Europe could only stress the need to have
the big Western maritime powers permanently
entangled in the affairs of Europe. In this
case, the importance of the Atlantic would
grow again. Atlantic islands and the Portu
guese Atlantic-oriented coast and ports
would continue to be valued highly.^
Salazar, however, moved towards alliance in the slow and
cautious fashion which characterized his style.

He did have

some reservations about the real strength of an Atlantic alli
ance that included France and other nations which he considered
weak and unstable, and being a dedicated nationalist disliked
the implications of European federation that were raised by
the proposals for a general alliance.

These misgivings were

made plain in a statement probably written by Salazar that
appeared in the Portuguese press on 30 October 1948.^
The advantages of joining the Atlantic Pact were so ob
vious that they outweighed Salazar's doubts.

On 10 June 1949

the American Ambassador to Portugal, Lincoln MacVeigh, called
on the Portuguese Minister for Foreign Affairs, Dr. Jose
Caeiro de Matta, and informed him that the Atlantic Pact was
completely separate from any project for European federation.
^Ibid., p. 41.
6F.R.U.S., 1948, 3:1008,
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and reassured the Portuguese government that no member state
could be compelled to grant base rights to any other power
against its will.

MacVoigh also urged the Portuguese not to

allow the exclusion of Spain from the alliance (to wliich the
Portuguese government objected) not to deter them from joining
themselves. 7
On 15 March 1949 Portugal, together with Iceland, Italy,
Denmark, and Norway, was officially invited to accede to the
O
Treaty.
On 4 April 1949 Caeiro de Matta signed the North
Atlantic Treaty on Portugal's behalf, and the country entered
the Pact as a charter member.

9

After joining the pact, Salazar

took some smug pleasure in congratulating the United Sta:tes
for finally waking up to the Russian threat.

In a conversa

tion with Averill Harriman, then acting as a special Ambassa
dor in Europe, on 25 November 1949, he "evinced great interest
in our [the U. S. government's] relations with the U.S.S.R.
Why it had taken so many years, with the loss of much precious
time, to realize what the Russians were up to."^*^

Salazar

hoped for more tangible benefits from inclusion in NATO.
Portugal was included in the Marshall Plan (Harriman was
7

U.S., Department of State, Foreign Relations of the
United States, 1949, 5 vols, to date (Washington, D.C.:
Government Printing Office, 1975-76), 4:19-20.
g

North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Information Service,
NATO Facts and Figures (Brussels: NATO Information Service,
1969T7 p. 21.
^F.R.U.S., 1949, 4:285.
^^Ibid., 4:716.
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traveling in Europe as representative for the Economic Coopera
tion Administration wliich distributed financial assistance
under the Plan) and sought aid not only for metropolitan Portugal but for its overseas possessions.

11

Portugal did not re

ceive any great amount of money compared to other European
countries, getting only $61,800,000 (as compared with over a
billion dollars for Greece) between 1949 and 1952.^^

The

greatest gains to Portugal from inclusion in NATO were politi
cal, not economic.

The country needed a powerful protector.

By inclusion into NATO, Portugal came under the wing of the
United States, the most powerful nation in the world.

Al

though the Alliance with Britain remained in force (and re
mains in force to this day) for all practical purposes the
United States took over Britain's old role as Portugal's
patron.

This change of allegiance was a small but graphic

illustration of a much larger phenomenon, the replacement of
an exhausted Britain by the United States as the paramount
power in the Atlantic world.
Portugal in her turn provided to the United States the
same service she had once rendered Britain--access to stra
tegic bases.

The United States was able to retain its wartime

landing rights in the Azores by means of an agreement signed

^^Ibid., 4:715,
12

.
•
Luc Crollen, "Portugal," in Small Powers in Alignment,
ed. Omar De Raeymaker (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1974),
p. 4 8.
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30 May 1946, although formal control of the airbases at Santa
Maria and Lajens was handed over to Portuguese authorities.

13

The rationale for the extension of 1946 was the need for the
United States to maintain communication wjth its occupation
zone in Germany, but when the next extension was signed (on
2 February 1948) the reason given was significantly differ
ent :
The advantages which those facilities will
achieve for the security of Europe and for
the re-establishment and consolidation of
world peace as well as the indirect value
which the same may bring about for the com
mon defense and security.^4
In less than two years the formal justification for Ameri
can rights in the Azores shifted from the narrow exigencies of
postwar occupation to a much broader concern with the multi
lateral defense of western Europe.

Thus it was symptomatic

of a great reorientation of American foreign policy that took
place during those years.
The 1948 extension remained in force for three years, to
be replaced on 5 January 1951 by the much broader "Mutual
Defense Assistance Agreement between the United States and
Portugal.This treaty (as renewed in later years) remains
13
U.S., Department of State, Department of State Bulletin
14 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, June 2 3, 1946),
364:1081-1082.
^^U.S., Department of State, Department of State Bulletin
18 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, March 14,
1948), 454:358.
^^U.S., Department of State, United States Treaties and
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the basis o£ U. SPortuguese relations at the present time.^^
American and other NATO forces were granted full authority to
use the Azores bases in wartime, or with mutual consultation,
in time of peace.

The two governments agreed to cooperate in

improving and expanding the base facilities on the island, and
American personnel were to be stationed at Lagens. 1 7
The provision of the Azores bases was Portugal's one
major contribution to NATO.
contribution, however.

It was an extremely important

As the 1951 treaty was signed, the

Korean War raged in the Far East, and fear of an imminent
Russian attack on western Europe was intense.

If such an

assault were actually launched, the NATO Allies would need the
Azores both as a transit point for aircraft bound for Europe
and as an anti-submarine base f6r use against the large Russian
underwater fleet.

They were a cornerstone of NATO strategy in

the 1950s.
Portugal, after becoming a NATO member, received some
American military assistance, but has never been asked to con
tribute to the defense of the "Central Front" in western
Europe.

Under the terms of the NATO pact, it is required to

maintain one infantry division for possible use on the European
Continent, but the Portuguese military role to the alliance
Other International Agreements, Vol. 2, Pt. 1: "Portugal:
Mutual Defense Assistance," TIAS No. 2187, 5 January 1951 (Wash
ington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1952), p. 438.
^^Crollen, "Portugal," p. 56.
^^United States Treaties, TIAS No. 2187, p. 444.
^^Crollen, "I'ortugal," p. 57.
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has been "Atlantic-centered," small air and naval forces to
assist in patrolling the sea lanes.

19

On 22 February 1967,

following I'rancc's witiidrawal from military participation in
the Alliance, Iberian Atlantic Command (IBERLANT) was
created.

20

IBERLANT has its headquarters in Portugal, and

its mission is to defend continental Portugal and the sea
approaches to Europe within the area bounded by the Azores
on the west, Madeira on the south, and the Iberian peninsula
on the east.

21

IBERLANT is a multinational force which in

cludes contingents from the United States (its commandant is
an American admiral), Britain, and West Germany as well as
Portugal.

Since the Portuguese army division theoretically

available for NATO duty has never been combat-ready, partici
pation in IBERLANT is Portugal's contribution to the military
strength of the Atlantic Alliance.

Even with American assis

tance, the Portuguese armed forces have remained small and
ill-equipped.

Luc Crollen, a Belgian scholar who has analyzed

the Portuguese relationship to NATO most thoroughly, wrote in
19 7 3:
On the whole, then, with its valuable stra
tegically located islands, its Atlantic
ports, and its communications facilities

'^^Ibid., pp. 61-62.
^^North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO Letter 15
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, April 1967),
4; 29.
21

North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO Letter 15
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office,September
1967), 9:22-23.
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Portugal has certainly been a most welcome
NATO partner; certainly also, in terms of
manpower, training and equipment the Portu
guese armed forces have been unable to live .
up to their commitments, since their main
defense efforts lie overseas.22
Portugal plays a role in NATO very much like the role it
played as a junior partner of the British empire; not a cen
ter of power itself, but a provider of vital ports and island
bases due to its strategic location, which might become indis
pensable to an ally in crisis times.
When Portugal joined NATO and for approximately a decade
afterward, these strategic advantages went unaccompanied by
any serious political disadvantages.

If Portugal was a dic

tatorship (the only dictatorship in NATO at the time it was
organized) it was a mild one, and unlike Franco's Spanish
regime, bore no stigma of collaboration with the Axis in
World War II.

Portugal's African colonies provoked little

controversy at a time when most of that continent was divided
up among Britain, France, and Belgium, and expected to remain
under European control indefinitely.
About 1960, however, the dramatic changes in Portugal's
relationship with NATO began to occur, largely for reasons
which lay outside Europe.

From a relatively placid and con

tented junior partner in the Atlantic Alliance, Portugal was
transformed into an unhappy dissident.

The United States,

which had won access to valuable bases at very little cost
22crollen, "Portugal," p. 64.
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when Portugal entered NATO, soon found itself trying to
reconcile serious contradictions in its foreign policies
as a result of Portuguese actions.

Strategic Asset, Political Liability Portugal in the 1960s
Beginning in 1956, Europe's retreat from its overseas
empires, which had begun in Asia immediately after World
War II, started in Africa as well.

Within less than a decade,

Britain, France, and Belgium abandoned their west African hold
ings, sometimes reluctantly cooperating with the inevitable,
sometimes eagerly divesting themselves of costly burdens.

In

an amazingly short time, a multitude of independent sovereign
ties replaced a few great empires.
Portugal defied the anti-colonial trend.

Stubbornly she

clung to her great African colonies, in the face of world
disapproval and armed revolt.

The defense of Portugal's

imperial holdings became the major preoccupation of Salazar's
regime.

It affected foreign and domestic policy alike.

From

1961 onward Salazar poured all the resources his country could
muster into wars against nationalist guerrillas first in
Angola, then in Mozambique and Portuguese Guinea.

He judged

his allies on their willingness to suppor't his overseas
struggles and found them wanting.

Disenchantment with NATO

followed.
Salazar's stubbornness created an excruciating policy
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dilemma for the United States government.

1961, the year of

armed rebellion in Portuguese Africa, was also the year
John F. Kennedy entered the White House.

Kennedy had as one

of his centra] foreign policy goals, the improvement of Ameri
can relations with, and the increase of American influence in,
the new states of Africa and Asia.

He regarded these countries

as the principal battleground between the United States and the
Soviet Union.

23

No such goal could be achieved if the United

States backed Portugal's colonial wars in Africa.

Failure to

support Portugal, however, would also involve penalties.

At

first glance it might not seem that a tiny ally like Portugal
could exert enough leverage to alter America's "Third World"
policy.

But Portugal had one powerful weapon at its disposal,

the Azores base--and the 1951 Agreement would expire on 31
December 1962.
After a decade the Azores remained a critical link in
America's worldwide base network.

Dean Acheson, former Sec

retary of State, architect of containment, and an extremely
influential advisor to the Kennedy administration, referred
to the Azores in 1961 as "an air base which is, perhaps, the
most important one we have anywhere."

25

Acheson opposed

23
Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Days (Boston:
Houghton Mifflin, 1965), p. 509.
^"^Crollen, "Portugal," p. 75.
25

Dean Acheson, "Fifty Years After," Yale Review 51
(1961);8.

154
American involvement in the Angola issue, and was supported
by the State Department's Bureau o£ European Affairs.

In

the summer of 1961, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the President's
military advisors, declared that the Azores would be essential
to American security if trouble broke out in Berlin.

26

The Portuguese Foreign Minister, Dr. Franco Nogueira,
took the first opportunity available to drop hints that Ameri
can access to the Azores might depend upon a more favorable
attitude towards Portugal, and play off the Pentagon and State
Department Europeanists against the Africa supporters. 2 7

The

Kennedy administration found itself compelled to follow an un
comfortable middle course, trying to avoid outraging the Third
World countries and mortally offending Portugal at the same
time.

The great arena of anti-colonial agitation was The

United Nations, and here the United States was most often faced
with a decision on the Portuguese issue.

Early in the Kennedy

administration the United States voted favorably on a Liberian
resolution advocating Angolan self-determination both in the
Security Council on 15 March 1961, and in the General Assembly
on 20 April.

?8

By the end of 1962 the U. S. government was

abstaining on U. N. resolutions calling for the imposition of
an arms embargo and economic boycott on Portugal although the
United States refused to permit the use of any military equip^^Schlesinger, p. 562.
^^Crollen, "Portugal," p. 75.

^^Ibid., p. 73.
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ment supplied to Portugal for NATO purposes in Africa.

As

Luc Crollen pointed out, "In fact, the Pentagon's fear of
jeopardizing the Azores base had actually determined the
limits of Kennedy's Africa policy."

29

The United States re

fused to endorse Portuguese colonialism, or to give it any
material support.

The American government quietly pressured

the Portuguese to moderate its policies.

But the United

States also refused to undertake any effort to force Portugal
out of Africa, or to be a party to any such efforts sponsored
by others.

This attempt to balance strategic and political

considerations could hardly satisfy either Portugal or the
Afro-Asian countries, but was probably the only policy the
available options would permit.

It is an unusually clear

example of the constraints on the foreign policies of even
the mightiest power, and of the disproportionate bargaining
strength of a small state which both possesses a strategic
location, and knows how to use it.

The strategic advantage

afforded the United States by its base in the Azores was
very tangible, and weighed in the balance at least as much
as the vague and uncertain benefits conferred by "world pub
lic opinion."

In the end the fact that the Portuguese pres

ence in NATO was a strategic asset was more important to the
American government than that it was also a political li
ability.

29

Ibid., p. 76.
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The equivocal American policy did score one clear gain-continued American base rights in the Azores.
ment was informally renewed on 4 January 1963.

The 1951 Agree
The Portu

guese exacted a stiff price for continued American use of the
Azores--a loan of $48, 750 , 000, a gift of $ 13,750,000 - - and
-Z Q
acquiescence in Portugal's African policies.
Friction between the U. S. and Portugal lessened under
Kennedy's successors.

Neither Lyndon Johnson nor Richard

Nixon paid as much attention to African opinion as Kennedy
had, and valued the Azores base highly.

The third extension

of the original 1951 Agreement took place on 9 December
1971.

31

In return for use of the Lajens base, the U. S.

government agreed to pay Portugal some $435,000,000.

32

In spite of the tenacity with which the United States
clung to its airfield in the Azores, some considered that the
base was in fact becoming obsolescent, as the size and range
of aircraft increased.

33

Events late in 1973, however, of

fered dramatic evidence to the contrary.

The fourth major

war between Israel and its Arab neighbors broke out on

^^Ibid., pp. 86- 87.
31

U. 5., Department of State, Department of State Bulle
tin 66 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, Janu
ary 3, 1972), 1697:24.
32

Newsweek. "Portuguese Guinea--A Propaganda War?",
27 December 1971, p. 28.
^•^Crollen, "Portugal," p. 54.

157
6 October.

34

On 15 October the United States launched a

major airlift to rosupply Israel with munitions.

35

Threat

ened with an Arab oil embargo, all European countries re
fused landing rights to American planes bound for Israel-all, that is, except Portugal.

Jet transports carrying muni

tions were allowed to refuel in the Azores--thus enabling
them to carry heavier cargoes.

Skyhawk fighter-bombers bound

for Israel landed at Lajes, refueling again from U. S. air-^
craft carriers in the Mediterranean.

36

The Portuguese assisted

the airlift even after the Arab oil embargo was imposed upon
37
them,
an action quite in keeping with the centuries-old
Portuguese tradition of scrupulous adherence to the terms of
their alliances.

During the tense days of the "Yom Kippur"

war, the strategic value of the Azores was dramatized as it
had not been since World War II.
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger paid an official
visit to Portugal almost immediately after the end of the
war (17-18 December 1973).

38

At the Azores base, whose value

^'^Marvin Kalb and Bernard Kalb, Kissinger (Boston: Little,
Brown, 1974), p. 459.
35
Facts on File Yearbook, vol. 33 (New York: Facts on
File, Inc. , 1973), p. 859.
^^New York Times, 25 October 1975.
^^Ibid., 11 November 1973.
7O
'U.S., Department of State, Department of State Bulletin 70 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, Janu
ary 14 , 1974) , 1803:26.
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had just been emphasized was due to lapse in February, 1974,
negotiations began for its renewal.

39

Before a new agreement

could be reached, however, the first political changes in
five decades--cataclyamic changes--took place in Portugal.
Serious problems were created for the United States and
Portugal's other NATO partners.

Overnight, Portuguese poli

tics became a major American concern.
Antonio Salazar, for all his remarkable abilities, in
the end joined the lengthy list of despots who lived and
ruled too long.

On 17 September 1968 he suffered a near-fatal

stroke which left him comatose and paralyzed.Ten days
later Salazar was succeeded as premier by Dr. Marcelo Caetano.

41

42
Never recovering completely, the old dictator died 27 July 1970.
The "Estado Novo" did not long outlive Salazar.
foundations had decayed away.

Its

Under Salazar, Portugal had en

joyed political stability at the price of repression and eco
nomic stagnation.

The poorest of western European states,

postwar Portugal depended heavily on tourism and the migration
of workers to more prosperous countries for economic survival.
39
U.S., Senate, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Portugal
in Transition (Washington, C.D.: Government Printing Office,
T975J , p. 12.
'^'^New York Times, 18 September 1968.
41
42

Ibid., 27 September 1968.

Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1969 and 1970,
vol. 17 ^LondoTT: Kees ing ' s Pul^l icat ions , Ltd. , 1969-1970),
p. 24108.
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The regime was finally ruined by the colonies to which
Salazar clung so obstinately.

By 1974 an array of 200,000

men was locked in stalemate with African nationalist guerrillas in all three mainland colonies.

43

burden was more than Portugal could bear.

In the end the
More immediately

dangerous to the government was the alienation of its ulti
mate support--the armed forces.

Faced with the prospect of

endless war, influenced by the Marxist doctrines of the very
enemies they were fighting, the younger officers turned
against the regime.

44

Caetano, a well-meaning but half

hearted reformer, had none of Salazar's prestige.
On 25 April 1974 Caetano was overthrown by an almost
bloodless military coup.^^

The new government, an interim

military regime controlled by the "Armed Forces Movement,"
pledged decolonization, establishment of democracy, and social
reform.

It also proclaimed its continued adherence to its

46
international engagements, "especially with N.A.T.O."
The "Revolution of Flowers" was almost universally wel
comed both at home and abroad.

The establishment of democracy

and the withdrawal of Portugal from its futile colonial cam43

Kenneth Maxwell, "The Thorns of the Portuguese Revolu
tion," Foreign Affairs 54 (1975):253.
'^^New York Times, 26 April 1974.
45

Portugal in Transition, p. 1.

'^^Portugal, Ministry of Mass Communications, Provisional
Government, the Men and the Programme (Lisbon: Minis try of
Mass Communications, ^974), pT TT.
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paigns were objectives which Portugal's allies could happily
support.

Within months the new government, run by military

men with little political experience, drifted alarmingly
close to chaos and left-wing extremism.

Especially disturb

ing to Portugal's allies was the rapid growth in power and
influence of the Portuguese Communist Party, newly emerged
from the underground.^^

The Communists were well organized

and had many supporters in the Armed Forces Movement.
The specter of a Communist-controlled Portugal raised
some alarming possibilities.

Politically, it meant increas

ing pressure on the unstable states of southern Europe-Spain, Greece, and above all, Italy, moving them toward the
extreme left.

Strategically, the loss of the Azores bases

would severely damage the military capabilities of the NATO
alliance.

Soviet access to the islands was the most night

marish possibility of all.
It soon became clear that the Azoreans were not in sym
pathy with the leftward drift of mainland Portugal.

The

islanders, as often in their history, were out of step with
Lisbon,.

There was little left-wing sentiment in the Azores.

The islanders were strongly tied to the United States, not
only by economic benefits derived from the Lajes base, but
the large Azorean immigrant communities in New England and
California.

A movement for Azorean independence arose, and

^^"Portugal Moves to the Left," Orbis 19 (1975):14.

161
for the first time since their discovery it seemed possible
that the islands might secede from Portugal.

48

In Portugal itself increasingly bitter strife between
the various factions which had emerged after the revolution
threatened civil war.

The crisis came on 25 November 1975

when a left-wing coup, in which the Communists and their
allies in the government were implicated, was crushed.
influence of the left has declined greatly since.

The

The vic

tory of the anti-Communist Socialists in subsequent elections
and the recent election of General Ramalho Eanes, who put
down the November coup, as President of Portugal, has eased
NATO concern with Portuguese problems.

But no one is yet

certain that the Portuguese revolution is over; the country
still faces difficult economic problems.

Its violent phase

does seem to have ended--while it lasted world attention was
fixed on Portugal and the Portuguese islands, whose vital
role was brought forcefully to the notice of the other NATO
powers, a role which was based on the importance of their
strategic location.

^^Time, "The Azores: Unrest in a Way Station," 18 August
1975 , pT~TS.

CONCLUSION

During the Second World War Portugal's
position on the edge of the Atlantic pre
vented its association with the Fascist
powers, and kept it neutral in the first
phase of the war. An Atlantic orientation
obliged it to grant base facilities in the
Azores to the major Western Powers, Great
Britain and the U. S., at the very moment
the Axis's Atlantic and Mediterranean
power position had weakened considerably.
With the emergence of the Cold War and
the increasing fear of a major conven
tional Soviet attack on Western Europe
in the late forties and early fifties,
the strategic importance of Portugal's
Atlantic islands and continental coast
increased tremendously. Portugal became
a vital component in Western Containment
policy and in the Pentagon's plans for
an aerial encirclement of the Soviet
U n i o n . . . .1
Thus, Luc Crollen summarized admirably Portugal's role in
world affairs during some recent and eventful years.

Con

tained within this short passage are phrases which can be
applied, however, to a much wider time span:

"Portugal's

position on the edge of the Atlantic;" her "Atlantic orien
tation," the "strategic importance of Portugal's Atlantic
islands and continental coast" are the keys to much of Portu
gal's history.

Not so much her internal history, although

domestic events and external pressures never remain uncon-

^Crollen, "Portugal," p. 95.
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nected for long, but certainly her international history,
her role in the European and Atlantic community have been
determined by her location.
The definition of strategic location offered at the
beginning of this study emphasized the importance of geo
graphical position as a factor in history.

A distinction

was made between temporary and permanent strategic location,
the latter being the condition of being so situated that
location alone affects the outcome of a series of histori
cal situations.

Strategic location is most important when

it involves the control of communication, the routes of
movement and transportation that are utterly vital to civi
lized life.

The Portuguese case is one of the best examples

available of the influence of strategic location on the con
trol of communications.

The Portuguese were the pioneers of

oceanic transportation, a role they could hardly have played
if they had not first possessed a territory excellently
suited to maritime ventures, and in the course of those ven
tures discovered and colonized a group of islands at the
crossroads of the North Atlantic.
No one planned it that way, of course.

Portugal's

origins and early history were as much the creatures of
happenstance as those of any nation, but location allowed
Portugal some crucial advantages which were exploited skill
fully at critical times in her history.

The developments

which permitted Portugal to lead the way into the Atlantic
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Ocean are inseparable from her position at the southwestern
corner o£ Europe.

From their historical experience, such

Portuguese empire builders as Afonso de Albuquerque derived
a keen appreciation of the power inherent in properly situ
ated islands and coastal harbors.

Strategic bases were tlie

linchpins of Portuguese dominion in the Indian Ocean, the
foundation of Portugal's century of greatness.
The Portuguese empire, however, is not much more than
an episode compared with the Anglo-Portuguese Alliance.

The

link between Portugal and Britain was the most enduring in
European history, and the prime example of an alliance based
on strategic advantages.

Britain and Portugal were not held

together by natural affinities.

In the fourteenth century

the two societies were somewhat similar, both being feudal
monarchies, but over the centuries they drifted apart.
Eventually they became as dissimilar in their politics,
economies, and social structures as any two states in Europe.
The economic advantages each country gained from the Alliance
were not decisive, being merely by-products of the political
alliance.

Portugal could have sold her wine and sardines

elsewhere; to Britain Portugal was a profitable but not in
dispensable market.
The Alliance was so enduring because it was based on
permanent strategic factors.

To Britain Portugal offered

two, things--the use of the splendid harbor of Lisbon and an
entryway into the Iberian peninsula whenever a British presence

165
there was desired, and the use herself (or the denial to her
enemies of the use, which might be equally important) of
Portugal's islands as bases to control the Atlantic seaways.
Thus the two roles, one associated primarily with continental
Portugal, the other witli the Azores, that Portugal played in
Britain's maritime•strategy.
And what did Portugal gain in return?

Protection.

Sel

dom strong enough to stand alone against outside threats,
Portugal always had a powerful ally to which she could turn.
On the only occasion in Portuguese history that such a threat
arose and England could not offer aid, the crisis after King
Sebastian's death in 1571, the result was national disaster
for Portugal and ultimately increased danger for England.
When Portugal won back her independence the Alliance with
Britain was swiftly revived, and endured as long as Britain's
power remained.

Thereafter, Portugal was shielded by Britain,

sometimes against her Spanish neighbor, but also against Louis
XIV, Napoleon, and Hitler.
Portugal paid a price for British protection.
always comfortable to be a client-state.

It is not

She submitted to

British economic dominance, and mostly during the early nine
teenth century, some British involvement in her internal
affairs.

But for Portugal it was a price worth paying.

To

tally untrammeled national sovereignty is an abstraction and
not a reality, especially for small states.

In practice the

British were willing to tolerate almost any Portuguese regime

166
that would observe the Alliance.

Client status was greatly

to be preferred to the most likely alternative, absorption
into Spain.

And as Salazar has been only the latest Portu

guese ruler to prove, even the weak have tlieir assets, which
can win them much if exploited skillfully.

And Portugal's

great asset was strategic location.
When the United States replaced Britain in her timehonored Atlantic role, Portugal almost immediately began to
play the same part, for the same reasons, in the American
scheme.

Demonstrably Portugal's strategic value was not

simply a by-product of British greatness.

No one can pre

dict what will befall Portugal and her islands in the future.
But it is a safe assumption that their strategic location,
significant from the age of the caravel to the age of the
C-5A transport plane, is in no danger of losing importance
soon.
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